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ABSTRACT 
Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union 
Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern 
armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state 
of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in 
muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive 
potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence 
planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in 
September 1939.  
The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable 
armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established 
in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African 
defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland 
was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South 
Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. 
The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a 
situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the 
South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned 
that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, 
was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to 
East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and 
employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the 
Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the 
tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes 
paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing 
Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of 
operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the 
campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the 
SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF 
gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African 
armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war. 
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OPSOMMING 
Na Suid-Afrika se toetrede tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op 6 September 1939, het die 
Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) verander vanaf ‘n verouderde vredestydse weermag na ‘n 
moderne  mag met offensiewe projeksievermoëns.  Gedurende die tussenoorlogperiode het 
‘n gevoel van swaarmoedigheid in terme van militêre inovasie in die UVM geheers.  Die 
resultaat hiervan was verwarde denke ten opsigte van pantseroorlogvoering en 
meganisasie.  Die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeplanners het nie die offensiewe potensiaal 
van pantsermagte verstaan nie.  Die gevolg was dat die UVM in September 1939 slegs oor 
‘n simboliese pantsermag beskik het. 
 Die Suid-Afrikaanse toetrede tot die oorlog het die stukrag vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n 
lewensvatbare pantsermag binne die UVM verleen.  Gevolglik is die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Tenkkorps (SATK) in Mei 1940 gestig.  Veranderinge in beide die aard en organisatoriese 
struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsinstellings het gevolg.  Die Italiaanse 
teenwoordigheid in Abessinië en Italiaans-Somaliland is as ‘n direkte bedreiging vir die 
aangrensende Britse Oos-Afrika gebiede gesien.  In Junie 1940, kort na die Italiaanse 
oorlogsverklaring, is Suid-Afrikaanse magte  na Kenia ontplooi. 
 Die UVM ontplooiing na Oos-Afrika was die eerste in ‘n gereelde oorlogsituasie 
sedert die Eerste Wêreldoorlog.  Ten spyte van die doktrine wat die Suid-Afrikaanse 
ontplooiing van pantsermagte na Oos-Afrika ondersteun het, het die SATK-eenhede gou 
geleer dat die aanvaarde doktrine, ontleen aan die Britse Ministerie van Oorlog gedurende 
die tussenoorlogsjare, slegs ‘n gids was tot offensiewe aanwending.  Die storie van die Suid-
Afrikaanse ontplooiing in Oos-Afrika gedurende die oorlog, word as ‘n lens gebruik waardeur 
die rol en aanwending van beide die UVM se pantserkarre en ligte tenks ondersoek word.  
Die geallieerde offensiewe deur Italiaans-Somaliland en suidelike Abessiniȅ gedurende 1940 
– 1941 illustreer duidelik dat die taktiese en operasionele aanwending van die Suid-
Afrkaanse pantsermagte gedurende hierdie tydperk van groot belang was vir die suksesse 
en mislukkings van die veldtog.  Die aard van die opponerende  magte in Oos-Afrika, die 
voortdurend veranderende topografie en klimaat van die operasionele teater, asook die aard 
van die Suid-Afrikaanse offensiewe operasies gedurende die veldtog, het  gekombineer om 
die unieke manier waarop die pantserkarre en tenks van die UVM van 1940 tot 1941 
aangewend is, te vorm.  Die operasionele ervarings wat die UVM opgedoen het gedurende 
die Oos-Afrika Veldtog, het die verdere ontplooiings van Suid-Afrikaanse pantser na Noord-
Afrika, Madagaskar en Italiȅ gedurende die res van die oorlog gevorm. 
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TERMINOLOGY 
The terminology used throughout the thesis is based upon the historical context of the time 
and the archival documentation available at the Department of Defence Documentation 
Centre (DOD Archives) surrounding the South African deployment to East Africa during 
1940-1941. As such, care has been taken to refer to both geographical and political features 
in their historical context, as mentioned in Harry Klein’s 1965 text Springboks in Armour: 
The South African Armoured Cars in World War II.1  For instance, Gimma is today known 
as Jimma, and Abyssinia known as Ethiopia. The use of metric units is adhered to 
throughout the text; though in the original sources, distances were often expressed in miles. 
The military terminology used throughout the thesis, can at times be confusing. While care 
has been taken to avoid the use of overly complicated military terminology, a number of 
military terms should be explained as contained within the manuals that guided the South 
African employment of armour in East Africa during the Second World War.2  
Line Ahead Formation:  “Each tank or vehicle following one behind the other, is the 
simplest of all formations, and is normally used for road 
movement...Although ‘line ahead’ will seldom be used by a 
regiment, or even by  a squadron, it will frequently be used by 
a troop. Not only does this formation enable a troop to make 
full use of ground and cover, and to pass through defiles, but it 
can also be most effectively used in action when moving on 
the enemy’s flank or parallel to this line of advance. ‘Line 
ahead’ then enables a troop to bring the full firepower of all its 
guns against the enemy, whether he is unarmoured and static, 
or armoured and mobile“.3 
Line Abreast Formation:  “Each vehicle facing to its front...A troop in ‘Line’ is able to 
direct all its fire to the front and, therefore, this troop formation 
possesses tactical significance. Its use, however, will be 
confined to occasions when there is reasonable security on 
both flanks so that tanks (armoured cars) may not mask each 
                                                        
1  H. Klein, Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War II 
(Johannesburg : Purnell & Sons, 1965). 
2  DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Collection – UDF Armoured Car 
Training Manual 1940 (Volume I & II) and DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted 
Pamphlet Collection, War Office Military Training Pamphlet No. 41 (Part 2) – The tactical 
handling of the Armoured Division and its components: The Armoured Regiment. 
3  DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Collection, War Office Military Training 
Pamphlet No. 41 (Part 2) – The tactical handling of the Armoured Division and its 
components: The Armoured Regiment. 
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other’s fire if a flank attack is made against them, and so be 
destroyed in detail”.4 
 
Fig 1: Armoured Platoon Formations.5 
Wedge Formation: “The one up formation consists of having one squadron in 
advance and the remaining two approximately abreast in rear 
of it. It is normally used in battle for the penetration of an 
enemy position, since its arrow-head shape is peculiarly 
suitable for this purpose. The two up formation is used where 
two squadrons lead and are followed by a third moving 
centrally. It is employed in battle when the frontage to be 
attacked is too wide for one squadron, and is in fact an 
inverted arrow-head. Both these formations represent a rough 
triangle and are generally the most practical methods of 
                                                        
4  Ibid. 
5  DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Collection – UDF Armoured Car 
Training Manual 1940 (Volume I & II). 
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moving troops when little information is available regarding the 
enemy. Either formation permits of two out of the three 
vehicles utilising their fire power while the third vehicle retains 
its power of manoeuvre with a view to assisting the remainder 
of its troop”.6 
Herringbone Formation:   When under attack from aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles 
(AFV) travelling in a line ahead formation will veer off the road 
in intervals so as to try and minimise losses. The herringbone 
formation allows the armoured cars and tanks to deploy 
defensively at a moment’s notice by simply deploying to the left 
and the right of their formation in intervals. 
Hull Down Position:  Hull down is a position taken up by an AFV so that its hull 
(body) is concealed behind a crest or other raised object. The 
turret of the vehicle remains exposed, this allows the armoured 
car or tanks to observe their immediate surroundings and fire 
upon potential targets, while the hull of the vehicle is protected 
from direct fire. 
Fire-Belt Action: A fire-belt action occurs when a commander orders all 
available vehicles under his command to fire all of their 
weaponry at a specific target or area. Whilst the fire-belt action 
is similar to suppressive fire, the former is sustained for a 
longer period of time or until all the ammunition within the 
ammunition belt of the weapon is expended.  
                                                        
6  DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Collection, War Office Military Training 
Pamphlet No. 41 (Part 2) – The tactical handling of the Armoured Division and its 
components: The Armoured Regiment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mobile forces are, according to military analysts and popular writers, South Africa’s national 
arm.7 Both Boer and British military traditions which shaped the strategic, operational and 
tactical employment of military forces in Southern Africa are largely based on mounted 
operations which conferred a high degree of mobility in African contexts. The ability of these 
forces to manoeuvre and deliver a high volume of firepower where needed ensured that from 
the early days of the commando, through the Anglo-Boer War, and on to the UDF 
deployments to German South-West and German East Africa during the First World War, 
mobile operations became the mainstay of the South African way of war.8 Throughout the 
1920s and 1930s a worldwide growth in terms of mechanised and armoured forces was 
evident. The development of these forces naturally brought about considerable changes in 
military organisation, training and doctrine, and key concepts which underpinned global 
cycles of military innovation in armoured warfare. In the Union of South Africa the 
possibilities that armour might confer were not fully realised at this time and interwar 
thinking, despite being geared at preparing soldiers for deployment in Africa, failed to 
appreciate the mobility, firepower, and protection which armour offered. At times, it seemed 
as if the theoretical concepts of mobility and manoeuvre warfare were forgotten by South 
African defence planners. The token armoured forces which the UDF possessed during the 
interwar period were mainly used during policing actions and, as such, saw little operational 
deployment in southern Africa.9 
Harry Klein, author of the keystone text on South African armoured deployments in 
East and North Africa during the Second World War,10  states that the South African national 
arm, which was honed and perfected during previous conflicts, ensured the successful 
employment of South African armour during the East African campaign of the Second World 
                                                        
7  Klein, Springboks in Armour, p. vii and J.J. Collyer, The Campaign in German South West 
Africa, 1914-1915 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1937) p. 165-173, as well as J.J. Collyer, 
The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa, 1916 (Pretoria: Government 
Printer, 1939) p. v-xvii and DOD Archives, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Group 2, Box 
519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in connection with matters discussed with the Minister by 
Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha at and Collyer at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 
1936. For a more contemporary interpretation of this school of thought see R. De Vries, Eye 
of the Firestorm: Strength Lies in Mobility (Tyger Valley: Naledi, 2013) and R. De Vries, 
Mobiele Oorlogvoering: ‘n Perspektief vir Suider Afrika (Menlopark: Harman Uitgewers, 1987). 
8  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914-1915, pp. 170-173 and Collyer, 
The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa, 1916, pp. xiv-xvii. 
9  W. Murray, ‘Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences’ In: W. Murray 
and A.R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998) pp. 6-29 and Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts in German East 
Africa, 1916, pp. xiv-xvii and B. Perrett, Iron Fist: Classic Armoured Warfare (London: Cassell, 
1998) pp. 9-11. 
10  Klein, Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War II, 
(Johannesburg: Purnell& Sons, 1965). 
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War. The UDF possessed barely any armour at the outbreak of war in 1939. A series of 
major changes in the organisation, training and doctrine of the UDF occurred between 
September 1939 and the first South African operational deployments to East Africa in mid-
1940. This naturally shaped the evolution of the South African armoured forces.11 In his 
recent memoir12, Maj Gen (Ret.) Roland de Vries commented on the conditions necessary 
for mobile warfare to flourish in Africa, an idea that was partly shaped by the first South 
African armoured deployment to East Africa during 1940-1941. De Vries argues that:  
“In mobile warfare it is necessary to ensure maximum fluidity of movement 
on the battlefield...and then to bring about tactical victory by seizing fleeting 
opportunities that follow any ensuing confusion. After all, Africa has the 
space for manoeuvring in great strides. The only things that could restrict our 
degree of mobility were the problem of logistics and the burdens brought 
about by distances and difficult terrain, when mobility was reduced by heavy 
equipment such as towed artillery and vehicles. In truth, the latter was one of 
the reasons, I believed, why enemies in Africa favoured positional warfare ... 
Fortunately, our equipment ... was designed and built specifically for African 
bush warfare ... with its amazing cross-country and bush-breaking ability, 
operational range and fire power ...”13  
 
Literature Review 
The literature covering the South African deployment to East Africa during 1940-1941, is 
scant at best. The first book to appear, on the South African deployment to East Africa, was 
Carel Birkby’s 1941 Springbok Victory.14 Other wartime publications, including Simpson’s 
South Africa Fights15 and Pollock’s biography of Pienaar16, although published to bolster 
wartime morale, have their merit and go some way to explain the South African successes 
during the offensives in Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia. Although propagandistic, they 
provide an interesting account. 
It is perhaps surprising, considering the role played by South African armour in the 
success of the Allied campaigns in Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia, that a single volume 
                                                        
11  Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa, 1916, pp. xiv-xvii. 
12  R. De Vries, Eye of the Firestorm: Strength Lies in Mobility (Tyger Valley: Naledi, 2013). 
13  De Vries, Eye of the Firestorm: Strength Lies in Mobility, pp. 194-195. 
14  C. Birkby, Springbok Victory (Cape Town: Libertas Publications, 1941). 
15  J.S.M. Simpson, South Africa Fights (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1941). 
16  A.M. Pollock, Pienaar of Alamein: The Life Story of a Great South African Soldier (Cape 
Town: Cape Times Limited, 1943). 
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covers the exact topic. Harry Klein’s Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured 
Cars in World War II, which appeared in 1965, addresses the South African deployment of 
armour during the East African and North African campaigns. Although an invaluable source, 
the publication suffers from a number of flaws. Klein was an armoured car company 
commander in East Africa and he barely attempts objectivity in his analysis of the successes 
and failures of the South African armour operations. Furthermore, Klein fails to address, in 
any detail, the interwar developments in terms of armour, internationally or in South Africa. 
A number of official histories on South Africa’s participation in the Second World War 
appeared. However, the Union War Histories Section, tasked with writing these histories, 
was closed down permanently after the appearance of only three publications: Crisis in the 
Desert (1952)17, The Sidi Rezegh Battles 1941 (1957)18, and War in the Southern 
Oceans (1961)19. Although planned, an official history of the South African deployment to 
East Africa during the Second World War did not appear and this was left to Neil Orpen, who 
worked under an Advisory Committee on Military History, formed at the initiative of a number 
of veteran’s organisations, and through the good offices of George Brink, to ensure that the 
publication programme of the Union War Histories Section would continue.20 Orpen, and 
James Ambrose Brown to a certain extent, lent renewed vigour. In terms of the East African 
Campaign, Orpen had an immediate success in 1968 with the publication of the first volume 
of this South African Forces in World War II series, titled East African and Abyssinian 
Campaigns21. Though essentially a campaign history, the book is the most complete 
publication to have appeared in terms of explaining the South African operations in East 
Africa in 1940-1941. Unlike Klein, a journalist before the war, Orpen was recognised as one 
of the leading South African military historians of the time. By 1979, Orpen and H.J. Martin 
published South Africa at War22, a book which helped to explain the South African home 
front during the war, as well as covering crucial aspects on development of the UDF during 
the interwar period. Orpen’s contribution to the military historiography on the UDF’s 
campaign in East Africa remains immense: he would also produce the first volume of Salute 
                                                        
17  J. Agar-Hamilton and L. Turner, Crisis in the Desert, May-June 1942 (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1952). 
18  J. Agar-Hamilton and L. Turner, The Sidi Rezegh Battles, 1941 (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1957). 
19  L. Turner, H. Gordon-Cumming and J. Betzler, War in the Southern Oceans, 1939-1945 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
20  I.J. van der Waag, 2003, ‘Contested Histories: Official History and the South African Military in 
the Twentieth Century’ in J. Grey (ed), The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the 
United States and British Commonwealth (Westport: Praeger, 2003) pp. 36-41.  
21  N. Orpen, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 1: East Africa and Abyssinian 
Campaigns (Cape Town: Purnell, 1968). 
22  H.J. Martin and N. Orpen, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 7: South Africa at War: 
Military and Industrial Organization and Operations in connection with the conduct of the War, 
1939-1945 (Cape Town: Purnell, 1979). 
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the Sappers (1981)23, which covered the South African Engineer Corps (SAEC) 
deployments to the East and North African theatres during the war. The book helped to 
understand the influence of geography on the offensive operations undertaken by the UDF 
in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland during 1940-1941. 
Birkby produced a further book which added to the literature available on South 
Africa and the participation of the UDF in the Second World War. His 1987 biography24 of 
George Brink, the erstwhile commander of the 1st South African Division (1st SA Div) allows 
for an interesting view on the strategic, operational, and often political decisions behind the 
South African campaign in East Africa. He also adds valuable insights on the innovative 
employment of South African armoured cars and tanks throughout this campaign and allows 
further interpretation of the South African employment of armour, including the success and 
in East Africa.  
However, there is very little corps history. Of the nine volumes (collectively known as 
the ‘Black Publications’) produced by the Directorate Documentation Services of the SADF, 
between 1968 and 1989, five specifically focus on the history of the infantry, the Special 
Service Battalion (SSB), artillery, signallers, and the medics. By 1994, whilst work was 
underway to publish a history of the engineers, the ‘Black Publications’ ceased to be funded, 
and the series ceased.25 
In 1990, James Ambrose Brown26 produced, as part of Ashanti Publishing’s South 
Africa at War series, The War of a Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia 
1940-1941. Whilst adding to the military historiography available on the South African 
campaign in East Africa, Brown failed to add new information and perspectives on the 
subject. The publication fails to account for a number of operations in which South African 
armour was involved, and essentially concludes that the ‘South African’ participation in East 
Africa ended after Addis Ababa was liberated on 6 April 1941. In 1996, whilst celebrating 
their 50th birthday celebrations, the South African Armoured Corps published a special 
commemorative publication27 celebrating the occasion. Only eight pages of the publication 
were dedicated to the early history of the South African armour during the Second World 
                                                        
23  N. Orpen and H.J. Martin, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 8: Salute the Sappers – 
Part 1 (Johannesburg: Sappers Association, 1981). 
24  C. Birkby, Uncle George: The Boer Boyhood, Letters and Battles of Lieutenant-General 
George Edwin Brink (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1987). 
25  I.J. van der Waag, 1997, ‘The Writing of Military History in South Africa’ in South African 
Military Yearbook 1997 (Pretoria: Prestige, 1997) pp. 24-26. 
26  J. Ambrose Brown, The War of a Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia 1940-
41 (Johannesburg: Ashanti, 1990). 
27  J. French (ed.), South African Armoured Corps 50th Birthday: 18 October 1946 – 18 October 
1996 (Pretoria: Armour Association, 1996). 
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War, with no new archival research or appraisals undertaken. Gustav Bentz28, writing for a 
special 2012 issue of Scientia Militaria, provided some fresh perspectives on the campaign. 
Although his approach is limited to an analysis of the battle of El Wak, Bentz fails to provide 
a distinct analysis of the role of the South African armour during the El Wak attack. This 
article is essentially a reduction of Bentz’s 2013 MMil dissertation29, in which he devotes an 
entire chapter to the South African deployment to East Africa, but fails to discuss the role of 
infantry and armour cooperation, an element which remained paramount throughout the 
South African deployment to East Africa.  
On the technological front, William Marshall published a book titled Marmon 
Herrington: A History of the South African Reconnaissance Car30 in 2013. Although 
making a contribution, Marshall does not provide a military historical analysis of the South 
African employment of armour, in East Africa or elsewhere. The strength of Marshall’s work, 
however, lies in the fact that it brings fresh insights in terms of the technical aspects of the 
armoured cars that were produced by South Africa and deployed during the Second World 
War. 
There is no recent analysis of the East African campaign and no analysis of the 
South African employment of armour in this campaign, nor any MA or PhD studies focussing 
on this specific subject. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
Research Aim and Chapter Structure 
The aim of this study is to investigate and discuss the role and employment of the South 
African armour during the Allied campaign fought in East Africa 1940-1941. Based upon 
extensive archival research, this thesis will not only evaluate the nature, organisation, and 
the doctrine that underpinned the South African armour deployments to East Africa, but 
discuss the process of innovation that occurred within the UDF throughout the interwar 
period in terms of armoured warfare. The thesis furthermore provides a fresh perspective on 
the East African campaign, and the important role which the South African armoured forces 
played in the first victorious Allied campaign of the Second World War. The thesis primarily 
focusses on the role which the South African armoured cars and light tanks played in the 
campaign, and does not discuss the role of the motorcycle units which also formed part of 
                                                        
28  G. Bentz, 2012, ‘From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of 
Battle in East and North Africa, 1940-1941’ in Scientia Militaria, 40 (3). 
29  G. Bentz, Fighting Springboks - C Company, Royal Natal Carbineers: From Premier Mine to 
Po Valley, 1939-1945. MMil Thesis Stellenbosch University (2013). 
30  W. Marshall, Marmon Herrington: A History of the South African Reconnaissance Car 
(Warsaw: Model Centrum Progres, 2013). 
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the SATC. This is due to the negligible role which the motorcycle units played in the 
campaign. When considering that South African armour deployed to North Africa, 
Madagascar and Italy for the remainder of the war, the experiences gained in Abyssinia and 
Italian Somaliland throughout 1940-1941, shaped the employment of the UDF armoured 
forces for the rest of the war. Whilst not a regimental, campaign or personal military history, 
the thesis straddles the strata of war, and thus provides fresh insights on the operational and 
tactical employment of South African armour in East Africa. 
In order to achieve this aim, the study has the following secondary objectives. The 
narrative is constructed over six chapters: two introductory chapters are followed by three 
core chapters addressing the operations in East Africa, while the sixth chapter is an analysis 
of chapters three, four and five. The first chapter focuses on the South African state of 
defence during the interwar period, and analyses the changes that occurred in the strategic, 
organisational, and doctrinal environments of the UDF prior to the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The melancholic state of the UDF, and interwar defence thinking, is explored, in 
order to adequately explain the state of mechanisation prevalent within the UDF prior to the 
outbreak of the Second World War. The outbreak of the Second World War is discussed as 
the impetus of growth for a viable armoured force within the UDF. The second chapter 
primarily deals with the East African theatre of operations during the period immediately 
preceding the launch of the Allied offensive operations. By commenting on the nature of the 
East African theatre of operations, as experienced by the South African troops in 1940-1941, 
this chapter provides insights into the South African and British threat perception and the 
quality of the Italian troops they faced in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. The Italian 
declaration of war in June 1940 is discussed, and the subsequent South African armoured 
deployment in East Africa is evaluated as the UDF prepared for the coming offensives and 
underwent their first baptisms of fire. 
The third, fourth and fifth chapters deal specifically with the South African armoured 
deployment in the East African theatre throughout 1940-1941. Whilst the thesis generally 
follows a chronological approach, these three core chapters are organised thematically in 
order to effectively discuss the South African armoured operations along the operational and 
tactical levels of war. Chapter three focuses on the 1st South African Infantry Brigade and its 
offensive employment through Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia during 1940-1941, but the 
primary focus, however, remains on the employment of armoured cars and tanks as the 
campaign unfolded through to the battles of Dessie (25 April 1941) and Amba Alagi (19 May 
1941). Chapter four focuses on the 1st South African Division and the offensives launched 
through South-Western Abyssinia and discusses the various roles in which the South Africa 
armour was employed up until the capture of Mega (18 February 1941). Chapter five deals 
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with the cases where South African armoured units were detached to other Allied units and 
formations, and concludes with the role South African armour played in the final battle of the 
East African campaign fought around Gondar in November 1941. These deployments can 
effectively be seen as the sideshows of the East African campaign. The thesis concludes 
with a sixth chapter that evaluates the South African doctrine for the employment of 
armoured forces throughout the East African campaign. The better understanding gained of 
the doctrine that shaped the offensive employment of the South African armoured cars and 
tanks, allows further analysis of the South African armoured operations. 
 
Methodology 
This study is an historical narrative of the operations in East Africa, with a focus on the 
employment of armour, and makes use of the historical method.  The literature is scant and 
belies the wealth of archival material, which lies for the most part in Pretoria and remains 
largely untapped. The SANDF Documentation Centre (Military Archives) in Pretoria has an 
enormous amount of material on the South African deployment to East Africa. The mainstay 
of this is nestled within the War Diaries (WD) archival group, and contains extremely 
valuable information regarding the offensive employment of armour throughout the 
campaign. Whilst collating information from war diaries, official and semi-official 
correspondence, military narratives, ciphers, and post-battle reports, it is possible to 
painstakingly reconstruct a collated narrative that covered the strategic, operational and 
tactical employment of armour throughout 1940-1941. The archival research concerning the 
interwar period was  more challenging, and all available material found on the development 
of armour within the UDF throughout this period is in just two boxes in the Chief of the 
General Staff (CGS) archival group, and some documents from the Brink Collection in the 
Acquisitions Group. 
I wrote much of the narrative between December 2013 and May 2014. During this 
time, I spent many a weekend at the Documentation Centre rechecking facts and figures, 
and adding that additional layer of research. Without the support of the Director 
Documentation Centre, Ms Louisa Jooste, the successful completion of this thesis would 
have been impossible. A constant source of inspiration, and always willing to listen to fresh 
ideas and often boring anecdotes on the use of armoured cars and tanks in East Africa, I am 
indebted for all financial, logistical and academic support that was given to me by Ms Jooste. 
To Gerald Prinsloo and Ilzé Cloete, from the Documentation Centre and the Ditsong National 
Museum of Military History respectively, thank you for providing me with superb photos 
which added immense value to this study. A special thanks is due to the South African 
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Armoured Corps, and its former, and current, General Officers Commanding. To Brig Gen 
B.C. Gildenhuys and Brig Gen A. Retief, thank you for affording me the opportunity to pursue 
my love of military history, and to have allowed me to enrol for a MMil in Military History. To 
those within the defence force that made this journey extremely difficult, thank you. You only 
managed to strengthen my resolve. 
Whilst commuting between Pretoria and Saldanha throughout 2012-2014, I was 
wined and dined, transported, encouraged, supported, and welcomed into the homes of a 
number of people. In no specific order, my heartfelt appreciation is extended to: Minnie van 
Niekerk, Barbara Kleynhans, Adina Katz, Chantal Fleischmann, Ralie Stevens, Andries and 
Welmarie Fokkens, Morne and Renske Booÿjens, Rob and Angie de Morney, Danie and 
Connie Groenewald, Ampie and Sylvia Prinsloo, Russell Cunningham, Ian and Marianne 
Liebenberg, Alwyn and Liesbet Geyser, Steve de Agrela, Ian Laubscher, Riaan Blaauw, 
Dennis Chambers, Kobus Steinmann, Gert de Beer, Martin and Daniela Tobler, Heidrun 
Tobler, and Gustav and Lientjie Bentz. Without the support and encouragement of my 
academic peers, Herman Warden, Jakobus van Aarde, Jacques de Vries, Anri Delport, Will 
Gordon and Tony Garcia, the writing of this thesis would have been far more difficult. My 
military history partner in crime throughout the last three years, David Katz (Jakkals Cohen), 
thank you for your support and encouragement. Sir, words cannot describe my gratitude.  
I am indebted to the guidance that I received from my supervisors, Lt Col (Prof) Ian 
van der Waag and Lt Col (Prof) Abel Esterhuyse. Without your encouragement, criticism, 
comments, and support, the completion of this thesis would not have been possible. To my 
folks, Flip and Annemarie Kleynhans, I am above all indebted to you for your constant 
support and encouragement throughout the past three years. Thank you for believing in me. 
To my brother, Tiaan Kleynhans, thank you for your support. 
Evert Kleynhans 
Pretoria, November 2014 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 
Chapter 1 – Melancholy, Muddles and Machines: South Africa, the Union Defence 
Force and the South African Tank Corps, 1918- 1940 
 
“Armoured Cars, owing to its limited cross-country performance, should be 
confined as far as possible to good roads or level country where full use could be 
made of its characteristic of mobility.”31 
 
Introduction 
The UDF, hamstrung by domestic politics and the post-1918 economic constraints, failed to 
develop into a modern fighting force prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in 
September 1939. The state of the South African defence force, and indeed the political 
deliberations on defence, remained wanting throughout the 1920s and 1930s.32 The South 
African Defence Act of 1912, a bone of contention regarding South African participation in 
the First World War outside of Africa, resurfaced and dominated internal political debates 
regarding the future employment of the UDF during the 1920s and 1930s.33  Meanwhile, as 
war clouds gathered again in Europe during the 1930s, South African attempts to modernise 
its military failed for political reasons.  By the time the United Kingdom declared war on 
Germany in September 1939, the South African military was unable to provide immediate 
assistance for the want of modern equipment, sufficiently-trained troops, and political 
divisions that threatened national unity.34  
The chapter has four aims. First, to investigate South Africa and its military 
preparedness during the inter-war period. Specific emphasis is placed on the various 
attempts to reorganise the UDF into an efficient defence force during the 1920s and 1930s. 
The changes that occurred in the strategic, organisational, and doctrinal environments of the 
UDF prior to the outbreak of the Second World War are also discussed. Second, the growth 
of an armoured force in the UDF prior to the outbreak of the Second World War is 
investigated. Third, the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 is discussed 
as an impetus for the growth of the UDF into a ‘modern’ fighting force. Finally, the chapter 
will conclude with the formation of the Active Citizen Force (ACF) armoured car companies, 
                                                        
31  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File 1 SA Div Operations General. Lessons of the E.A, 
Campaign – Armd Cars, undated. 
32  I.J. van der Waag, ‘The UDF Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1940’ in Scientia Militaria, 
30 (2), 2000, pp. 183-219. 
33  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, p. 16. 
34 Klein, Springboks in Armour, p. 1. 
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established between September 1939 and June 1940, and the subsequent growth of the 
SATC prior to the commencement of the Allied campaign in East Africa. When these four 
aims are combined, the melancholic state of the UDF during the interwar period will be 
highlighted, the muddles of South African interwar defence thinking will become known, and 
the state of mechanisation within the UDF prior to, and shortly, after the outbreak of the 
Second World War will be better understood. 
 
The South African Experience during the First World War 
Following the political unification of the four British crown colonies of the Transvaal Colony, 
the Orange River Colony, the Cape Colony, and the Natal Colony in 1910, the First World 
War was indeed South Africa’s first experience as a belligerent in a scenario of total war.35 
After the quelling of the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion within the Union, South Africa had notable 
successes in the campaigns in German South-West Africa, German East Africa, and the 
Middle East. At best categorised as ‘small wars’, these campaigns had few battlefield 
casualties when coupled to their successes. It was in Europe, however, where South Africa 
would receive first-hand experience of the all-encompassing nature of total war, where entire 
nations mobilised and the death toll surpassed that of any other ‘modern’ war to date.36 The 
South African participation during the campaigns on the Western Front were, however, 
immediately more costly in manpower, for the South African Brigade in France lost more 
than four-fifths of its men by the cessation of hostilities in 1918.37 
The nature of the campaigns fought in Europe was vastly different from those 
conducted in Africa during the First World War; the latter were also more aligned to the 
South African nature of warfare38, despite the general belief that “[f]or warfare in tropical 
Africa troops other than native Africans had proved in general unsuited”39 due to the disease 
factor. The campaign in German South-West Africa, most notably, suited the South African 
approach towards warfare, as it was dominated by highly mobile operations carried out 
                                                        
35 I.J. van der Waag, ‘All splendid, but horrible: The Politics of South Africa’s Second “Little Bit” 
and the War on the Western Front, 1915-1918’ in Scientia Militaria, 40 (3), 2012, p.99. 
36  B. Nasson, Springboks on the Somme: South Africa in the Great War 1914-1918 
(Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 123-155. 
37  G. Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War (London: Cassell, 
2004) p. 284 and V. Alhadeff, South Africa in Two World Wars: A Newspaper History (Cape 
Town: Don Nelson Publishers, 2nd Edition - 2013), pp. 41-43. 
38  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in connection with 
matters discussed with the Minister by Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha and Collyer 
at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 1936, undated. 
39  Birkby, Uncle George, p. 59. 
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mainly by mounted infantry.40 Similarly, the campaign in German East Africa was dominated 
by wide flanking movements which may be linked directly to the South African notion of 
mobile warfare.41 Static fronts, trench warfare, and the preponderance of massive artillery 
barrages, however, dominated the battlefields of Europe and deployment in Europe 
precluded the use of the mounted arm, except during the opening phases in September and 
October of 1914, as warfare remained almost entirely static. In fact, Brig Gen John Collyer, 
wartime CGS, argued in 1937 that the mobility, and indeed efficiency, of the South African 
Infantry Brigade in France was severely curtailed during the static role which it was 
employed in during the offensives on the Western Front.42 
 
Fig 1.1: South African soldiers next to British armoured car in East Africa circa 191643 
However, it was also on the Western front that South African troops were introduced 
to one of the single largest innovations of the Great War. Tanks, developed to permit the 
                                                        
40  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 944. Memorandum on problems involved in 
preparing a Manual on Bush Warfare, 12 January 1937. 
41  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 944. Memorandum on problems involved in 
preparing a Manual on Bush Warfare,- 12 January 1937 and Collyer, The South Africans with 
General Smuts in German East Africa, 191, pp. 266-277 as well as Collyer, The Campaign in 
German South West Africa, 1914-1915, pp. 155-173. 
42 DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 944. Memorandum on problems involved in 
preparing a Manual on Bush Warfare, 12 January 1937. 
43  DOD Archives, Photographic Repository. 991000974 - Rolls Royce Armoured Car in GEA, 
WW1. 
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advance between the trenches through its superior mobility and firepower, and strike a 
devastating blow to enemy defences and morale, had notable successes at, amongst other, 
the battles of Amiens.44 Despite some battlefield successes, tanks remained heavy, 
cumbersome, weapons which did not offer much manoeuvrability on the battlefields of 
Europe, characterised by limited vision, extreme discomfort, and general unreliability on the 
battlefield. Despite negativity regarding the battle handling of tanks, AFV were successfully 
utilised in a series of offensives in secondary theatres,45 including the deployment of a 
section of armoured cars during the campaigns in German South-West Africa and East 
Africa.46 In these theatres South African soldiers experienced the potential of armoured 
forces first-hand. By armistice, the full potential of the tank on the battlefield had not been 
realised by the European belligerents. Tanks were relegated to an infantry support 
weapon47,  a notion that was still prevalent in many countries, including Britain and the 
Dominions, at the outbreak of the Second World War twenty years later.48 The sudden 
peace which engulfed Europe in November 1918, lasting for approximately two decades, 
meant that tanks and armoured cars were relegated to the position of a weapon of 
promise.49 
 
Strategic, Organisational and Doctrinal Developments in the UDF  
The cessation of hostilities in November 1918 had serious consequences for all former 
belligerents. In Europe, and across the British Commonwealth, the willingness to spend vast 
sums of money on defence-related matters dwindled during the inter-war era, especially 
during the great depression.50 It was this rationale that denied the creation of large defence 
forces during the inter-war period, let alone the development of new weapons. Despite the 
political uncertainties in Europe created by Adolf Hitler’s rise to power during 1933, and his 
subsequent expansionist policies during the 1930s, most European powers failed to 
                                                        
44  T. Travers. ‘The Allied Victories, 1918’ in: H. Strachan, The Oxford Illustrated History of the 
First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 281-287 and T. Brighton, 
Masters of Battle: Monty, Patton and Rommel at War (London: Penguin, 2008) pp. 40-53. 
45 DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 16. File: Armoured Cars – Purchase Of. The Army, Air 
Force, and Navy Gazette (March 1929) – Mechanisation in 1929 British Plans by Major W.E. 
de B. Whittaker. pp. 1-2. 
46  Perrett, Iron Fist: Classic Armoured Warfare, p. 20. 
47 Brighton, Masters of Battle: Monty, pp. 52-53. 
48  DOD Archives, War Diaries (WD), Box 283, File 1 S/G/ 66 Vol1 – 1 SA Dive Operations 
(General). Lessons of East African Campaign – Armoured Cars.  
49 DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 16. File: Armoured Cars – Purchase Of. The Army, Air 
Force, and Navy Gazette (March 1929)– Mechanisation in 1929 British Plans by Major W.E. 
de B. Whittaker, pp. 1-2 and A.J. Smithers, Rude Mechanicals: An Account of Tank Maturity 
During the Second World War (London: Grafton, 1989) pp. 16-18. 
50  Van der Waag, The UDF Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1940, pp. 183-219. 
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implement significant changes to its defence policy in the inter war period.51 The Japanese 
expansionist policies in the Far East, and Italy’s war in Abyssinia, created political 
uncertainties for Britain and South Africa alike. The permanent Italian military presence in 
East Africa after 1936 was a direct threat to South African sovereignty, and indeed the 
British Empire.52 The political uncertainties, governmental restrictions on defence budgets, 
and the failure to innovate in the military sphere, led most Allied countries to the precarious 
position in which they found themselves in 1939. 53  
South African society, accustomed primarily to the notion of fighting limited wars in 
southern Africa, with even more limited objectives, and very few casualties, did not accept 
the severe loss of life in a conflict which was geographically far removed from South Africa’s 
sphere of interest. The war heightened divisions within South Africa by increasing the 
suspicion of government leaders, institutions, and the military.54 The political alignment with 
the Triple Entente during the war, had caused a full-scale Afrikaner rebellion within the Union 
of South Africa during 1914, and as such South African society remained much divided at 
the time of the armistice in 1918.55 As with generals in Europe, the South African generals 
Jan Smuts and Louis Botha, received extreme criticism for the huge loss of life and the 
callousness of the offensives on the Western Front that led to little or no operational gains. In 
Britain, though, Botha and Smuts were praised for their assistance to the Empire during the 
trying times of the First World War. The various British Dominions felt that the colonial troops 
should never have been deployed in a static role against what can best be called German 
professional militarism.56 
The debate regarding South Africa’s participation in the First World War at the behest 
of the British Empire remained at the centre stage of political discussions during the 1920s. 
This debate centred on the South African foreign policy during the First World War and the 
basic issues which governed South African participation in a war perceived as foreign and 
not in South Africa’s national interest. First, South African civil society continued to question 
                                                        
51  P. Calvocoressi and G. Wint, Total War: Causes and Course of the Second World War 
(London: Purnell: 1972), pp. 47-70 and, Video interview by Alexander Mathews with Bill 
Nasson about his book South Africa at War: 1939-1945 (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2012) 
accessed at http://aerodrome.co.za/video-interview-with-bill-nasson/ on 26 January 2014. 
52  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, pp. 7-9. 
53  W. Murray and A.R. Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2001) pp. 1-18 and W. Murray, ‘Armored Warfare: The British, 
French, and German Experiences’ In: Murray and Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period, pp. 6-29. 
54  Van der Waag, All splendid, but horrible: The Politics of South Africa’s Second “Little Bit” and 
the War on the Western Front, 1915-1918, pp. 93-95. 
55  T.S. Emslie (eds.), Adrift on the Open Veld: The Deneys Reitz Trilogy (Cape Town: 
Stormberg Publishers, 2009) pp. 211-228 and Birkby, Uncle George, p. 49. 
56  Van der Waag, All splendid, but horrible: The Politics of South Africa’s Second “Little Bit” and 
the War on the Western Front, 1915-1918, pp. 94-95. 
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the morality behind the South African intervention and whether or not it was plausible for 
South African politicians to permit the immense loss of South African soldiers in 
geographically distant wars.57 In fact, there remained an immense disdain for the ‘new’ 
technological way of warfare, in part brought about by the arrival of tanks and armoured cars 
on the battlefield.58 Smuts himself wrote that these inventions“… make us profoundly 
sad...when we see our greatest intellectual and scientific discoveries turn like so many 
daggers at the heart of civilisations”.59 Second, it was argued that South Africa would have to 
focus her military attention on fighting limited wars on the African continent, only when the 
territorial integrity of the Union was threatened, and during cases of political unrest within the 
Union. 60 
The South African military authorities determined the “lessons” that could be learned 
from their experience in the First World War, as was the case with defence forces across the  
world, during the 1920s and 1930s.61 John Collyer produced two military textbooks62, the 
only substantive South African writing on the experience of the campaigns in German South 
West Africa and German East Africa. These publications were of limited value to the officers 
of the UDF for they were only printed during the latter half of the 1930s; the second volume 
appeared in 1939. This meant that an entire generation of military officers, the fighting stock 
of the UDF during the Second World War, were unable to ‘learn’ from the old master’s 
military treatises. The most enduring aspect of Collyer’s leadership, in terms of producing 
military manuals, was the fact that he believed European textbooks would be irrelevant in the 
military education of the young officers of the UDF who would one day be employed in 
fighting African wars.63 The lessons that Collyer drew from the First World War were 
misconstrued when compared to defence thinking in Europe during the same time, however, 
they highlighted the inadequacies of interwar South African military thinking. Collyer was, 
however, correct in his perception that South Africa was ill-prepared to partake in any 
                                                        
57  Van der Waag, The UDF Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1940, pp. 183-184. 
58  Murray and Millett, A War to be Won, pp. 1-18 and W. Murray, ‘Armored Warfare: The British, 
French, and German Experiences’ In: Murray and Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period, pp. 6-29. 
59  W.K. Hancock and J. Van der Poel (eds.), Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol III: June 
1910-November 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) pp.324-325. 
60  A.M. Fokkens, ‘Afrikaner Unrest within South Africa during the Second world War and the 
Measures taken to Suppress it’ in Journal for Contemporary History, 37 (2), 2012, pp. 123-
125 and DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 65, File – Defence Policy 1933. 
61  Van der Waag, The UDF Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1940, pp. 184-187. 
62  J.J. Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa, 1916 (Pretoria: 
Government Printer, 1939) as well as J.J. Collyer, The Campaign in German South West 
Africa, 1914-1915 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1937). 
63  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in connection with 
matters discussed with the Minister by Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha at and 
Collyer at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 1936 and DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, 
File 944. Bushfighting Compiled by General Collyer. 
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campaign during a future European war. He emphasised the importance of military history 
and the collection of accurate intelligence reports on all areas of interest where South 
African forces might be deployed in the future. He argued that intelligence gained prior to 
deployment will almost definitely ensure strategic surprise, shortening any campaign in 
Africa, and thereby limiting unnecessary battlefield casualties on the part of the UDF.64 
Collyer was, however, a mounted infantrymen at heart, and had spent the majority of 
his career fighting ‘limited wars’ within Africa. As such he did not readily grasp the massive 
potential that modern fighting equipment could confer upon the UDF in future wars. He 
downplayed the role of air power and discredited the drive towards mechanisation, because 
of his former service in the UDF as a mounted infantryman.65 To judge Collyer outright would 
be foolish, for he was in the unfavourable position of not knowing what future wars South 
African soldiers would be fighting. The mobile operations that characterised the South 
African deployment in East Africa and North Africa during the early years of the Second 
World War were never contemplated by Collyer and his military peers. During the early 
1920s the UDF developed a special striking force in conjunction with the South African 
Mounted Rifles. The South African Field Force, essentially established around a small 
mechanised nucleus, offered the UDF the ability to deal quickly and clinically with uprisings 
within the Union of South Africa and in her neighbouring territories. South Africa had indeed 
established an experimental mechanised force well before their British counterparts.66 
When J.B.M Hertzog’s National Party, in a coalition with the Labour Party, came to 
power in South Africa during 1924, South Africa’s foreign policy changed drastically. The 
National Party objected to any sort of military intervention abroad in lieu of the recent 
wartime experiences, and opposed any military intervention to be made at the behest of 
Britain and its colonial empire.67 During the National Party’s tenure of power (1924 to 1934), 
Hertzog and his Cabinet avoided employing the UDF outside the continent of Africa.68  This 
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became quite evident during the years of recession between 1929 and 193269, which 
affected the entire political and economic outlook of South African society.  The lack of a 
coherent military vision for the future employment, and armament, of the UDF, stemmed 
from the political indecisiveness present with regard to foreign wars during the 1920s and 
1930s.70  
The National Party was forced to establish three broad principles which would govern 
the future operational employment of the UDF.71 First, it was decided that the UDF would 
only be deployed within the confines of the African continent. The South African Defence Act 
of 1912 stated explicitly that the UDF could only be employed outside the borders of South 
Africa in defence of the Union itself. It was believed that employment within Africa would 
confer upon the UDF the advantages that are associated with fighting a war based upon 
military and technological asymmetry.72 Second, the nucleus of the UDF would be formed 
around a small force which would be well-equipped to deal with any contingencies that might 
arise within Africa. It was believed that the use of mounted infantry, as well as the air force, 
would be sufficient to quell any “native” uprisings or conflicts in this area of operations.73 No 
direct emphasis was placed on mechanising the UDF, because it was believed that the 
infrastructure of Africa precluded the optimal employment of mechanised/armoured forces.74 
Last, it was decided that the UDF would have to be militarily potent enough to strike a lethal 
blow at a moment’s notice if and when it was decided to employ the military arm.75 This was 
sufficiently demonstrated by the internal deployments of the UDF during the Bulhoek and 
Bondelswarts uprisings, the unrest on the Rand in 1922 owing to the miners’ strike, and the 
punitive expeditions which were launched against Chief Impumbu in Ovamboland during 
1931.76 
The National Party’s tenure of power had serious consequences for the UDF and for 
South African defence. Great Britain relied almost exclusively on South Africa to suppress 
“native” uprisings in the neighbouring Portuguese colonies, Matabeleland, Mashonaland, 
and the British high commission territories within Southern Africa. Coincidently, the above-
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mentioned South African sphere of influence was inexplicitly linked to the British 
possessions in Africa, and the direct political and military threats to them. It was realised that 
South Africa would only get involved in a world conflict at the behest of Great Britain, and 
that other threats to its sovereignty would only emanate from punitive ‘native’ uprisings.77 It 
was believed that the UDF was sufficiently organised to deal with this request, despite the 
severely curtailed deployment capabilities of the UDF for such policing actions.78 During the 
1926 Imperial Conference, the South African Minister of Defence, Col F.H.P. Cresswell, 
stated in no uncertain terms that the UDF would only be deployed to protect the territorial 
integrity of South Africa within the sphere of Southern Africa. By rigidly enforcing the 
amended South African Defence Act, bearing similarities to that of 1912, Cresswell stated 
that only volunteers would be eligible for foreign deployment in aid of the Empire, as was the 
case in the First World War with the South African Imperial Service Units.79  
The Depression of the 1930s curtailed the deployment prospects of the UDF, for 
during this period 49 ACF units were immediately closed down, as well as a number of 
Defence Rifle Associations (DRA). Needless to say, the defence budget of South Africa was 
severely cut, and as such the acquisition of modern equipment ceased all together. The 
South African defence budget had dwindled from £ 1 019 529 in 1929, to a mere £ 720 976 
by 1932.80 By 1934, following the electoral success in 1933 of the United Party, formed 
through a coalition of the National Party and Smuts’ South African Party (SAP), matters 
relating to defence received a new priority. The appointment of a new Minister of Defence, 
Oswald Pirow, heralded in a new, albeit misconstrued, era of defence. Pirow promised a 
significant increase in the ailing defence budget, and tried to reverse the dire situation in 
which the UDF found itself. He proposed to transform the ailing UDF into a ‘modern’ military 
establishment through a proposed five year plan. The UDF would furthermore be expanded 
to include three fully equipped air force squadrons, a defence reserve of 100,000 men, and 
even a proposed mechanised battalion with a limited armour element attached to it.81 
When South Africa eventually recovered from the recession of the 1930’s, parliament  
hesitated to increase the defence budget, for other sectors of the government  had a greater 
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need for increased budgets82 Oswald Pirow assured parliament that large numbers of men 
were available in case of an immediate mobilisation.83  In reality, however, the true strength 
of the UDF remained wanting. The UDF had 20,000 men under arms, with two obsolete 
medium tanks, two outdated armoured cars, two armoured trains, a number of artillery 
pieces, and eight anti-aircraft guns.84  The artillery in question only had a meagre arsenal 
consisting of 941 rounds of ammunition, which would only allow them to lend fire support to 
a single day’s offensive.85  
In stark contrast to military developments in Europe, South African defence planners, 
most notably Pirow and the CGS, Lt Gen Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, had their own unique 
ideas on defence. It was believed that a strong air arm would suffice in operations in the 
African subcontinent, and where rugged terrain potentially hampered the deployment of 
large mobile ground forces.86 Precedence was thus given to the development of a strong air 
force. The South African Air Force (SAAF) consisted of four Hurricane fighters, two bombers, 
63 antiquated Hawker Hartebeest aircraft, and a myriad of obsolete support craft, including 
roughly 230 training aircraft.87 Furthermore, an elaborate system of coastal defences would 
safeguard South Africa’s coastline and ports from any possible seaborne invasion. Despite 
the few coastal defences in and around South African ports, South Africa had no navy nor 
any naval vessels of its own, and a mere three officers and three ratings serving in the South 
African Naval Services.88 The South African army would be modelled upon a mixture of Boer 
and British infantry, of which only 18 000 were properly armed and trained along the lines of 
mounted infantry89, as well as being supported by an antiquated establishment of field 
artillery.90 The UDF in essence suffered from a dysfunctional strategic culture during this 
period. 
By the latter half of the 1930s, tensions started to become evident between Smuts 
and Pirow due to matters relating to South Africa’s defence and the state of preparedness of 
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the UDF. Smuts, supported by Collyer, believed firmly that South Africa’s first line of defence 
did not lie over its immediate borders, as Pirow did, but further afield in the subcontinent of 
Africa.91 The notion that South Africa had no immediate threat to its sovereignty was soon 
displaced, when in May 1936, Benito Mussolini’s Italian armies had successfully annexed 
Abyssinia and parts of Somaliland in East Africa.92 Despite a heightened threat level, 
brought about by Mussolini’s expansion in Africa, the South African government believed, 
and stood firmly behind the fact, that the UDF’s sole purpose was to protect South Africa’s 
neutrality at all times.93 In this regard, the UDF developed a contingency plan in order to 
invade South Africa’s neighbouring territories in case of an emergency which necessitated 
military involvement. Plans W, X, Y and Z were geared at eliminating any threat in the 
Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola in the event of a pro-German or pro-Italian 
rising in these territories.94 Van Ryneveld was informed of developments in East Africa by his 
British counterpart, and as such kept abreast of all British movements and decisions taken 
as a result of Italian aggression in neighbouring East African territories.95 Politically it was felt 
that South Africa would remain neutral in the event of any European conflict, especially one 
involving Germany and Britain. Under this context South African would only come to the aid 
of Britain, if and when Germany declared war on Britain. The UDF had to start preparations 
for a looming global conflict, as the geo-political situation of Europe, and by extension Africa, 
had drastically changed since 1933.96 
During 1937 Van Ryneveld sent Col G.E. Brink97, who would command the 1st South 
African Division (1st SA Div) in East Africa and the Western Desert, to Europe on a staff visit 
in order to gain a strategic picture of German, Italian, French and British strategy, tactics and 
armament.98 When Brink arrived in Berlin on 6 April 1937, he was questioned by Major von 
Poppenheim, of the Attaché Group at the German War Office, as to the purpose of his staff 
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visit. Brink stated in no uncertain terms that his visit to Germany was of no political 
significance, and that he was merely visiting the Third Reich to “learn as much as possible 
about the organisation, training and equipment of the new German Army”.99 Brink, rather 
tongue in cheek, and most likely under Pirow’s instruction, proclaimed to Poppenheim that 
he was in no way connected to the British Military Attaché in Berlin. The mainstay of Brink’s 
visit to Germany was in essence to study the progress which had been made by the 
Wehrmacht in terms of motorisation and mechanisation, including the tactical employment of 
the German armour units.100 By 14 April 1937, Brink received official word from Poppenheim 
that Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg had endorsed his visit, except to the German tank 
units which were still in an experimental stage. During the period 22 April – 30 June 1937, 
Brink visited amongst others the Chief of the German Military Staff, Gen Ludwig Beck, the 
infantry school, the military school, the Luftwaffe Headquarters and air school, the 
Rheinmetall Arms factory, the field and tactical training of the 69th Regiment, the 56th Artillery 
Regiment, and finally paid visits to a physical training battalion and a Hitler Youth camp. 
Brink was invited to attend the secret German divisional military manoeuvres in East Prussia 
during September 1937, but he was forced to decline owing to his impending visit to Italy.101 
Brink’s impression of the erstwhile German military might is captured in a letter to his wife, 
Lillian, where he simply states: “...made my mouth water. They certainly do things very 
well”.102 
In Italy, Brink was escorted by Lt Col Vinciguerra to visit amongst others; the Italian 
General Staff, a tactical Infantry Battalion fire demonstration at Civitavecchia, the Reserve 
Officer’s school and the Regiment Genoa, a cavalry unit.103 During his visit to the Regiment 
Genoa, Brink was able to see the inner workings of an Italian light tank squadron, which was 
equipped with Carden-Lloyd tanks. Brink was, however, left unimpressed by the Italian 
cavalry, and in essence their armour, and noted that the general military bearing of the 
Italian army was unimpressive. His visit to Italy was of immense importance, for it was 
realised by the UDF and Brink alike, that South African troops might have to fight the Italian 
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foe in Abyssinia in the future. Considering that Brink became the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) of the 1st SA Div in 1940, he was best suited to measure the 
effectiveness of the Italian military.104  
Brink also paid  visits to France and the United Kingdom, where he visited the French 
War Office, the French Military School and Staff College, the manoeuvres of the French 2nd 
Light Armoured Division, and a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) for the senior officers 
of the 2nd Light Armoured Division. His visit culminated with the observation of the actual 
armour manoeuvres of the above-mentioned unit. Brink was left unimpressed with the 
French military forces, and their armour did not instil much confidence in him.105 
Over the period 25-27 September 1937, Brink was fortunate enough to be able to 
attend the British Army’s yearly Infantry and Tank Manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain.106 By the 
end of September Brink’s continental visit was over, and he returned to South Africa 
enlightened as to the latest trends in organisation, training, and equipment of some of the 
major European powers, and more notably the rapidly changing geo-political position in 
Europe. Brink was able to compare the armour formations of Germany, Italy, France and 
Britain, and as such gained valuable information on the military organisation and strategy of 
the major continental powers in terms of their thinking around motorisation and 
mechanisation.107 In essence Brink had visited his future adversaries and compatriots during 
his staff visit of 1937, and as such had gained value knowledge as to South Africa’s biggest 
threat in Africa – Italy. Brink furthermore experienced the might, and professionalism, of the 
‘new’ German Wehrmacht under Hitler’s leadership, and when compared to his British visit 
and the unpreparedness evident in the British Army, Brink had voiced his doubts whether or 
not Britain would be able to match the German military and technological might in a future 
conflict.108  
It is important to take a closer look at the five-year plan which Pirow undertook. First, 
in organisational structure, the core of the UDF consisted of a small nucleus made up of the 
permanent force, an ACF component, and the DRA. Owing to prior military experience, the 
permanent force members of the UDF occupied the important posts within the headquarters 
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and staffs.109  The ACF members formed the basis for recruitment of frontline troops and for 
the various ancillary units. The permanent force personnel were responsible for the 
organisation, training, and mobilisation of the peacetime establishment of the UDF. Pirow 
firmly believed that by the end of his five-year plan for the UDF, South Africa would possess 
a world-class defence force comparative to any European nation. 110  
Secondly, a strong emphasis was placed on a cadet training scheme that would 
allow for boys over the age of 14 to be trained along military lines. Pirow believed that such a 
scheme would solve the problem of manpower shortages. Furthermore, organisations such 
as the Boy Scouts, and Voortrekkers, would aid the training programmes by rendering 
support to the UDF during the preparatory phases of military training.111 In hindsight, this 
move might be comparable to that of the establishment of the Hitler youth during the 1930s, 
as Pirow was an ardent admirer of Hitler and the new German Reich. Through this scheme, 
it was believed that over 50% of boys that went through the cadet training programme would 
have received military training comparable to that of ACF standards.112 Through this process 
it was envisaged that over 20,000 boys would be trained every year, and therefore they 
could immediately be absorbed into the defence reserves.113  
Thirdly, Pirow promised an annual increase in the defence budget. The UDF believed 
that regular budgetary increases would instil military effectiveness and efficiency. He argued 
that South Africa would have to be able to produce certain war materials within the Union. 
This led to the decision in 1936, that only equipment which could not be produced locally 
would be stockpiled for future use.114 Fourthly, the protection of South Africa’s sea lanes, 
and the vital shipping route around the Cape of Good Hope, would be the responsibility of 
Britain. In conjunction with the Royal Naval presence in Simonstown, Pirow opted to have 
the local harbours and port defences systematically upgraded. It was furthermore proposed 
that the British Monitor Erebus would supplement the port defences of Cape Town by acting 
as a floating artillery battery.115 The Erebus scheme, however, never came to fruition.116  
Fifthly, Pirow realised that, in fulfilling Government’s request to have the UDF on 
standby in case an intervention was necessary in Southern Africa at the behest of the 
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Commonwealth, he would have to draw from a vast array of military experts who had prior 
experience in conducting such ‘police actions’. Yet, despite Collyer’s suggestion the South 
African experts on the campaign in German East Africa be consulted, Pirow opted to make 
his own decisions.117 Pirow, likely guided by his pro-German sentiments, rather approached 
the ‘foremost master’ of bush warfare according to him at that time, Lettow-Vorbeck, to 
advise him and the UDF on the creation of a defence force that could operate effectively in 
the African bush.118 After due consultation with Lettow-Vorbeck, Pirow proceeded to try and 
mould the core of the army into a force that resembled light raiding columns. This was in fact 
Pirow’s attempt at mechanisation, in its rudest form.119  
Pirow proposed the production of ‘bush carts’, which can be described as an all-
terrain vehicle drawn by oxen or mules. He argued that the use of these ‘bush carts’ was 
indeed more cost effective than procuring advanced mechanised or motorised equipment.120 
Scepticism reigned and the mechanisation of the UDF was thwarted by fears of limited 
deployment, made worse by concerns that South Africa would not be able to procure the 
spare parts needed for keeping such forces operational.121 Pirow based his support of the 
‘bush cart’ concept on two fundamental points. Firstly, economically, it would be more viable 
to procure vast numbers of ‘bush carts’ rather than more expensive and high maintenance, 
mechanised forces. Secondly, Pirow argued that the ‘bush carts’ would be more reliable on 
the narrow tracks of sub-tropical Africa. His view was further augmented by the prevalent 
belief that mechanised transport would get bogged down in muddy tracks during the African 
rainy season.122 
South African defence policy during the 1930s was a personification of Pirow and a 
showcase for his views on defence and military innovation.  An explanation might be found 
in the fact that Pirow believed that the UDF would never meet an enemy force on the 
battlefield larger than a third of its size.123  Pirow further felt that by delaying the purchases of 
new war machinery, he had indeed found a middle ground for the preparation of South Africa 
for eventual war.  He believed that Britain would provide South Africa with ample fighting 
vehicles, aircraft, and weapons in the event of war breaking out.124 Pirow, however, 
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mistakenly believed that such an acquisition would occur at pre-war prices.  By July 1939, 
with the ever increasing threat of war in Europe, Pirow initiated talks with Britain for the 
procurement of modern arms and equipment. He believed that the time had indeed arrived 
to transform the UDF into a modern fighting force, albeit too late, with modern fighting 
equipment.125   
The request was problematic for Britain who, like the rest of Europe, had started its 
own preparations for the looming global conflict.  At this point, the inadequacies of not only 
Pirow as Minister of Defence, but also a failed South African defence policy, started to affect 
South Africa detrimentally in terms of preparing for war.  The state of unpreparedness that 
became a hallmark of the UDF during the 1930s can only be ascribed to a poor government 
policy on defence, coupled with misconstrued views by South African defence planners and 
the state of the Union's political system.  In the event of South Africa becoming involved in 
only a defensive war, it was believed that South Africa would have between three to six 
months to mobilise its defence force.126  Thus, a continued misnomer in defence thinking, 
especially in terms of mobilisation, remained the status quo in South Africa prior to the 
outbreak of the Second World War.  South African defence planners remained convinced 
that there would be enough time to mobilise once war had been declared.127 
 
Furtive Steps towards Armour in the Union Defence Force 
The origins of the SATC can be traced back to the beginning of 1925, when discussions 
centred on the possible formation of a South African Armoured Car Section within the 
UDF.128 The UDF received a British Whippet tank after the end of the First World War as an 
Imperial gift, where after it was merely used for demonstration purposes.129 The 
establishment of an armoured force could offer the UDF the ability to conduct long, 
aggressive, reconnaissance. Highly mobile formations, of which armoured cars would form 
the backbone, were characterised by speed, circuit of action, reliability, and silence. These 
qualities would prove invaluable in the African terrain, where economy of force would prove 
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the prevailing factor which decided the outcomes of battles.130 By the end of February 1925, 
the UDF General Staff decided to import two Crossley Armoured Cars from Britain. The 
acquisition of the two Crossley Armoured Cars, at £ 2600 each131, can be seen as the first 
furtive steps, aimed at the provisional establishment of a permanent armoured car section in 
the UDF.132 Upon delivery to the UDF, the Crossley Armoured Cars commenced their first 
trial run at the Artillery Barracks in Pretoria where a top speed of 15 mph was recorded.133  
The mobility which these armoured cars promised the UDF was recognised 
immediately. UDF Permanent Force Order No. 2652 was drafted on 21 March 1925, which 
required the names of all the men who had served in armoured car units during the Great 
War to be forwarded to the office of the CGS. There was a nil return, as no South Africans 
served in such units during the Great War, nor did the UDF have such a unit in the field. This 
meant that there was no institutional knowledge in the UDF regarding the formation, 
structure, and employment of armoured units. The little military information that was 
available to the CGS and his staff on the establishment of an armoured car unit was 
borrowed from the British Army.134 By April 1926, Van Ryneveld duly instructed the 
Quartermaster General (QMG), Col C. Brink, to ensure that all the pool drivers received 
training on the armoured cars. This move, Van Ryneveld hoped, would ensure that all the 
vehicles in question remained serviceable and ready for deployment in the case of an 
emergency. The Commandant of the SA Military College was to ensure that all instructors at 
the College received training in the handling of the machineguns mounted on the armoured 
cars.135 The mobility of the Crossley’s and the firepower offered by its machineguns was 
demonstrated between 1926 and 1929 on three separate occasions at the Quaggapoort 
firing range.136  
During October 1925, Van Ryneveld sent a proposed peace time establishment table 
for the Armoured Car Section to Col H.S. Wakefield, the Adjutant General (AG). The peace 
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time establishment of the section would comprise of 11 men, and two armoured cars.137 It 
was decided in principle to attach the Armoured Car Section, for administrative purposes, to 
either the HQ UDF or to one of the squadrons of the 1st South African Mounted Rifles. The 
South African Field Force’s existence, however short-lived, meant that South Africa had in 
fact established an experimental mechanised force well before the British.138 The men, once 
trained, would be qualified as both gunners and drivers of the armoured cars.139  
The armoured car section had neither a mechanic nor storemen on the 
establishment. This highlighted the muddled thinking within the UDF, for it seemed as if 
neither the office of the CGS, nor the AG, fully grasped the importance of the attachment of 
either a mechanic or storemen to the armoured car section. The regular mechanical 
maintenance of the armoured cars by their crews, and mechanics alike, remained 
paramount to their continuous successful employment. The UDF was still to learn value of 
continuous maintenance on its AFV whilst deployed operationally. By October 1930, the 
QMG handed one Crossley armoured car over to the Commandant of the SA Military 
College, for the sole purpose of crew training amongst the instructors of the College. They 
relied on a British War Office manual of 1921, titled “Armoured Car Training”.140 The British 
manual was, however, suited for armoured car training in European conditions alone, and 
did not allow for training in southern African conditions. The UDF thus had to borrow ideas 
and concepts around armoured car training from the British manual, and adapt it to meet the 
specific peculiarities of the South African conditions. The UDF’s theoretical approach, and 
practical employment, to armoured warfare, and the employment on armoured cars in such 
an instance, was derived from the British Army. The practise of using British manuals for 
training purposes, of various military arms, in the UDF prevailed until the late 1930s, and 
effectively prevented South African innovation in terms of theoretical thinking around the 
training and deployment of its forces.141  
By July 1931 it was decided to commission both Crossley cars and form an UDF 
armour car detachment, and the entire staff of the Small Arms Branch of the SA Military 
College received ‘adequate’ training in the use of these vehicles.142 Training in the use of 
                                                        
137  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 110, Armoured Cars General. Draft of Proposed 
Peacetime Establishment of Armoured car Section – 30 October 1925. 
138  Van der Waag, The UDF Between the Two World Wars, p. 201. 
139  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 162, Units and Formations. SA Tanks Corps History. 
140  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 110, Armoured Cars General. Letter from Acting CGS to 
Commandant SA Military College 9 October 1930 
141  Birkby, Uncle George, p. 91. 
142  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 110, Armoured Cars General. Correspondence between 
CGS and G1 – 3 March 1931 and DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 110, Armoured Cars 
General. Correspondence between Commandant SA Military College and QMG and CGS re 
Armoured Car Training – 12 February 1932. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
these cars remained rudimentary at best, and theoretical recourse was still taken to the 
British War Office manual of 1921 regarding training and employment of armoured cars. No 
particular précis was available on crew training for the Crossley cars, and was largely based 
on British thinking around the subject. As such, armoured car drill was improvised from the 
handbooks which regulated the training and employment of British Rolls Royce and Peerless 
Armoured Cars. These manuals, however, failed to take into account the peculiarities of the 
southern African environment, and were thus negligible in terms of their utilitarian value for 
the UDF. The first UDF handbook on armoured car training and employment only appeared 
during 1940. During the interwar period, the UDF relied solely on the 1930 War Office 
Manual.143 Due to the fact that only one Crossley was available for training at the SA Military 
College, armoured car training remained haphazard for no provision was made to ensure 
that the practise of formation and battle drills occurred. Thus, by the end of 1931, the use of 
armoured cars within the UDF remained at an experimental stage when compared to 
developments in the United Kingdom and Germany.144 
 
Fig 1.2: Armoured Car at Impumbu’s kraal, 1932145 
During 1932 there was a renewed drive within the UDF to test the operational 
efficiency of the Crossley armoured cars, in order to gauge their offensive capabilities. 
                                                        
143  DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Collection – UDF Armoured Car 
Training Manual 1940 (Volume I & II) and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 1-5. 
144  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 110, Armoured Cars General. Correspondence between 
Commandant SA Military College and QMG and CGS re Armoured Car Training – 12 
February 1932. 
145  DOD Archives, Photographic Repository. Crossley Armoured Car near rifle stacks at the 
Indaba held at Knobkierie pan during the Ipumbu revolt in Owamboland, SWA (no photo 
reference number). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
Despite previous exercises at Quaggapoort146, the Crossley armoured cars had to date 
neither been deployed over a considerable distance nor under operational circumstances. 
The CGS decided by August 1932 to test the operational durability and efficiency of the 
vehicles in the extreme distances and climate of the South West Africa Protectorate, 147 and 
subsequently dispatched the armoured cars to assist in the occupation of the Chief 
Impumbu’s kraal. The armoured cars assisted in the successful assault on Impumbu’s kraal, 
meeting no opposition until the untimely arrival of a swarm of bees, which brought the 
armoured car operation to an abrupt halt.148 Ovamboland was chosen as the best 
geographical area to test the vehicles, owing to the ruggedness of the terrain and the 
challenge which it would pose to the crews and vehicles alike. Upon the successful 
completion of the Ovamboland tests during August 1932 by Capt J.B. Kriegler, a lengthy 
report was submitted which highlighted the shortcomings of the Crossley armoured cars’ 
operational performance.149  
This report detailed all the operational inadequacies of the Crossley armoured cars 
identified during the Ovamboland operation.150 It was immediately found that the armoured 
cars were unsuitable for use on sandy roads owing their immense weight and inadequate 
tyres. The tyres of the armoured cars furthermore received immense damage when being 
driven across rocky terrain; this was partly due to the fact that the tyres were solid and could 
thus not be deflated to allow for easier navigation across rugged terrain. It was noted that the 
springs of the armoured cars could not handle the severe pressure exerted on the armoured 
cars. On average, the armoured cars managed 6 km per gallon, and more than 80% of the 
total journey had to be driven in low or second gear. The carburettors caused immense 
trouble throughout the trip, owing to the fine sand that accumulated in the working parts of 
the engines.151 The drivers also complained that their seating, as well as the bodies of the 
cars, made the operation immensely uncomfortable. The report, for the most part, 
highlighted the problems associated with the vehicles.  Despite this, the engines were found 
to have given little trouble, and the asbestos linings in the hulls of the vehicles adequately 
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kept the heat out.152 For the next seven years, there was no expansion in the use of the 
armoured cars, nor attempts to grasp this new promise of mobility within the UDF.153  
By January 1939, Van Ryneveld gave authority for the manufacture of 22 locally-
produced armoured cars suited for the specific needs and realities of the operational 
environment of the UDF. These vehicles were the first South Africa produced armoured cars, 
and their design and manufacture was thus entirely geared to meeting UDF requirements in 
terms of bush warfare. He gave strict orders that the armoured cars would have to be ready 
for experimental and training purposes by the end of July 1939.154 Upon completion of the 
production of the 22 armoured cars, based on a Ford chassis with a Marmon-Herrington 
drive, Van Ryneveld decided that the SA Military College would conduct the necessary 
experimental testing in conjunction with the SSB Demonstration Company. It was decided 
that the newly-established armoured car company would be attached to the SA Military 
College for administrative and training purposes.155 Appropriately the CGS tasked the AG to 
draft a provisional establishment for the armoured car company as soon as possible.156 
 
Declaration of War – Impetus for Growth in UDF and SATC 
The German Wehrmacht invaded Poland on Friday, 1 September 1939, and matters 
changed dramatically for the UDF.  The news of the German invasion was greeted in South 
Africa with great earnest and large portions of the population remained anxious as to what 
course of action the Union Government would take. On 2 September, the Governor-General 
of South Africa, Sir Patrick Duncan, adjourned the informal sitting of parliament until 
Monday, 4 September. On Sunday 3 September, Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime 
Minister, issued an ultimatum to Hitler ordering Germany to withdraw from Poland, where 
failure to do so would result in a state of war existing between the two countries.157 Hitler 
refused and by midday Monday the Second World War commenced. On Monday 4 
September, the House of Assembly voted on South Africa’s neutrality. Hertzog proposed 
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that South Africa remained neutral, whereas Smuts advocated participation at the behest of 
Britain. Hertzog’s motion for neutrality was narrowly defeated by Smuts with 80 votes to 67, 
where after Hertzog resigned as Prime Minister. Smuts duly formed a new government, 
upon request from Duncan, and South Africa effectively declared war on Germany on 6 
September 1939.158 
The South African declaration was indeed the impetus needed to correct the severe 
state of unpreparedness which existed in the UDF. When Smuts assumed power in 
September 1939, he did so as Prime Minister, Minister for External Affairs, and most 
importantly Minister of Defence. The onus was thus upon Smuts, first to determine, and 
hence rectify South Africa’s position with regards to its defence as determined by Pirow. On 
7 September, Smuts cabled the South African High Commissioner in London, informing him 
that he believed it necessary to deploy a South African brigade and several air squadrons to 
Kenya. This move, Smuts argued, was to be a mere precautionary measure aimed at 
preventing an Italian attack on Kenya from Abyssinia. Smuts, fully aware that the UDF was 
in no position to deploy immediately to the East African Theatre, made the proposal in order 
to ascertain the War Office’s views on a South African deployment to East Africa. He, 
furthermore, drafted a letter to the British High Commissioner in Pretoria, Sir William Clark, 
proposing the training of two divisions, with ancillary troops, as well as 14 air force 
squadrons for service in Kenya. By 22 December, Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, informed Smuts that the British Government believed that Kenya was not 
threatened and thus did not wish to provoke Italian aggression by deploying large numbers 
of troops to East Africa.159 
 The UDF greeted the news of the outbreak of war with considerable eagerness, 
despite several shortcomings in its ranks. The permanent force of the UDF stood at a 
strength of 5 385 men, whilst the entire personnel of the ACF could only account for 14 631 
men. George Brink, recently promoted to Brig Gen, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of 
army Organisation and Training, inferred that the UDF had in essence a shortage of 39 000 
infantrymen. The, Director-General of the DRA, Len Beyers, estimated that out of the 
122 000 men in the South African Commandos, only 18 300 were properly armed and 
trained to acceptable military standards. A period of rapid reorganisation was started 
immediately, in order to rectify problems regarding organisation, training, equipment, arms 
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and armament, including its armoured fighting capability.160 By the latter half of 1939, Van 
Ryneveld warned Defence Headquarters of Italy’s possible belligerence on the side of 
Germany. He argued that Italian armies could simultaneously overrun Sudan and Egypt, 
where after her forces may threaten the British possessions of Kenya and Tanganyika, and 
even possibly South Africa. During November 1939, Col P. De Waal, the Director-General of 
Operations, visited East Africa in order to ascertain to what effect the UDF could assist the 
British forces in the event of an Italian attack. To this effect, the British Government, on 20 
December 1939, intimated that a possible move of South African troops to Kenya might only 
be needed during 1940.161 
 
Formation of Armoured Car Companies 
During September 1939, a UDF Committee under the leadership of Lt Col W.H.E. Poole was 
tasked to conduct a test, and subsequently, report on the newly developed South African 
armoured cars.162 These vehicles were driven by a Ford V8 engine, had a 134-inch, 5-ton, 
chassis, and included a superior Marmon Herington drive.163 Delivery was taken at 
Johannesburg on 18 September 1939.164 The committee under Lt Col Poole comprised of Lt 
Col J.B. Kriegler, Capt G.N. Nauhaus, and Lt I. Kat-Ferreira.165 Upon delivery and after 
rigorous testing, the committee found the new Marmon Herrington vehicles to be vastly 
superior to the antiquated Crossley armoured cars. Great improvements were noted in the 
general speed and performance of the Marmon Herringtons.166 It was decided to test the 
performance of the vehicles in the Eastern Transvaal during a test run held in November 
1939. The cars proceeded on the return trip from Pretoria – Sabie – Kowyn’s Pass – 
Schoemanskloof – Machadodorp – Pretoria. After the successful completion of this trip, it 
was suggested that modifications were necessary with regards to curbing problems which 
arose from overheating, weak springs, an insufficient cooling system, and inadequate turret 
flaps and an observation post.167  
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Fig 1.3: Marmon Herrington armoured car during trial run, circa 1939.168 
Between December 1939 and January 1940, two Crossley armoured cars from the 
Armoured Car Section were deployed in South West Africa for operational duties in order to 
quell any uprisings which might arise from pro-German elements within the territory. The 
operational duty of the Armoured Car Section further highlighted the problems which the 
cars experienced with their water pipes and trouble in the arid regions of South West 
Africa.169 During January 1940 a further test run was conducted by Kat-Ferreira on the 
Marmon Herrington armoured cars over a distance of 1920 km. The route used for the test 
was a round trip from Voortrekkerhoogte – Potgietersrus – Tzaneen – Lydsdorp – Gravelotte 
– Sabie – Nelspruit – Middelburg – Voortrekkerhoogte.170 The test showed that the problems 
with overheating had sufficiently been dealt with. Moreover, it was clear that a four-wheeled 
drive was essential, that the wireless transmitter on each car had to be improved, that an 
additional porthole in the rear of the turret was required, that rust proof water tanks were 
crucial, and that additional asbestos lining for each car was required. The necessary 
modifications to the experimental Marmon Herrington armoured cars were made prior to the 
production of new vehicles.171 Thus, during the first five months of the Second World War, 
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despite the numerous tests conducted on armoured cars in general, no organised AFV units 
existed in practice.172 
By January 1940, however, the realisation that South Africa might be called upon to 
assist in the defence of East Africa, at the behest of Britain, served as the impetus for the 
creation of a permanent AFV unit in the ACF. On 31 January 1940 authority was granted for 
the establishment of No. 1 Armoured Car Company (ACC), which was to be located at the 
SA Military College.173 The Commandant of the SA Military College assumed overall 
command of the company and was directly responsible for recruitment, training, and 
administration of the newly-formed unit. Established with effect from 1 January 1940, No. 1 
ACC had an original establishment of 6 Officers and 161 Other Ranks. This establishment 
allowed for a total of 22 AFV.174 Immediate difficulties, however, arose in the recruitment of 
suitable men.175 By the end of February 1940, only 35 recruits had joined and no more were 
forthcoming. When, in May 1940, mobilisation on a voluntary basis became possible, 
recruitment greatly improved and the ranks of the company immediately swelled. When the 
men were required to sign the Africa Service Oath, only one individual refused to sign the 
oath.176 
During February 1940, the training of the men attested to No. 1 ACC commenced in 
all earnest. They first underwent the mandatory period of basic training, where after 
specialised training was received in wireless transmitters and gunnery. The recruits were 
furthermore compelled to undertake a driving and maintenance course on the new Marmon 
Herringtons. Due to a lack of instructors this proved impossible.177 By 1940, the men 
received further training in squad drill, map reading, hygiene, Vickers Machine Gun training, 
and Bren Gun instruction. At the end of March, the company received instruction that they 
would have to participate in field exercises during June 1940. Thus, the men of the company 
would have to complete their basic armour training and conversion by the end of April 
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1940.178 This decision adversely affected the training of the men, for fewer hours could be 
spent on each training subject. During April 1940, the company received further training in 
tactics, gunnery, wireless, crew drill, mounted drill, anti-aircraft training, and rifle exercises. 
Problems, however, arose during the tactical training as lectures were only theoretical and 
without practical demonstrations and exercises. The specialised training of the men was 
severely hampered due lack of training equipment, and most notably shortages in arms, 
ammunition, and wireless sets. The most alarming facet of the training, however, was that no 
armoured cars were available for tactical training, which meant that TEWT could not be 
conducted by the SATC personnel.179 No armoured cars, furthermore, meant that no Driving 
and Maintenance course could be presented. As a result, by the end of April 1940, the UDF 
had one ‘trained’ armoured car company in theory, with none of its men ever having received 
any practical instruction on the Marmon Herrington vehicles.180  
The tactical and operational training which the SATC recruits did receive in terms of 
the employment of armour during offensive and defensive operations was based on the 
1940 UDF manual titled ‘Armoured Car Training’. The manual explicitly stated that 
“Armoured car units will normally form part of the larger mounted and armoured formations, 
but owing to their characteristics they will often be employed independently rather than in 
close cooperation with other arms”.181 As such, theoretically, the UDF would deploy 
armoured cars in three specific roles, as described in Chapter 1 of the manual. Due to the 
high degree of mobility which armoured cars offered the UDF, the SATC realised that the 
basis for deployment would be moulded around the core concepts of reconnaissance, 
defence and attack. In terms of reconnaissance duties, the armoured guards would be 
deployed as advance, rear, or flank guards, or escorts, depending on the operational 
situation. When deployed as a mobile protection element, the cars have the ability to seize 
and deny it to enemy forces, and delay their offensive deployment against the main force. 
The combination of stealth, fire and movement, and surprise, made armoured cars a unique 
offensive weapon. The offensive deployment of the cars, however, remained limited to the 
country in which they operated, and the strength of the enemy opposition which they 
encountered.182 
The UDF armour doctrine, however, made specific provision for ‘Operations against 
Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Enemies’, which helps to explain the novel employment of 
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South African armour in East Africa throughout 1940 and 1941. Under these circumstances, 
the armoured doctrine categorically stated that “...the nature of the theatre of operations may 
necessitate modification in the conduct of operations...The extent to which armoured cars 
can operate will be determined largely by the nature of the country and climatic conditions. In 
certain areas, as in deserts or foothills, armoured cars will have considerable latitude of 
movement, while in hilly or irrigated areas they will be restricted very largely to roads. 
Extremes of temperature and altitude may make conditions difficult, while torrential rains or 
prolonged wet weather may restrict temporarily movement in areas which are normally 
favourable”.183 In this type of warfare or ‘other’ operations as the manual termed it, the 
soldiers were taught that the terrain directly influenced the administration and mechanical 
maintenance of their armoured unit’s organisation. It was emphasised to the SATC recruits 
that South African armour could also be employed for convoy duties, for providing protection 
to isolated aerodromes, and for tasks in connection with internal security, such as the relief of 
invested frontier posts or the rounding up of tribal raiding parties. The main aim of armoured 
operations, as taught to the SATC recruits, should be the securing of set strategic, 
operational and tactical objectives through the heightened mobility, firepower, and protection 
offered by the South African armour.184 
By the latter half of April 1940, authority was granted for the formation of a further 
four reserve force armoured car units. These units comprised of a light tank company and 
armoured car company on a fulltime basis, while arrangements were also made for the 
establishment of two ACF armoured car companies in Johannesburg.185 By May 1940, 
however, a decision was made to establish the new armoured car companies on a full-time 
basis. The 1st Battalion SATC was formed in May 1940, and was initially situated at the SA 
Military College in Voortrekkerhoogte.186 The battalion comprised of one light tank company, 
two armoured car companies, and three motorcycle companies, and at full strength would 
comprise of 58 officers and 1063 other ranks. During June 1940, however, the 1st Battalion 
SATC had an actual strength of only 326 other ranks. By May 1940, the SATC started to 
receive the first batch of the locally produced Marmon Herrington armoured cars.187 The 
arrival of the new vehicles signalled an immense change in the training programme at the 
Armoured Fighting Vehicle Training Centre (AFVTC), for men would now receive training on 
the actual armoured cars, rather than antiquated Caterpillar Dragon tracked vehicles used by 
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the UDF till then. The steady influx of recruits meant that very soon there were insufficient 
vehicles for training. The ranks of the SATC were greatly expanded when a 2nd battalion was 
added to its compliment owing to the rapid expansion of the AFV units of the UDF. Each 
battalion of the SATC now consisted of three armoured car companies, and one motorcycle 
company, with the light tank company and a motorcycle company remaining unattached.188 
By mid-1940, five of the armoured car companies were almost at full strength, 
although two of them comprised mostly of recruits with little or no training. The tremendous 
increase in the ranks of the SATC, and the proposed formation of an additional three 
armoured car companies, meant that the AFVTC had to be reorganised. By October 1940, 
the AFVTC moved from Voortrekkerhoogte, to the newly establish AFVTC at Kafferskraal, 
Premier Mine. The new AFVTC included an HQ, AFV School, a Tactical Training Branch, a 
Recruits Depot, and a Pool. 189 Under instruction from the AG, the SATC was to raise 48 
Armoured Car Companies in total. In practise, however, this meant that the ongoing 
reorganisation affected training adversely as the number of armoured cars that could be 
used for training was too few.190 In order to bolster the perceived fighting efficiency of the 
armoured units, a decision was made to reorganise the establishment of the armoured car 
companies so as to allow for more cars per company. It was henceforth decided that each 
company would comprise of 35 armoured cars and 18 scout cars, with a compliment of 14 
officers and 247 other ranks. No information is available on how this reorganisation affected 
the light tank company within the SATC. This new organisation came into effect during the 
latter half of 1940.191 
 
Conclusion 
The military preparedness of the UDF throughout the interwar period occurred rather 
haphazardly with a number of changes to its organisation, training and equipment evident 
throughout this period. The influence of individuals, more notably Pirow, Collyer and Van 
Ryneveld, ensured that South African defence thinking was geared to fighting limited wars in 
Africa. These changes combined to leave the South African defence force in a rather 
dilapidated state at the outbreak of the Second World War, not unlike Great Britain and 
                                                        
188  Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 7-8 and DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 84, CGS 143/17 
– AFV Units General. Secret Report on A.F.V. training in the Union of South Africa -1940. 
189  Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 8-9. 
190  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 84, CGS 143/17 – AFV Units General. Secret Report on 
A.F.V. training in the Union of South Africa -1940. 
191  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 84, CGS 143/17/9 Monthly Letter to Oppositely AFV. 
Secret Cipher from DCGS to Opposite – 9 December 1940 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, 
p. 9. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
France. The need for modernisation and mechanisation in the UDF throughout the 1920’s 
and 1930’s, especially in terms of creating modern armoured forces, proceeded extremely 
slowly. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, the UDF only 
possessed a token, yet obsolete, armoured force, with limited operational experience. 
Moreover, not a single member of the UDF served in any armoured force during the First 
World War. The South African application of armour remained wedded to interwar British 
doctrine, and the UDF continued to rely on British War Office manuals well into the 1940’s. 
The outbreak of the Second World War, served as the impetus for growth and modernisation 
in the UDF. From September 1939 Smuts proceeded to rectify the inadequacies of the 
‘Pirowian’ defence force and this included the local manufacture of the Marmon Herrington 
armoured cars. Throughout 1939 and 1940 the UDF, and more notably the SATC, grew from 
strength to strength, despite some setbacks with regards to training and enlistment. In order 
to help defend the British Empire against the encroaching Italian aggression in East Africa, it 
was believed that the SATC was sufficiently prepared for a possible deployment to the 
frontiers of Kenya by mid-1940.  
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Chapter 2 – Appreciation, Apprehensiveness and Adventure: The South African 
Deployment to East Africa, 1940 
 
“The terrain in the theatre precluded any possibility of confining the Armoured 
Cars to roads, because very few roads existed and far from being confined to 
roads they were more often than not used to break roads through the bush…”192 
 
Introduction 
Despite the melancholia that was prevalent within the UDF during the interwar era, the 
outbreak of the Second World War induced the United Kingdom and South Africa to view the 
Italian presence in East Africa as a threat to British interests on the African continent. The 
British positions in East Africa, in Kenya, Somaliland, and the Sudan, were immediately 
threatened by the Italian forces in Libya and in Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland. For South 
Africa, the threat, although further removed, was real.193 The Italian declaration of war on 10 
June 1940 heightened the British and South African perception of the rising threat in Africa. 
In South Africa rumours abounded of a so-called fifth column that might invade the Union 
from Portuguese East Africa. The UDF drew up plans and made provision for a counter 
against any such invasion.194  Smuts could now actively commit troops to the defence of 
East Africa and the UDF was rapidly mobilised in order to meet the requirements for its 
expeditionary forces. By mid-1940, the first South African troops arrived in East Africa. A 
steady stream of UDF soldiers followed and, by December 1940, South Africa had an entire 
Division in the Kenya, with all three brigades occupying positions on the frontline. The SATC 
provided units for the defence of East Africa from the outset in June 1940. By December 
1940, three armoured car and one light tank company of the SATC awaited the start of 
Cunningham’s offensive.195  
This chapter has several aims. First, to provide a broad overview of the East African 
theatre of operations, focussing on the opposing forces, topography, climate and 
communications. Second, the Italian declaration of war is analysed in lieu of its offensive 
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posturing in East Africa throughout 1940. Third, the South African arrival and preparations 
for war in East Africa is discussed. Fourth, the arrival of the SATC units in East Africa is 
addressed, and analysed against the backdrop of their baptism of fire. Finally, Cunningham’s 
plan for the East African offensives of 1940-1941 is discussed.  
 
The East African Theatre of Operations 
By April 1940, the Italian forces in East Africa were numerically superior to that of the British 
Forces. The supreme commander of the Italian forces in East Africa, His Royal Highness 
(HRH) Prince Amadeo of Savoy, Duke of Aosta and a cousin of the Italian king, had to his 
disposal approximately 255 000 troops with which to defend the Italian territories of 
Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland.196 The Duke of Aosta, who became Viceroy of Ethiopia in 
November 1937, attempted to ensure effective administration of the territories under his 
care. However, the lingering ravages of a nationalist rebellion remained ever present in 
Abyssinia, despite Marshal Rudolfo Graziani’s earlier operations, and left Aosta unable to 
effectively subjugate certain parts of Italian East Africa.197 The Italian positions in this region 
were subject to considerable geo-strategic vulnerabilities. The Duke of Aosta highlighted 
these vulnerabilities when he visited Rome before Mussolini’s declaration of war in June 
1940. He informed the Duce that if the sea communications to East Africa were cut during 
war, his Italian armies in Eritrea, Abyssinia, and Somaliland would effectively be cut-off from 
the Italian mainland and its North African territories. Aosta realised that his only link to Rome 
would thus be via the Italian Airforce (Regia Aeronautica). Despite promises of reinforcement 
in the form of men and machines, the duke was left in a rather perilous position when the 
war came to East Africa in mid-1940.198 
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Map 2.1: The East African theatre of operations.199 
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 By the end of May 1940, Rome had ordered the Duke of Aosta to fully mobilise the 
forces under his command by 5 June, although Marshal Badoglio, the Italian CGS, had 
assured Aosta that this was for defensive purposes only. The Duke, no doubt sensing that 
Mussolini was determined to go to war, suggested a series of offensive actions in East 
Africa. These suggestions were declined, despite the fact that they would have conferred a 
number of tactical and strategic advantages upon the Italian forces in East Africa. Aosta was 
furthermore informed that Italy would declare war on the Allies at midnight on 10/11 June. It 
has been argued that the Italians in East Africa had indeed been morally unprepared for war, 
especially since the territory had only been conquered a few years before. Large tracts of 
Abyssinia still remained unconquered and in the hands of the local Shifta. If war was 
declared against Britain, the Viceroy would have to fight both a conventional war against the 
British Empire, and an unconventional war against the Shifta insurgents.200 The Italian 
colonists, few in number and dispersed, were under constant threat from the vengeful 
retaliatory attacks of the Abyssinians, and as such the Italian armed forces’ sole 
responsibility was that of guaranteeing the lives of the Italian populace. The initiative in East 
Africa, prior to the Italian declaration of war, had been solely with the Duke of Aosta and the 
Italian High Command (Comando Superiore). Aosta realised, and correctly so, that this 
initiative would be lost if the British managed to get supplies and reinforcements through to 
their territories in Kenya, Sudan and British Somaliland. Such a move would nullify any 
chance of a swift, calculated, Italian victory in East Africa.201 
 The Comando Superiore estimated that its East African Empire had sufficient 
provisions for six months before it would be necessary to resupply the far-flung garrisons. As 
such, the Duke of Aosta could account for 47 000 tons of lubricants, 91 500 tons of petrol, 27 
000 tons of diesel, and large stocks of food, medical supplies, and arms and ammunition by 
mid-1940.202 Yet, despite this and an abundance of manpower in East Africa, Aosta suffered 
from one great feat – mobility. The Italian motor transport in East Africa had been 
operationally employed since 1935, and by 1940 these vehicles were unsurprisingly in a very 
bad state owing to the taxing nature of the terrain on which they operated. Despite numerous 
attempts, no transport, or even new tyres, was forthcoming from Rome.203 The Italian 
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preparations for war in Europe and North Africa simply received priority and, as a result, the 
forces in East Africa enjoyed very little mobility. Despite operating on interior lines of 
communication, the Italian defensive position in East Africa remained precarious.204 Aosta’s 
viceroyalty was organised into four sectors. A Northern Sector, under the command of Lt 
Gen Luigi Frusci, faced the northern Sudan. A Southern Sector, under command of Lt Gen 
Pietro Gazzera, fronted southern Sudan and northern Kenya, while an Eastern Sector, 
commanded by Lt Gen Guglielmo Nasi, faced the borders with French and British 
Somaliland, as well as including much of central Abyssinia. The fourth command, the Juba 
Sector, was under the command of Lt Gen Gustavo Pesenti, who was responsible for 
Somaliland, where it bordered with Kenya, and the famed Juba River defensive line.205 
 The Italian forces in East Africa, days prior to the declaration of war, was organised 
into two divisions, namely the Savoy Grenadiers and the Africa Division. These two divisions 
accounted for 16 Italian battalions, 28 independent Colonial brigades, 17 independent 
Colonial battalions, two companies of medium tanks, one squadron of light tanks, a 
squadron of armoured cars, eight Colonial cavalry groups, 12 artillery groups, 22 Irregular 
Banda groups and 15 smaller Banda detachments.206 In June 1940, Aosta could account for 
a total force of approximately 291 000 men, 39 light tanks, 126 armoured cars, more than 
800 guns, artillery and an array of further personal and support weapons. This force grew 
day by day as more units were mobilised for active service.207 The Italian armies in East 
Africa outnumbered their British counterparts by ten to one.208 However, the fighting qualities 
of these Italians were dubious.209 According to a military intelligence appreciation from the 
office of the Director General of Operations, Col P. De Waal, their quality ranged from good 
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to bad, to indifferent. The most efficient were the enlisted men of the Savoy Grenadier 
Division, which included battalions of Bersaglieri, Alpini, Grenadier and Blackshirt troops. 
There were also crack Italian white troops in the artillery and cavalry, and in the machinegun 
battalions, as well as in the light tanks and armoured cars. The remainder of Aosta’s forces 
consisted of local East Africans in the Italian Colonial units, who were of varying fighting 
ability and questionable loyalty. The Italian Native Irregular levies, collectively referred to as 
Banda, were used to patrol and guard the long borders of a vast East African empire. 210 The 
Italian forces in East Africa, were thus perceived to be extremely strong, and remained a 
daunting threat on paper to British outposts in Kenya, the Sudan and British Somaliland. 
Mussolini’s pre-war adventures and aggressive foreign policy would cost him dearly in the 
following years.211 
The topography of East Africa, and the climate and communications, conferred a 
tactical and strategic advantage in defence upon the Italians and did not favour the 
employment of armour forces. The mountains, rivers and lakes, and the bush together 
formed a natural defensive barrier all along the Italian frontiers. The Abyssinian plateau, 
covering more than half of Italian East Africa, provided an excellent defensive position, 
especially against attacks originating from the Sudan or Kenya. The Kenyan Highlands, in 
turn, offered the Allied forces a strong defensive position from which they could protect their 
lines of communications stretching into the Northern Frontier District (NFD).212 The NFD, 
situated between the Kenyan Highlands and the Abyssinian border, comprised of a low lying, 
waterless, semi-desert which had very few defendable positions. During the rainy season, 
the NFD turned into a quagmire which proved a great obstacle to any force trying to traverse 
it.213 All important roads from the NFD converged on the Kenyan Highlands, which could be 
used to form a strong defensive line in the event of an Italian invasion. Lake Rudolph, 
situated to the west of the Kenyan Highlands, formed the Allied left flank, whilst the Tana 
River formed the right flank of the Kenyan Highlands from Garissa. The coastal route from 
Malindi to Mombasa had two ferry crossings, which could both be easily outflanked by Italian 
forces. East Africa could at best be described as bush country situated below 4000 feet 
above sea-level, however, certain areas consisted of impenetrable jungles which severely 
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curtailed the movement of men and machines.214 Already in 1939, South African defence 
planners, situated in the office of the CGS, realised that an advance into Abyssinia from the 
south or west would be extremely difficult, owing to the relentless topography. It was 
believed that Italian forces in East Africa, despite their numerical superiority over the Allies, 
were too few for the Duke of Aosta to consider an advance across the NFD into the Kenyan 
highlands. Thus, it was realised that the NFD would have to be defended by a series of 
artificial defences around the available water sources and a large body of troops.215 
 
Fig 2.1: A typical East Africa scene, circa 1940.216 
 In terms of climate, East Africa had intense variations in rainfall and temperature, 
which, in turn, fostered a diverse disease ecology. When combined, the extreme rains, 
varied temperatures and the prevalence of disease, made East Africa an extremely difficult 
terrain in which to conduct operations, whether of an offensive or a defensive kind. There 
were two distinct rainy seasons in East Africa; a ‘small’ one towards the latter of the year, 
and a ‘big’ one from April onwards. In the NFD, Italian Somaliland, Southern Abyssinia and 
the Kenyan Highlands, rainfall was generally recorded between the months of March to 
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about September/October.217 The rainfall, however, always consisted of thunderstorms, and 
this in turn greatly affected the movement of armed forces. In the NFD, heavy rain turned the 
black cotton soil into an impregnable morass. Yet, despite the heavy rainfall and the 
presence of some large rivers, water remained a scarce commodity throughout the year.218 
The low lying areas of East Africa were described as arid and hot, with warnings against 
sunstroke, whilst the temperatures inland were considered to be moderate to cool and 
healthy. Due to the heavy rainfall and extreme temperatures in the NFD and the coastal 
areas, diseases were particularly prevalent.219 Malaria, especially common in the NFD, 
necessitated the issue of adequate supplies of Quinine. Dysentery, owing to the high levels 
of salts present in the soil and water, also caused major problems.220 The preponderance of 
the Tsetse flies and Horse sickness meant that no animal transport could be considered for 
an advance across the NFD. Horse sickness, however, disappeared once the higher 
altitudes of the Abyssinian highlands were reached.221 The South African defence planners 
situated in the office of the CGS, drawing from the experiences of the South African 
campaign in East Africa during the First World War, and from the personal experience of 
former officers such as Collyer, were all too aware of this.222 
 In terms of communications, the road network of Kenya was well established. Most 
roads in the highlands were classified as ‘all weather’ roads, while the remainder of Kenya’s 
roads were classed as ‘practically impassable’. Efforts were made during 1939-1940 to 
improve all roads to and from the defended outposts on the Abyssinian frontier. All roads in 
the NFD were to be converted to ‘all weather’ roads and in case of an Italian advance across 
the frontiers, these roads had to be of such a nature that they could be quickly destroyed. As 
a precautionary measure, in case of heavy rainfall and mud, all vehicles that passed through 
the NFD were to be equipped with chains.223 The Great North Road, connecting Pretoria with 
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Nairobi along the “spine” of Africa, stretched north from South Africa for 4209 kilometres. 
The road north was extremely good, which meant that a motorised column could reach 
Nairobi from Pretoria within 23 days. During wet weather, supply columns could still use the 
road, albeit with the addition of 10 days to their journey to compensate for the mud and 
swollen rivers.224 Abyssinian roads were considered to be relatively good and for ‘all 
weather’, something that presented Italian forces with the ability to deploy rapid 
reinforcements on all fronts of Italian East Africa. The road networks towards Sudan were of 
a far better nature than the roads in the south of Abyssinia.225 
 The railway network across the entire East Africa theatre consisted of a standard 
gauge of one metre and was in a relatively good condition. The main railway lines in East 
Africa were: Mombasa – Nairobi – Kisumu (930 km), Nairobi – Sagana – Nanyuki (148 km), 
Tanga – Arusha – Voi (436 km), Dar-es-Salaam – Mwanza (1229 km), and Jibuti – Addis 
Ababa (784 km). The Mombasa – Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam – Mwanza, railway lines 
could support in excess of 20 000 tons of freight per month, enough to ensure adequate 
supplies for two divisions in the field.226 The Tanga – Voi, and Jibuti – Addis Ababa, railway 
lines were, however, only able to support freight of up to 10 000 tons per month, and would 
need considerable expansion in order to sustain two divisions in the field. It was decided that 
locomotives from India would have to be provided in case of hostilities, as South African 
rolling stock could not be used in this theatre owing to the difference in railway gauges.227  
 The British ports in East Africa were Mombasa, Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam and Mwanza. 
After careful consideration by the South African defence planners, it was decided that 
Tanga, due to its capacity of handling only 10 000 tons per month and the close proximity to 
Italian aerodromes, would not be worth considering as a major supply port. The port at Dar-
es Salaam was found to be unsuitable, owing to the limit capacity of the railhead at Mwanza, 
and it was thus decided that Mombasa would be the main port for the supply of any 
foreseeable South Africa forces in East Africa. The port of Mombasa was, however, liable to 
be attacked by the Italians, and as such all defences around the port was increased.228 It 
was appreciated that the Italian forces in East Africa would be self-sufficient for up to a 
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period of 6 months, where after resupply would be necessary in case of offensive action. 
Italy would be forced to resupply its forces in East Africa via the port of Massawa, which 
would mean that it would have to capture Egypt in order to ensure the safety of its sea 
communications with its African empire. Allied troop movements to and from East Africa 
needed to be well guarded due to the presence of an Italian naval contingent at Massawa 
that might threaten Allied sea communications. The success of Allied, and in essence South 
African, operations in East Africa would therefore require the maintenance, and security, of 
all vital lines of communications to and from East Africa prior to the commencement of a land 
campaign.229 
The British East African possessions of Kenya, Sudan and British Somaliland, were 
vulnerable to Italian attack from the moment the war erupted, although London had hoped 
that Italy would remain neutral.230 The Italian navy and air forces might threaten British lines 
of communication through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and all along the East 
African coast. Unsurprisingly, London and Paris hoped to remain on a defensive footing in 
East Africa and not provoke any form of Italian aggression, which would divert attention and 
resources away from the main theatre in Western Europe.231 Notwithstanding in September 
1939, a second East African Brigade (EA Bde) was formed under Brig C.C. Fowkes, and 
started training at Dar-es-Salaam. However, not wanting to provoke the Comando Superiore, 
the battalions of the attached Nigerian Regiment were kept in West Africa, where they 
trained under the command of Brig G.R. Smallwood. By 11 September, the British forces in 
Kenya, under the command of Brig D.P. Dickinson, were bolstered by the arrival of the 22nd 
Indian Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery. The King’s African Rifles (KAR) were the only 
immediate troops available for the defence of Kenya, and by 21 September the formation of 
the 1st East African Light Battery had bolstered this force. 232  
 The Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command, Lt Gen Sir Archibald Wavell, 
concluded during January 1940 that the British possessions in East Africa could be 
defended, and the Italian force in Abyssinia attacked, with the addition of a comparatively 
small reinforcement of Allied troops. In order to invade Abyssinia, Wavell realised that the 
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British would have to control Berbera and Jibuti indefinitely, for these ports were the 
logistical lifelines of Abyssinia. In February Wavell visited Kenya, which had subsequently 
been placed under his command, and argued that, if sufficient numbers of troops were sent 
to East Africa, it would be possible to assume the offensive and attack the Italian forces in 
Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland should hostilities erupt.233 A month later Wavell was in 
South Africa to gauge the state of readiness of the UDF. He was clearly immensely 
impressed by what he saw and, in a letter to Gen Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, he stated: “I was impressed by what I saw of the South African 
Defence Forces. They seem to be making a big effort to produce a military force out of very 
little ... we should do everything possible to encourage the effort they are making ... if Italy 
came into the war against us, South Africa would fight her ‘all out’ anywhere in Africa”.234  
Smuts received a telegram from London that February, cordially reminding him of his 
suggestion the previous year that the UDF might provide troops for service in Kenya. The 
move of a battalion of the KAR to Iran and another to British Somaliland, necessitated 
London’s direct approach, as a mere precautionary measure, to dispatch a brigade of troops 
to Kenya as soon as possible.235 South Africa, however, only had one full time infantry 
formation in service, and as such the Field Force Brigade was unable to depart to East 
Africa immediately.236 Smuts accepted the British proposal and, on 7 February, informed the 
South African parliament that UDF operations would now extend as far north as Kenya and 
Tanganyika. The South African Defence Act, however, still limited the deployment of South 
African soldiers to southern Africa. An Africa Service Oath was introduced on 23 March and 
soldiers who signed it agreed to serve anywhere in Africa for the duration of the war. 
Distinguished by the red tabs on their epaulettes, the men who signed the Africa Service 
Oath formed part of the Mobile Field Force (MFF).237 Smuts informed the British War Office 
that a South African brigade group would be ready for service in East Africa by June. The 
UDF estimated that the South African contingent earmarked for service in East Africa would 
comprise of 19 618 men in all.238 
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 Whilst in Cape Town, to attend a parliamentary session, George Brink suggested to 
Smuts and Van Ryneveld that the UDF brigade group earmarked for service in East Africa, 
should comprise of units representative of large parts of the Union of South Africa. Smuts 
agreed, and it was suggested that the senior ACF regiments from the Cape, Natal and 
Transvaal would be mobilised as the need arose. The formation of the 1st South African 
Infantry Brigade Group was authorised on 13 May and placed under the command of Col 
John Daniel.239 In order to meet the manpower demands of this Brigade Group and its 
ancillary units, the UDF was fully mobilised in order to meet the immediate manpower 
requirements estimated at 139 000 men. The Brigade Headquarters was established at 
Kafferskraal, and the first volunteers for the Brigade Group arrived at the concentration area 
at Premier Mine by the end of May.240 The 1st South African Infantry Brigade Group, 
however, was a brigade in name only, and the units were still severely under-equipped 
considering that they were supposed to move to East Africa by June. The first South African 
soldiers to arrive in Kenya were the 1st Anti-Aircraft Brigade, who arrived on 1 June in order 
to protect the vital port of Mombasa.241 Operating in conjunction with the SAAF, these South 
African soldiers were the first soldiers of the UDF to serve operationally outside of South 
African territory since the end of the First World War.242 
 
The Italian Declaration of War  
On 10 June 1940, Count Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the British 
Ambassador to Rome that as of midnight, Italy would be at war with the United Kingdom.243 
In East Africa, the news was greeted with great anticipation, as the SAAF pilots were readied 
at Mombasa for a possible attack by Italian bombers on the port. Yet, much to the disbelief 
of the airmen, no attack was forthcoming. On 11 June, South Africa was effectively at war 
with Italy, after a declaration of war from Pretoria. The SAAF, immediately taking the 
offensive, attacked a large Banda camp at Moyale. This sortie was the first South African 
offensive action of the war.244  
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Back in the Union of South Africa, tensions ran high as a possible Italian invasion of 
the country was expected via the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Plan Z was put into 
motion and the 1st Transvaal Scottish with elements of No. 1 ACC was ordered to secure 
Komatipoort on the Portuguese East African border in case of an invasion on the night of 10 
June.245 The men of the Transvaal Scottish and No. 1 ACC secured Komatipoort and 
returned to Premier Mine, having learned valuable lessons about the movement of a large 
body of men and vehicles via road. The armoured cars were, however, not employed 
offensively, and the lessons they learned were more centred upon road movement, fuel 
consumption and convoy discipline. The Italian declaration of war brought the Second World 
War closer to South Africa, for the closest threat to the Union’s sovereignty was now merely 
6400 kilometres to the north, on the border between Kenya and Abyssinia.246 
 Towards the end of June, the Duke of Aosta ordered pensive thrusts into British East 
Africa to gauge the resilience of the Allied defences. On 2 July, Italian forces attacked the 
British frontier outpost of Moyale.247 British Moyale was only defended by a company of the 
1st KAR, but, despite a considerable numerical weakness, the East African soldiers managed 
to beat off the Italian attack. The British position was immediately reinforced, in order to 
prevent the loss of a strategic frontier outpost. On 4 July, Italian General Vincenzo Tessitore 
attacked Kassala in the Sudan with a force of 12 000 men. Major General William Platt 
briefly defended Kassala with three companies of the Sudanese Defence Force but was 
forced to retreat for fear of being completely overrun.248 At Gallabat, situated on the Sudan-
Abyssinian border to the north of Lake Tana, the 27th Italian Colonial Battalion and 1st Banda 
Group drove off its defenders and continued to route the Sudanese police at Karora and 
Kurmuk with the help of Italian air and artillery support. The Italian offensives, albeit limited, 
highlighted the numerical inferiority of the British forces in East Africa and caused some 
concern for Gens Platt and Dickinson.249 The Kenyan frontier especially needed 
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reinforcements, and thus the arrival of the 1st South African Brigade was anticipated eagerly 
by Dickinson.250 
 
The South African Preparations for War in East Africa 
In South Africa, a month after the 1st South African Brigade (1st SA Bde) was mobilised, Col 
D.H. (Dan) Pienaar was appointed commander of the brigade on 19 June. The South African 
infantry, still under training at Premier Mine, anxiously awaited the order which would see 
them depart for the front in East Africa.251 Throughout June and July, steady streams of 
South African units arrived in East Africa via road and sea, including artillery, engineers, 
armour, medics and various other ancillary units. The units which travelled to Kenya by road 
traversed the spine of Africa along the Great North Road. The Great North Road connected 
Pretoria to Nairobi, a distance of approximately 4000 kilometres, which were covered within 
23 days in dry weather conditions. By mid-May, the 5th South African Infantry Brigade (5th SA 
Bde) had been formed at Pietermaritzburg under the command of Brig B.F. Armstrong, and 
the brigade was immediately mobilised to full strength in order to deploy to East Africa later 
during 1940. By 25 June, the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade (2nd SA Bde) was 
established, with Col F.L.A. Buchanan as its commanding officer.252  
Across the length and breadth of South Africa, various ACF units were mobilised to 
meet the massive manpower demand placed upon the UDF by its commitment to serve in 
East Africa.253 During June, Dickinson received a force multiplier in East Africa with the 
arrival of Smallwood’s 23rd Nigerian Brigade, as well as the 24th Gold Coast Brigade (GC 
Bde) under the command of Brig C.E.M. Richards. The impending arrival of the 1st SA Bde 
necessitated the formation of two divisions in East Africa and the 11th and 12th African 
Divisions254 were established towards the end of June, under the command of Maj Gens 
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H.E. de R. Wetherall and A.R. Godwin-Austen respectively.255 These two divisions formed 
part of the main part of the East Africa Force, tasked with defending, and eventually 
conquering, East Africa.256 By 27 June, Pienaar’s men received the warning order for their 
impending move to Kenya, and by 17 July the men were en route to arguably the start of one 
of the greatest adventures in South Africa’s war history.257 Smuts, at the farewell parade of 
the 1st SA Bde on 1 July258, parted with his troops with the following words: “You are going to 
face danger, hardship and sacrifice – perhaps death itself...You will become better and 
stronger men. You will not return the same as you went ... you will have that proud 
consciousness that you have done your duty by your country...”259 
 On 24 July the 1st SA Brigade disembarked at Mombasa, and proceeded by rail to 
the South African Advanced Supply Depot at Gilgil in the Kenyan Highlands. At Gilgil, 
situated to the north of Nairobi, Dan Pienaar moulded his brigade into an efficient fighting 
force, amidst the large number of Allied troops concentrating in the Kenyan Highlands. The 
South African troops were officially welcomed to Kenya on 31 July by the Governor, Sir 
Henry Monck-Mason Moore.260 The seeming monotony of a ‘standard’ 40 hour ‘civil service’ 
week was followed by the South Africans under training at Gilgil.261 These were indeed care 
free days for the South African soldiers, who often had enough time in between the training 
for a safari, or a hunt, or to explore the Kenyan countryside.262 The apparent lacklustre 
attitude present at the South African camp at Gilgil disappeared rapidly following news that 
Godwin-Austen’s 12th African Division had been forced to abandon British Somaliland due to 
the Italian invasion of that territory on 5 August. By 14 August, all forms of British resistance 
in British Somaliland had petered out, with the retreat of the 12th African Division from 
Berbera. The Duke of Aosta’s forces had captured British Moyale, bringing the Italian threat 
to Nairobi seemingly a step closer, although Churchill believed the possibility of an Italian 
expedition advancing across the NFD, and directly threatening Nairobi, was 
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incomprehensible.263  Dan Pienaar was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance of north-
western Kenya in lieu of a possible South African move to the NFD.264 
 By the end of August, the three battalions of the 1st SA Bde were ordered forward to 
the Kenyan-Abyssinian border.265 The Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Rifles (Dukes) was ordered 
to the Turkana sector in north-western Kenya, and occupied Lodwar, Lokitaung, and Kalin. 
This placed a severe burden on the South African logistic system, as the men from Cape 
Town were now effectively 640 kilometres away from the 1st SA Bde HQ at Gilgil. The 
position at Lodwar, headquarters of the Dukes during their sojourn at Turkana, was 
immediately strengthened by defensive works, and the SAEC developed the water supplies 
in order to provision the troops with enough drinking water.266 By 6 September the Royal 
Natal Carabineers (RNC) and the 1st Transvaal Scottish (TS) were attached to the East and 
West African forces in order to complete their training. The 1st TS moved to Habaswein on 
18 September, whilst the men from the RNC moved into their positions at Wajir on 17/18 
September.267 Towards the end of September, Pienaar’s 1st SA Bde was effectively 
deployed over a front of 1600 kilometres. Whilst deployed to the frontiers, the South Africans 
completed combined training with their East and West African counterparts, allowing further 
time for the men to get accustomed to the particular operational climate of the NFD.268 
 By August, Churchill was pressing for an Allied offensive in East Africa. His main 
concern was centred on the South Africans and the extended time Wavell was allowing them 
to acclimatise to East African conditions. Wavell argued that the South African soldiers 
needed more time to acclimatise to the harsh climate of the NFD than their African 
counterparts, a point Churchill contested. Churchill, disagreeing with Wavell, alluded to the 
fact that the UDF troops in Kenya were some of the finest soldiers a commander could have 
at his disposal in the wide open expanses of the NFD, and that they were sufficiently trained 
for offensive operations. 269 In the Union, force development was moving more swiftly, and 
by 13 August the 1st SA Div had been established under the command of Brig Gen George 
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Brink. The 1st Division comprised the 1st SA Bde deployed in Kenya, and the 2nd and 5th SA 
Bdes still assembling in South Africa.270 
 During October, Maj Gen George Brink, newly promoted, journeyed to Kenya for 
discussions with Dickinson on the arrival and future employment of the 1st SA Division. 
Dickinson had, prior to Brink’s arrival, requested Van Ryneveld to provide a South African 
divisional commander and staff to join his command. This was necessary, Dickinson argued, 
for the fact that it was envisioned that UDF troops might at some time resort under the 
command of one of the African divisions, whilst African formations might at times be 
commanded by the South African division.271 Whilst in Kenya, Brink paid a visit to Pienaar’s 
Headquarters at Habaswein to discuss the proposed employment of the Division and its 
brigades. Pienaar, in low spirits due to the deployment of his troops across a 1600 kilometre 
front, was eager to impress upon Brink his concern about being attached to an African 
division. Brink, possibly sharing Pienaar’s sentiments, urged Van Ryneveld to discuss with 
Smuts the unfavourable position of the UDF in East Africa.272 
 Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde arrived at Mombasa on 21 October and journeyed to the 
South African Infantry Base Depot at Gilgil.273 Four days prior to their arrival, the troops of 
the MFF in East Africa were designated as simply ‘South African Forces’ by East Africa 
Force Headquarters. Upon arrival at Gilgil, the 2nd SA Bde started an intense period of 
training that culminated with battlefield manoeuvres.274 A meeting was held at Khartoum on 
27 October between Smuts, Anthony Eden (the British Secretary of State for War), Wavell, 
Platt, Dickinson, Van Ryneveld, and Lt Gen A.G. Cunningham.275 Cunningham had been 
appointed as the General Officer Commanding East Africa Force, and effectively replaced 
Dickinson who suffered from poor health. The meeting agreed that, if the Italians could be 
driven from East Africa, valuable forces would be freed to join the Allied defence of the 
Middle East. Smuts correctly argued that all attacks on the Duke of Aosta’s forces in East 
Africa should be coordinated, so as to ensure unity of action.276 This offensive action could 
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only succeed if the strategic port of Kismayu was secured before advancing into Abyssinia. 
The capture of Kismayu before the invasion of Abyssinia would mean that the Allied lines of 
communication were considerably shortened. In doing so the logistical nightmare which 
could threaten to stem the Allied offensives in Italian East Africa would be nullified. By the 
end of the conference, Smuts, Eden and Cunningham agreed that the Allied offensive in 
East Africa would commence early in 1941. The offensive operations in East Africa were 
dependant on the rainfall, and thus had to be effected between December and March when 
a gap in the weather existed.277 
 
Fig 2.2: Planning for Operations: Brink, Cunningham, Smuts and Van Ryneveld.278 
 Smuts arrived in Nairobi on 29 October, together with Cunningham and Van 
Ryneveld, to inspect the South African soldiers undergoing training. The South African Prime 
Minister was greeted at Gilgil by a rousing reception offered to him and his entourage by the 
2nd SA Bde. After visiting Nanyuki, Smuts travelled to Garba Tula via the courtesy of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
information of the Minister of Defence – December 1939 to March 1940 and DOD Archives, 
UWH Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at GHQ Middle East 1-4 Dec 1940.  
Notes on Future Plans in Middle East. 
277  Birkby, Uncle George, pp. 99-100 and DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 16, File 23. 
Security of East and Southern Africa – An appreciation of the situation from the point of view 
of the Chief of the General Staff of information of the Minister of Defence – December 1939 to 
March 1940. 
278  Ditsong National Museum of Military History, Reference Library, Photographic Collection. EA 
454A – Gen. Smuts (centre) in conference with his Staff Officers at Government House 
Nairobi. Lt. Gen. Cunningham, G.O.C. East Africa Force (second from left), and Lt. Gen. Sir 
Pierre van Ryneveld, Chief of the General Staff (fourth from left) and Maj. Gen. G.E. 
Brink(left). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
48 
SAAF, whose fighters almost shot him down as his aircraft flew over Archer’s Post in the 
NFD. 279 After visiting Garba Tula, Smuts travelled to Habaswein and Wajir to visit the South 
African troops already deployed along the Kenyan-Abyssinian frontier.280 Back in Nairobi, 
Smuts paid further calls to every possible South African depot and mess, in order to greet 
the South African troops and offer them words of encouragement, and he left East Africa 
confident that a decision had at last been reached as to an offensive in East Africa.281 Eager 
to ensure that South African soldiers take part in the ‘fighting’ war and show that South 
African soldiers were ready to fight and die for the British Commonwealth, the decision to 
move over to the offensive in East Africa suited Smuts. The decision to finally move over to 
the offensive, must have found favour with Churchill as well. In fact, the bond between 
Smuts and Churchill probably pushed Wavell and Cunningham to an early offensive.282 
 The Headquarters of the 1st SA Div was established at Gilgil on 11 November, and 
the 2nd SA Bde was immediately attached to it. It was envisaged by Cunningham’s 
Headquarters that Brink’s Division would assume command of the area between Wajir and 
the eastern shore of Lake Rudolf, where after the 24th GC Bde would be attached to it.283 
Brink and his staff reconnoitred the road to Marsabit on 20 November, along which his lines 
of communication would stretch.284 On 25 November it was decided that Brink would be 
responsible for the Marsabit area only, whilst the 12th African Division would concentrate at 
Wajir. A renewed request to allow Pienaar’s men to join the 1st SA Div was declined by 
Cunningham, based on the grounds that it would be necessary to have South African ‘white’ 
troops with the 12th African Division to bolster their morale and fighting efficiency.285 
Armstrong’s 5th SA Bde disembarked at Mombasa on 27 November and journeyed to Gilgil, 
where they started their training cycle in East Africa. Brink officially took command of the 
Marsabit area on 1 December, establishing his Divisional Headquarters at Isiolo 
approximately 280 kilometres to the north of Gilgil. On the same day, Buchanan’s men took 
over the defence of the entire Marsabit front from the 22nd EA Bde and soon South African 
troops occupied the outposts of Kalacha and North Horr, from where intensive patrols were 
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conducted towards Dukana, Maikona, Balessa, El Had, El Bes, Karsa, Kokoi and the shores 
of Lake Rudolf. The patrols, however, failed to establish contact with the Banda believed to 
be operational in those areas, whilst Brink used the lull to continue with the training of the 
Division. The 5th SA Bde continued their training at Gilgil, and only came under the 
operational command of the 1st SA Div by 16 December.286 
 
The Arrival of the South African Tank Corps in East Africa 
In June 1940, No.1 Light Tank Company (No. 1 LTC) embarked at Durban aboard the SS 
Inchanga for their voyage to Kenya and so became the first unit of the SATC to be deployed 
outside of South Africa during the war. The unit sailed from Durban on 8 June without any 
AFV to their complement and, upon arrival in Nairobi on 17 June 1940, they received twelve 
British Mark III light tanks, newly arrived from the Middle East.287 The Headquarters of No. 1 
LTC was established at Kabete, the erstwhile General Headquarters of the MFF, where 
training on the tanks commenced under the watchful gaze of instructors from the British 
Royal Tank Regiment. During this period, No. 1 LTC was commanded by Maj I.M.L. Kat-
Ferreira, who, by the end of July, had 91 men under his command. 288 Whilst undergoing 
training at Kabete, and in between bouts of trying to hunt elephants289, difficulties were 
encountered in transporting the tanks. The original 3-ton trucks used for tank transport duties 
were unable to transport the tanks effectively over the harsh terrain and so it was decided to 
rather use 5-ton trucks for the further drive north.290 
 By 1 August 1940, No.1 LTC was ordered to advance 128 kilometres west from 
Nairobi, where they were to join the 1st SA Bde at Gilgil for further training. In the meanwhile 
Maj P. Clark had replaced Kat-Ferreira as commander of the light tanks. Clark replaced Kat-
Ferreira after an unsavoury incident relating to unit discipline, where a court of investigation 
found that he was unable to exercise complete control over his men. Reports of 
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drunkenness, indiscriminate shooting in the town, and poor attendance of lectures given by 
the instructors of the Royal Tank Regiment, ensured that Kat-Ferreira received his marching 
orders. Upon his arrival at Gilgil, Clark was responsible for ensuring that the training of his 
men was focussed upon integrating the light tanks with the infantry during offensive 
operations.291 Primacy was given to training with the infantry, so that the tankers would know 
what to expect when fighting in an operation where they had to provide mutual support to 
one another. By 14 August, the company was ordered to leave Gilgil and travel via Nanyuki 
to the NFD. The final destination of the company was Arbo Wells, an area which had been 
constantly harassed by Italian Banda patrols since the outbreak of the war. Having travelled 
across large tracts of barren, waterless terrain via Isiolo, Benane, and Garba Tula, the 
company arrived at Arbo Wells on 17 August where they reverted under the command of 
Brig Richards’ 24th GC Bde.292 The company spent the remainder of the week training at 
Arbo Wells under the watchful guise of Maj Knox Peebles of the Royal Tank Regiment. By 
20 August, the company became the first UDF unit to be committed into action against the 
Italian Forces in the NFD, when they were ordered to undertake a patrol towards Lak Bor in 
order to engage a group of Banda irregulars known to be moving through the area. 293  
 
Fig 2.3: South African armoured car performance evaluated by Brink and his staff.294 
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 On 21 August, the light tanks, in conjunction with the East African Reconnaissance 
Squadron, proceeded from Arbo Wells to patrol the area at Lak Bor in the proximity of El 
Wak. Having departed from Arbo during the afternoon, the column only bivouacked at 22:00 
owing to the slow progress made by the large reconnaissance patrol. Just before midnight, 
however, the vanguard of the convoy was attacked by small arms fire, where after the 
infantry cleared the area of resistance. The convoy continued their advance during the early 
hours of 22 August, encountering slight resistance once more, until it reached the vicinity of 
the El Wak Aerodrome where a stronger Italian force was encountered. However, the 
infantry debussed and soon secured the area. By mid-morning, after investigating the El 
Wak aerodrome and its surrounds, the patrol verified that the area was lightly held by Italian 
Banda and they returned to their camp at Arbo Wells. By the end of the August 1940, the 
light tanks were returned to Habaswein where their training continued. 295 For the remainder 
of August and through to mid-December the men honed their fighting skills in their tanks and 
carried out routine patrols across the NFD.296 
 In the meanwhile, No. 2 and No. 3 ACC, under command of Maj C.G. Walker and 
Maj S.B. Gwillam, disembarked at Mombasa on 4 October, where after the men journeyed to 
Gilgil where they encamped. There the men, expecting to be under training, were instead co-
opted into playing a friendly game of cricket at the Gilgil Country Club on 6 October, where 
after route marches were conducted during the following two days. The men furthermore 
received instructions to stay away from any brothels whatsoever, and to not associate 
themselves with any non-European women, nor to molest or interfere with any local 
Kenyans.297 The first patrol action undertaken by the South African armoured cars occurred 
during October 1940. After arriving in East Africa, the men of No. 2 ACC initially encamped 
at Gilgil where after orders were received to advance to the Mitiburi camp at Thika. The men 
arrived at Thika on 8 October after a short train journey from Nairobi, only to find that their 
armoured cars had been attached to the same train after their arrival at Mombasa. The men 
once more reacquainted themselves with their fighting vehicles, and steadily became familiar 
with their surroundings. On 12 October, the men and machines of No. 2 ACC journeyed to 
Garissa on the border with Italian Somaliland, where they subsequently joined the Nigerian 
Brigade on 14 October. Shortly after their arrival at Garissa, Walker and his men were 
ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force in the dense countryside between Liboi and 
the Italian Somaliland border. The reconnaissance, conducted by a platoon of armoured cars 
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under the command of Walker, scouted towards the vicinity of Hagadera which was roughly 
56 km from Liboi. Having found no Italian forces in the vicinity of the Hagadera waterhole, 
Walker and his men encamped for the night.298 
 The next morning Walker and his armoured cars journeyed to Liboi.299Two sections 
of armoured cars, under Lt G.J. Labuschagne and Lt. G.T. Loser, were ordered to advance 
on the Italian Somaliland border and make contact with the enemy. The two sections of 
armoured cars were instructed by Walker not to attack a superior force for the fear of being 
captured or subsequently destroyed. Having advanced to within three kilometres of the 
border, the two sections of armoured cars were attacked by a small enemy force. Having 
rushed through the mortar, machinegun and rifle fire, the armoured cars managed to engage 
the enemy with their own Vickers machineguns. The armoured cars were unable to flank the 
enemy outpost due to the dense bush, but the South African fighting patrol did, however, 
proceed to the border where after they turned around and engaged the enemy outpost once 
more on their return journey to Garissa. This brief action, fought on the border of Italian 
Somaliland, was the first independent South African fighting patrol undertaken exclusively by 
the men of the SATC in the East African theatre during the war.300 
 The first independent brush of the armoured cars with the enemy, on the Italian 
Somaliland border during October 1940301, was of immense tactical and strategic value for it 
influenced the employment of the armoured cars for the entire campaign. Owing to the fact 
that the South African armoured cars were never before employed in an offensive role, their 
first attack was used to measure the effectiveness of the machines themselves, the 
weaponry and the tactical battle handling of the armoured cars in East Africa.302 It was soon 
established that the mechanical maintenance of armoured cars was crucial during offensive 
operations, even when a complete mechanical overhaul was impossible owing to rapid 
advances across large tracts of country. The engines, springs and U-bolts of the armoured 
cars were taking such a severe strain, that it was believed that the cars would not last many 
months more. The arrival of the, new, four-wheeled-drive armoured cars was therefore much 
anticipated. Bulletproof tyres were a necessity during offensive operations, for a tyre 
                                                        
298  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
13/9/40 to 31/10/1940 and DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File East African Campaigns. 
2 SA Armd Car Coy 4 Jan 1940 – 30 Apr 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, 21-22. 
299  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File East African Campaigns. 2 SA Armd Car Coy 4 Jan 
1940 – 30 Apr 1941 and Simpson, South Africa Fights, pp. 187-188. 
300  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
13/9/40 to 31/10/1940 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, p. 22. 
301  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
13/9/40 to 31/10/1940 and Simpson, South Africa Fights, pp. 187-188. 
302  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
13/9/40 to 31/10/1940 and DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File East African Campaigns. 
2 SA Armd Car Coy 4 Jan 1940 – 30 Apr 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 22-24. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
punctured by rifle fire, or the African bush, could have dire consequences for the crew it they 
were left stricken in a waterless, hostile, territory. The Italian tactics, as initially experienced 
by the armoured cars, was centred on a road ambush where the bush was particularly 
dense. By using the dense bush to impede the manoeuvrability of the armoured cars, and 
often through the assistance of an anti-tank trap, the Italian attackers would then bring down 
a merciless mortar and machinegun fire on the armoured cars. The Italian hand grenades 
and rifle fire had no effect on the armoured cars and was not considered a severe threat to 
the operability of the armoured cars. The impracticality of tactically training armoured car 
crews in the wide open countryside of the South African Highveld was recognised for actual 
employment in East African was in terrain marked by dense bush that limited operability. It 
was recommended by Labuschagne that training in South Africa should occur in terrain 
similar to that of East Africa, and an area north of Pretoria, towards the Pienaars River, was 
deemed to be similar. An operation by an armoured car section in the East African theatre 
was a challenge due to limited visibility, the dense bush and difficult terrain, and thus mutual 
support between the armoured cars often proved difficult.303 
 The men of No. 2 ACC spent the remainder of October 1940 with the Nigerian 
Brigade at Garissa, where they were slowly accustomed to the rigors of operational duties in 
East Africa. The brief sojourn at Garissa was indeed an adventure for the South Africans, for 
during their stay they were twice bombed by the Regia Aeronautica and a certain Nagel 
strayed from camp where after he was chased up a tree by a lion and elephant – not at the 
same time. By the end of October, No. 2 ACC was ordered to return to Mitiburi camp whilst 
No. 3 Platoon, under Lt G.M. Stegmann and Lt J.B. Dunning, remained at Garissa on patrol 
duties in the vicinity of Hagadera and Galma-Galla. The men of No. 3 Platoon were relieved 
by Lt C.A.H. Heard’s No. 2 Platoon on 12 November, who continued with the allotted patrol 
duties along the Italian Somaliland border.304 November 1940, however, brought with it 
extremely heavy rains which turned most roads in the Northern Frontier District into 
quagmires. This bogged down the South African armoured cars and Lt Heard and his patrol 
was even missing for the better part of four days. The remainder of No. 2 ACC meanwhile 
received 14 new four-wheeled drive Marmon Herrington armoured cars with bulletproof tyres 
at Mitiburi camp during November. By mid-November 1940, in anticipation of Cunningham’s 
offensive, No. 1 Platoon left Gilgil for Wajir, where they would join Pienaar’s 1st SA Bde in its 
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preparations for the forthcoming attack on El Wak. The main compliment of No. 2 ACC, 
however, joined the 2nd SA Bde at Marsabit towards the end of 1940.305 
 By 15 December, No. 1 ACC had arrived in East Africa, and arrived at Gilgil on 17 
December. The Company’s armoured cars were at Gilgil three days later, where after Maj H. 
Klein and his company was ordered to occupy a forward area close to Marsabit. The men 
were attached to Brink’s Division and expected to be employed in the El-Yibo – Gorai – 
Hobok triangle and further afield in the Galla Sidamo.306 No. 3 ACC in the meantime 
journeyed from Habaswein to Wajir, from where they were ready to join the 1st SA Div’s 
offensive in early 1941.307 Thus, by December 1940 the SATC units were dispersed all along 
the Kenyan-Abyssinian border, awaiting the commencement of Cunningham’s offensive. No. 
1 ACC was attached to Armstrong’s 5th Brigade, whilst No. 2 ACC was attached to 
Buchanan’s 2nd Brigade. No. 3 ACC was attached to Pienaar’s 1st Brigade, who in turn 
resorted under the command of the 12th African Division. No. 1 LTC was attached to 
Richards’ 24th GC Bde, which was also attached to the 12th African Division.308 
 
The Advance into Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland Planned 
During the first week of December, Wavell called for a conference with General Officers 
Commanding of East Africa and the Sudan, Cunningham and Platt, to decide on a future 
course of action for the combined offensives to be launched in East Africa during 1941.309 
Cunningham wished to deploy the South African brigades around the high ground of 
Marsabit, for it was believed that European troops would be unable to operate in the 
unhealthy coastal belt. Wavell stated that only one South African brigade would be able to 
operate along the coastal belt, despite renewed South African attempts to convince the 
conference that a concentrated thrust along the coast, past Kismayu, would directly threaten 
Addis Ababa.310 British Intelligence had failed to consider the use of an advance along the 
coast, past Kismayu, as a feasible plan of attack, despite the fact that this territory had no 
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mountain barriers or escarpments which could block the advance of invading troops.311 The 
area which Cunningham had instead earmarked for Brink’s offensive operations meant that 
the 1st SA Division would have to traverse sparse, waterless, bush country, crisscrossed with 
mountain barriers and escarpments that impeded an advance on Addis Ababa from the 
NFD.312 
 During the conference, Wavell emphasised that the offensive operations in the 
Sudan and in Kenya needed to be synchronised in order to maximise the advantages of 
combined operations.313 Wavell and his staff were convinced that the Massawa-Asmara 
area, Jibuti and Addis Ababa served as the strategic nerve centre of Italian East Africa, and 
if threatened in unison, Italian resistance would crumble piecemeal. By deciding to make use 
of irregular warfare and forces all along the frontiers of Italian East Africa, Wavell could 
conserve the British regular forces in Kenya for a final push. Wavell, after intense 
deliberation with his staff, decided that Cunningham’s offensive in East Africa would be 
formed on three pillars. The UDF predicted this course of action during 1939 and, a 
comparison of the documentation with that of the Khartoum Conference of 1940, show 
Smuts’ influence upon Wavell.  
Perhaps, Smuts and Churchill gave Wavell no option in deciding his own course of 
action in East Africa.314 First, in the Sudan, Platt’s forces would have to capture the Kassala-
Sabdarat-Tessenei which occupied a triangle on the Sudan-Eritrea border. Second, from 
Kenya, a thrust was planned to take Kismayu, which would deny the Italians the use of the 
port, thereby severing all their logistical ties with the Italian mainland. A second operation 
was planned from Kenya that would threaten the area to the north and north-east of Lake 
Rudolf. Lastly, Wavell advocated that it was necessary to spark, and lead, a patriotic Shifta 
revolt in Abyssinia, which would harry the Italian lines of communication and make the 
countryside ungovernable. South African defence thinking in 1939 already questioned the 
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viability of the launching of such a revolt in southern Abyssinia, especially over fears that it 
might leave large tracts of the countryside ungovernable.315 
 Upon his return to Nairobi in December, Cunningham decided that the offensive 
operations aimed at capturing Kismayu would only be attempted during May or June of 
1941. The capture of Kismayu, designated Operation Canvas, was the East Africa Force’s 
most important objective, for its capture would relieve pressure on the port of Mombasa. The 
key to the capture of Kismayu was the advance on and capture of Gelib and the Juba River, 
which would shorten the Allied front in East Africa and provide another sea base for the 
logistical supply of the East Africa Force.316 Cunningham’s decision to retard the launch of 
Operation Canvas was based on a number of considerations, some which frustrated Pienaar 
and his staff. Firstly, Cunningham argued that a shortage of water supplies prevented the 
movement of such a large body of men over an area mainly devoid of water. Secondly, 
Italian morale was thought to be extremely high after the capture of British Somaliland and, 
thirdly, some of the troops, notably the 25th EA Bde, were not yet fully trained for offensive 
operations. Finally, Cunningham argued that he did not have sufficient motorised transport to 
provision his troops on the long lines of communications that would be created by an 
advance on Kismayu. 317 Cunningham therefore decided that an advance on the frontier 
would be affected immediately, in order to establish a defensive line along Colbio-Dif-Wajir-
Huri Hills-Dukana along the frontier with Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. A series of 
administrative facilities and supply depots would subsequently be established along this 
defensive line in order to secure sufficient logistical stockpiles before Operation Canvas 
would commence.318 
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Map 2.2: The intended South African area of operations.319 
 Cunningham expressed his wish that the operations in the area to the north and 
north-west of Lake Rudolf, were to start as soon as possible. The southern Abyssinian 
province of Galla-Sidamo was to be attacked by Brink, for Wavell argued that the South 
African troops’ organisation and training were best suited to operations in this area. Wavell 
instructed Cunningham to employ these regular troops on irregular lines. It was argued that 
small, mobile, columns should be employed to harass and occupy Italian outposts, attack 
their lines of communication and ferment a Shifta revolt in southern Abyssinia.320 This style 
of warfare, as practiced by South Africans in the East African campaign of the Great War 
and advocated by Collyer during the interwar era, suited the South African psyche for mobile 
operations. The difference now, some 18 years on, was that the mounted infantry and 
cavalry had replaced their horses with motorised transport, armoured cars and light tanks, 
but the underlying principles of mobile warfare remained the same.321 Despite the fact that 
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the Somaliland operations received priority, Cunningham realised that Brink and his Division 
could play an active role in threatening Addis Ababa before the arrival of the rainy season. 
Cunningham believed that the northern front, offered the most direct line of approach to 
Addis Ababa despite the imposing geographical obstacles hindering any advance south.322 
 By that December, Cunningham’s East Africa Force comprised of approximately 
77 000 men, of whom 27 000 were South African. The Allied lines of communication in 
Kenya were stretched to its limit, and this was quite possibly a larger threat to Cunningham 
than the Italian presence in East Africa.323 His forward troops along the Tana River were 368 
kilometres from the nearest railhead, whilst Pienaar’s troops at Wajir were 480 kilometres 
from their nearest railhead. At Dukana, Brink’s two South African Brigades were as far 
forward as 624 kilometres from its nearest railhead, whilst the 25th EA Bde at Lokitaung was 
also in excess of 507 kilometres from its nearest railhead. The logistical problems associated 
with such distances from the rail infrastructure were immense. The roads connecting the 
railheads with the forward operating areas simply could not deal with the immense workload 
required in provisioning the thousands of troops, dispersed over a wide arc of operations, 
with all of their logistical needs. The construction of new ‘all weather’ roads therefore 
received priority, alongside the development of water supplies able to sustain the Allied 
advance across the Italian frontiers.324 In this regard, the men of the SAEC provided sterling 
work to the East Africa Force, maintaining above all 2080 kilometres of road prior to the 
commencement of the offensives. Cunningham realised that when his advance commenced 
in late 1940 and early 1941, his logistical problems would be enlarged due to his lines of 
communications being extended further into the heart of Italian East Africa.325 
 
Conclusion 
The year 1940 had indeed been a catalyst for change within the UDF. From a peacetime 
defence force, which had only been partly mobilised since the outbreak of hostilities in 
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September 1939, the UDF could account for an entire Division deployed in East Africa by 
December 1940. The East African theatre of operations, and more notably the topography, 
climate, communications and the nature of the Italian military forces, combined to create a 
unique operational situation in East Africa by December 1940. The threat of torrential rains, 
the extreme heat and lack of water in the NFD, and a sporadic communication infrastructure 
ever present throughout East Africa inhibited a rapid Allied offensive into Abyssinia and 
Italian Somaliland. The Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, and the subsequent 
capture of British Somaliland and areas of the Kenyan NFD by Mussolini’s ‘mighty’ armies, 
forced Britain to secure the safety of British East Africa. Smuts’ promise of troops for service 
in East Africa was readily accepted as the Italian threat level increased. The UDF troops 
operational in Kenya since June 1940 included four units of the SATC comprising of 
armoured cars and light tanks. During August and October 1940, two of the SATC units were 
employed in a combat situation for the first time and, as such, valuable lessons were learned 
by the units on their offensive abilities and the character of their Italian foe. Cunningham’s 
offensive, planned to be launched in early 1941, was influenced by Smuts and the South 
African defence planners who ensured that South African units would actively participate in 
the coming offensive operations. By the mid-December 1940, the South African units were 
poised, ready to take the fight to the Italians in Abyssinia and Somaliland. 
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Chapter 3 – Roads, Rivers and a Rout: South African Armour operations in 
Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia, December 1940 – May 1941 
 
“Cars were therefore used for the dual role of Armd Cars and Tanks, a very 
economical combination…The long approach marches ruled out the possibility of 
using tanks. The limited life of the tracks and the need for frequent rest periods for 
maintenance would have made the tanks less suitable.”326 
 
Introduction 
A vast number of troops had amassed on the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border by December 
1940, as they awaited deployment in Cunningham’s planned offensives for the coming year. 
Dan Pienaar and his brigade had been at Wajir, where they were attached to Godwin-
Austen’s 12th Division, for a considerable time. The SATC had two units in the vicinity, No. 3 
ACC with Pienaar’s brigade, and No. 1 LTC with Richards’ 24th GC Bde.327 The Italian threat 
in Italian Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia was real enough, and Cunningham, eager to 
move over to the offensive on the border with Italian Somaliland, sought opportunity to 
secure access to vital water sources, a viable crossing, and a test of his troops’ fighting 
capability. The role played by the SATC armoured cars and light tanks in the advance into 
Italian Somaliland is known to few and appreciated by fewer still. Yet, it was these initial 
actions that shaped the experience of South African armour during the remainder of the 
Second World War, in both a positive and a negative fashion.328  
This chapter’s primary aim is to seek an understanding of the employment of the 
South African armour in offensive operations in Italian-Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia. 
In order to fully understand the employment of the South African armour in this operational 
area, the chapter has a further three secondary aims. The first is to discuss the Allied attack 
on El Wak and to highlight the specific role played by the South African armoured cars and 
light tanks during the action in December 1940. Second, the chapter describes the Allied 
offensives in Jubaland and Southern Abyssinia, with a specific focus on the armoured 
support that the SATC provided to these operations. Finally, the chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the advance on Addis Ababa, and the final actions fought around Dessie, 
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Combolcia, and Amba Alagi, and highlight the changing roles of armoured cars in East Africa 
as dictated by the changing topography. 
 
The Battle of El Wak: South African Armour in Action 
Throughout December 1940, Cunningham grew eager to launch an offensive somewhere 
along the Kenya - Italian Somaliland border, due to mounting pressure from Wavell, 
Churchill and Smuts. The planned offensive was important for three reasons. Firstly, an 
offensive would reduce the vast area of no-man’s-land between Cunningham’s position and 
that of the forward Italian troops. Secondly, such an offensive would provide Allied engineers 
with the opportunity to improve vital communication links and water sources in the NFD in 
order to support Cunningham’s planned offensives into Italian Somaliland and Southern 
Abyssinia during 1941. Lastly, by attacking isolated Italian outposts and through sustained 
offensive patrols, Cunningham believed that moral ascendancy could be gained over the 
Italian troops. Cunningham, referring to this scheme as his ‘cutting-out operations’, was 
pressurised by Wavell, Churchill and Smuts to move over to an early offensive in East Africa. 
The 1st SA Bde was concentrated at Wajir where it was undergoing rigorous training. 
Cunningham believed that the culmination of the Allied troop’s training in the NFD should be 
an attack on an Italian defended locality. After the first locality chosen for an attack was 
found to be devoid of Italian troops, Cunningham decided that the defended Italian outpost 
of El Wak would suffice as an objective. The entire force earmarked for the offensive against 
EL Wak, carried out a full battle dress rehearsal prior to the launch of the operation which 
gave the troops, and their commanders, valuable insights as to their specific roles. The 
stage was thus set for the opening salvos of the campaign in East Africa.329 
Prior to the Allied advance on the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border, aerial 
reconnaissance conducted by the SAAF provided Godwin-Austen with valuable intelligence 
on the Italian defensive dispositions as well as on the approaches to El Wak. The anticipated 
Italian positions in the area around El Wak meant that an envelopment of El Buru Hachi, 
British El Wak, El Ghala, Zareba, and Italian El Wak were needed to effectively rid the area 
of Italian defenders.330 Godwin-Austen realised that owing to the thick bush, an Italian 
withdrawal from the area could be expected at the first sign of an Allied advance. A 
successful envelopment demanded unity of action between the attacking forces. Godwin-
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Austen had two brigades at his disposal for the attack: Richards’ 24th GC Bde and Pienaar’s 
1st SA Bde. Richards’ brigade, codenamed DICKFORCE for the attack on El Wak, had No. 1 
LTC attached as his armour element. Pienaar’s fighting column, called PINFORCE, had No. 
3 ACC for its armour spearhead.331 
 
Map 3.1: The proposed plan of attack on El Wak – December 1940332 
It was proposed that PINFORCE and DICKFORCE leave Wajir on 14 December and 
make for their respective staging areas in the proximity of the British Landing Ground close 
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to El Wak before first light on 15 December, where after no movement was to occur during 
daylight. Once dusk settled in, DICKFORCE would advance on and occupy the British 
Landing Ground, where after it would be split into two separate columns. Column A, 
consisting of the 1st Bn Gold Coast Regt and No. 1 LTC, would attack through BOUNDARY 
CUT, a tactical point demarcating the Kenyan-Somaliland border for the operation, and 
occupy the Italian objectives in Area X. The South African tanks were ordered to support the 
infantry advance throughout the attack, and clear a road through the border cutting in order 
to allow the advance to continue unabated towards Area X. Column B, consisting of the 
Dukes and A Squadron 1st East African Armoured Cars, was to threaten the Italian 
objectives at Areas Z and Y.333 PINFORCE was to advance on BOUNDARY CUT, and 
hence occupy Zareba and the objectives at Areas V and W. During the attack on El Wak, 
No. 3 ACC had four distinct roles allocated to it prior to the commencement of the operation. 
First, to lead the PINFORCE column from Wajir to the debussing point at BOUNDARY CUT. 
Second, the armoured cars were to clear a way through the dense scrubland, to allow for the 
infantry advance, for a distance of approximately 6 800 metres.334  Third, they were to clear 
the locality of the Zareba in conjunction with the RNC (Carbineers). And finally, once Zareba 
was secured, the armoured cars were to travel east to protect the flank of the 1st TS 
(Transvaal Scots).335 
The advance of DICKFORCE was extremely rapid throughout 14 December, at one 
stage reaching average speeds in excess of 25 km/h. The South African tank-transporters, 
however, struggled with the rapid pace of the advance and the trucks suffered considerable 
mechanical damage. By midday the tank transporters had reached their first objective, 
where after a halt was called for the remaining daylight in order to service the vehicles. At 
dusk the tank transporters once more moved off with DICKFORCE and reached Camp M 
well before midnight. On 15 February, the South African tanks advanced on BOUNDARY 
CUT in conjunction with the 3rd Gold Coast Regiment, where they acted as the vanguard for 
the advance of the entire force. When this advance guard neared the area around the British 
Landing Ground, they came under fire from Italian defensive positions, where after an 
“intimidatory” attack was launched. The infantry attack, developed around the flanks of the 
position, and was supported by No. 1 LTC when resistance died down. The attack had 
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barely been joined, when Richards and the remainder of DICKFORCE arrived at the British 
Landing Ground. Richards ordered Clark and his tanks to join Column A and accompany 
their advance through the dense bush towards the border cut.336 
 During the night of 15 December, Clark’s light tanks trampled a road through the 
dense scrubland to the border cut, allowing the infantry of Column A to advance steadily 
behind them. The tanks could, however, only advance with the assistance of the infantry, 
due to the trying nature of the terrain over which the advance occurred. No mechanical 
breakdown or deficiencies were recorded, which is a testimony to the sterling work 
performed by the men of the Light Aid Detachments under stern operational conditions. The 
commander of Column A, Lt Col I.R. Bruce of the 1st Gold Coast Regiment, ordered his force 
to advance to a position approximately three kilometres to the north of the British Landing 
Ground to guard against a surprise attack, where after the men bivouacked for the 
remainder of the early hours of the morning. By daybreak the South African tanks were 
ordered forward to a position east of the border cut, approximately 800 metres to the south 
of the wire entanglements of the border. After a ten minute artillery concentration, the tanks 
were ordered to advance to the wire entanglements and then east for approximately 200 
metres whilst engaging all visible Italian defensive positions. This move allowed the East 
African engineers to use Bangalore torpedoes to blow apart the wire entanglements. The 
tanks of No. 1 LTC advanced on Area X and proceeded with mopping up operations, which 
were retarded due to limited visual control, the thickness of the bush and the rough nature of 
the terrain which impeded the armoured advance.337 
 After midday Bruce ordered Clark to take his tanks and reconnoitre the road from 
Italian El Wak to El Allu in order to determine the position of the remainder of the Italian 
positions to the east of the border cut. The advance of the tanks had no sooner started, 
when they surprised a strong Italian defensive post from the rear. After a brisk fire fight, the 
Italian defenders were forced to retreat, leaving a number of Italian field guns and 
machineguns behind. In conjunction with troops from the 1st Gold Coast Regiment, and 
Royal Engineers, Clark’s men cleared the post and destroyed all war material left behind by 
the retreating Italians, save the field guns. By the end of the day’s fighting, No. 1 LTC was 
ordered to remain under the command of Bruce’s Column A, who was subsequently ordered 
to Godwin-Austen’s Divisional Reserve. On 17 December the men of DICKFORCE started 
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their return journey from El Wak back to Wajir, and the South African tanks experienced 
considerable difficulties on the return trip. Mechanical breakdowns and bad roads hampered 
the movement of the tank transporters and approximately 32 kilometres into the journey 
Clark’s vehicles became separated from one another. By midday on 18 December, all men 
and machines of No. 1 LTC could be accounted for at Wajir.338  
 The PINFORCE fighting column advanced according to plan during 14 December, 
until forced to halt 64 km from Wajir. PINFORCE advanced quickly and thus caught the rear 
of DICKFORCE, who had halted for the remainder of the day. Fears abounded that Italian 
scouts on the Burwein Hills observed the advance, and thus the forces only moved out again 
well after dusk. No. 3 ACC reached their rendezvous point during the early hours of 15 
December, where after a defensive laager was established beyond the forward elements of 
Godwin-Austen’s Headquarters for the remainder of the day.339 By dusk, the armoured cars 
were ordered forward, but after three kilometres once more ran into the rear of DICKFORCE. 
The advance across the poor roads hampered the movement of the both fighting columns to 
such an extent that the armoured cars were ordered to advance across country in order to 
clear a way for the motorised transport. Approximately ten kilometres from the British 
Landing Ground, the armoured cars found the tank transporters of No. 1 LTC under attack 
by a group of Banda. This Banda attack was brushed aside by a swift fire-belt action by No. 
3 ACC, where after a halt was called in order to allow the 1st Transvaal Scots to catch up to 
the armoured cars. PINFORCE realised that unprotected vehicles provided easy targets for 
the Banda, and hence adapted its standing orders. The armoured cars had reached the 
British Landing Ground unscathed, but well behind schedule, and thus proceeded to lead 
PINFORCE to their debussing point in order for the attack on El Wak to commence at the 
scheduled time.340 
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Fig 3.1: El Wak burning after the South African victory.341 
 The armoured cars of No. 3 ACC, upon arrival at the debussing point at BOUNDARY 
CUT, advanced through the bush as per instruction, and effectively cleared a way for the 
infantrymen of the 1st Transvaal Scots during their advance.342 The armoured cars advanced 
on a bearing of 70° for 2 600 metres, where after an order was received for Gwilliam, OC 
No. 3 ACC, to contact the Carbineers before advancing on Zareba. The armoured cars 
advanced to within 1 000 metres of Zareba, and hence waited for an instruction from the 
Officer Commanding 1 RNC, Lt Col J. McMenamin, before advancing further. When the 
order was received, Gwilliam led his company into Zareba which was devoid of any visible 
Italian presence. Gwilliam advanced to a point 200 metres to the north of Zareba, where 
after several Italian artillery shells landed beyond his position.343 It was believed that the 
Italian gunners were firing at his dust, but this caused no damage to Gwilliam’s armoured 
cars. No. 3 ACC were ordered to move to the right flank of the 1st Transvaal Scots in order to 
provide fire support to them, but no sooner had the armoured cars moved when Pienaar 
ordered Gwilliam to take his armoured cars to the village of El Buro Hachi. This Gwilliam did, 
ordering his cars to occupy a position immediately to the north of the village from where a 
possible Italian counterattack could be halted. Pienaar later on ordered the armoured cars to 
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advanced 16 kilometres up the road, when a brief skirmish with some retreating Banda 
occurred 11 kilometres to the north of the village. PINFORCE withdrew from El Wak during 
17-19 December, with Gwilliam’s armoured cars acting as the rear guard and escort to the 
various elements of the 12th Division during the retro operation to Wajir.344 
 The South African soldiers, both infantry and armour, proved they were a worthy 
fighting force during the attack on El Wak. The attack was the first occasion where the SATC 
had undertaken a planned offensive action during the campaign in East Africa, apart from 
brief skirmishes with local Banda groups during the reconnaissance patrols undertaken 
during the latter half of 1940. The victory at El Wak was achieved at a relatively small cost; 
two South Africans soldiers killed and a handful of South African and East African troops 
injured. No damage was, however, recorded to any of the AFV. Such was the distinction 
shown by the men of No. 1 LTC, that Godwin Austin sent a personal note of thanks to the 
South African tankers for their valued efforts during the offensive action.345  
The Allied victory at El Wak was important for three reasons. First, the belief that 
Italian morale was far superior to that of the Allied forces was immediately proven wrong. 
Indeed, the opposite was proved, as most of the defenders around El Wak had simply 
chosen to retreat, rather than stomach a fight. The victory at El Wak ensured that the Allied 
morale was on the ascent, and that it would remain high for the remainder of the campaign. 
Second, after the fall of El Wak, the Italian High Command decided to withdraw all Italian 
forces to their defensive line on the Juba River. Only a handful of Banda were left to the west 
of the river to act as harassing troops, whilst two well-fortified Italian outposts remained at 
Afmadu and Kismayu. Finally, the victory at El Wak decided the pace, and intensity, of the 
remainder of the campaign in East Africa. The Allied thrust towards Addis Ababa was 
hastened by six months owing to the fact that Cunningham realised that it was possible to 
secure a firm foothold across the Juba River by the time the dreaded torrential summer rains 
arrived.346 
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Interlude to Somaliland Operations 
By the end of December, Clark and his men were ordered back to Nanyuki for a period of 
training with Wetherall’s 11th Division. The interlude in the offensive operations ensured that 
Clark and his men enjoyed a period of rest and recuperation, as well as the time to conduct 
much needed maintenance and repairs on their fighting vehicles and tank-transporters.347 
Whilst No. 1 LTC enjoyed a spell in the rear area, No. 3 ACC busied themselves with 
reconnaissance duties on the Italian Somaliland border. On 1 January 1940, one of 
Gwilliam’s platoons had effectively been attached to the 12th Division Headquarters. The lull 
in the fighting, caused by the Italian withdrawal towards their defensive line on the Juba 
River, meant that only a handful of Banda troops were still operational in the area between 
El Wak and Gobwen. By mid-January, a platoon from No. 3 ACC was ordered to accompany 
a fighting patrol, consisting of the Carbineers and the Dukes, towards Moyale. Intelligence 
reports indicated that a large Italian force occupied the area of Korondil, Dobel and Ajao in 
the proximity of Moyale. Pienaar issued clear and concise orders, the Italian troops were to 
be located, and then either killed or captured.348 This aggressive reconnaissance served as 
a diversionary attack, in order to keep the Duke of Aosta guessing as to the true intention of 
Cunningham’s forthcoming offensive. By forcing the Duke to redeploy his troops across a 
wide front, Pienaar had in fact created the necessary diversion needed for the 5th and 2nd SA 
Bdes to start its offensive operations against the Mega-Moyale complex without interference 
from the Italian garrison at Moyale.349 
 The armoured cars, under the command of 2Lt P.E.B. Halliwell, reported to Maj 
Flower at the Carbineer lines at Wajir. The patrol left El Bey two hours behind schedule, 
where after good speed was made across country with Halliwell’s armoured car leading the 
advance. Considerable confusion ensued when different orders were received by Halliwell 
throughout the operation, which seemed at times to him that Maj N.A. Deane of the 
Carbineers tried to countermand the decisions of Flower. Halliwell clearly expresses his 
displeasure in the state of events, stating that it “was most unfair to Flower, who was in 
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charge of the operation”.350 The indecisiveness which reigned throughout the command 
cadre of the patrol, continued for the remainder of the journey towards Moyale. The patrol 
only made contact with a group of Banda close to Bactiti, who fired three shots towards the 
armoured cars and then fled. Numerous vehicle tracks were, however, observed which 
indicated some form of Italian patrol activity in this sector. Halliwell, upon returning to Wajir, 
reported a lack of decisiveness to his higher headquarters in terms of the orders which were 
issued by the Carbineer officers throughout the patrol, especially Deane who did not 
understand AFV employment nor their battle handling. This unfortunate episode marred the 
entire patrol and affected its success.351 
 During January, Gwilliam took delivery of nine new Mark II Marmon Herrington 
armoured cars. The new vehicles, with a double plated turret, replaced some older cars of 
No. 3 ACC which had proved unable to deal operationally with the demands of the East 
African topography. On 20 January, under Pienaar’s watchful eye, a series of firing tests 
were carried out on one of the single plate turret Mark II armoured cars. It was established 
that the turrets were not impervious to sustained fire, and that vulnerabilities were still 
present. A further series of tests were conducted on the newly-arrived armoured cars during 
an operation towards Buna. A total of fifteen Mark II armoured cars travelled 336 kilometres 
across the East African terrain in order to test the four wheel drive and handling of the 
vehicles. The armoured cars gave no mechanical problems and Gwilliam reported that the 
cars ran perfectly and instilled confidence in their crews. Gwilliam, however, confided that 
the armoured cars needed bumpers, bullet proof tyres and adequate spares due to the 
nature of the terrain in which his cars were operationally employed. By the end of January, 
No. 3 ACC was poised to undertake further offensive operations into Italian Somaliland.352 
 
Thrust into Somaliland: Assault on Gobwen and Kismayu 
After the fall of El Wak, the Italian forces fell back to the Juba River, the only natural, 
defendable feature in Somaliland and the site of the main Italian defensive line. Two strong 
outposts, Afmadu and Gobwen, guarded the approaches to the Juba River.353 Afmadu 
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straddled the road junction between Gelib and Kismayu, while Gobwen protected a vital 
crossing over the river to Giumbo. Kismayu, at first glance, seemed to be an impregnable 
fortress: coastal artillery defended against possible seaward attack, while a combination of 
minefields, artillery and anti-tank ditches secured the town from landward attack. A large 
number of Italian troops, including a number of colonial infantry, garrisoned the town.354 By 
February, the men of No. 1 LTC once more joined the fight in Italian Somaliland, and were 
attached to Pienaar’s 1st SA Bde for the opening offensive of the campaign. The 1st SA Bde 
travelled to Eyadera on 4 February after concentrating at Gherille since 1 February, with No. 
3 ACC acting as an armoured escort to the column along the way.355 
Cunningham’s plan for the advance rested on three distinct pillars which required 
swift, sharp, action for the want of adequate supplies and water.356 First, Godwin-Austen’s 
Division would advance on Afmadu from Garissa. The attack by the 12th African Division 
would be split into two, with the 24th GC Bde attacking towards the vicinity of Gelib, whilst the 
1st SA Bde would attack south from Dif and hence capture Gobwen and force a crossing of 
the Juba River towards Giumbo. Pienaar had No. 1 LTC and No. 3 ACC at his disposal in 
terms of armoured forces. Second, whilst the two brigades of the 12th African Division carried 
out their respective offensive operations, aimed at envelopment, Wetherall’s 11th Division 
would advance on the coastal port of Kismayu, where after they would threaten Chisimaio, 
Bura, Kolbio and Lak Badana.357 These plans were confirmed verbally to the brigade 
commanders on 5 February by Godwin-Austen himself.358 The offensive into Italian 
Somaliland proved a bold move by Cunningham, for the logistical needs of his East Africa 
Force would be tested to its limits. The starting point for the planned offensive, Garissa, was 
already 368 kilometres ahead of the nearest railhead in Kenya. By pushing onto and 
capturing Kismayu, Cunningham’s lines of communication would be stretched by a further 
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448 kilometres. Cunningham hoped that the capture of Kismayu, with its port installations 
still intact, would relieve the pressure on his already extended lines of communication.359  
The troops of the 1st SA Bde, known as PINCOL360 for the advance into Somaliland, 
assembled at Eyadera on 12 February for the attack on Gobwen. Some days before, 
Godwin-Austen informed Pienaar as to the role envisaged for his Brigade during the 
upcoming offensive.361 Godwin Austin emphasised that “…the Infantry … alone, by vigorous 
assault by the bayonet, can win the day. They must not have any idea that a complete 
victory can be won by shattering the enemy by artillery and tanks … The tanks must not be 
left hanging about on the objective”.362 Gobwen, a small, strongly-fortified village on the 
western bank of the Juba River, was important mainly due to the presence of the ferry 
crossing to Giumbo. The plan for the attack on Gobwen and Giumbo was drawn up by 
Godwin-Austen’s staff, and it allowed for almost no personal discretion and independent 
action by Pienaar during the attack. Pienaar ordered a reconnaissance from his brigade’s 
staging area at Eyadera towards the satellite landing ground which was to serve as the 
marching off point for the advance on Gobwen.363 Klein laments the fact that Pienaar should 
have perhaps disobeyed his orders all together, for whilst waiting to commence his offensive 
the Italian forces were withdrawing from, and destroying the port installations, of Kismayu. 
This was a valid point, especially in view of the pressure on the overstretched lines of 
communication.364 The 12th Division’s staff was partly to blame. They insisted on a policy of 
complete radio silence and left the individual commanders with no personal scope for 
initiating patrols or aggressive reconnaissance. Pienaar, therefore, did not pass on the 
information about the Italian forces’ withdrawal from Kismayu to Godwin-Austen’s staff, and 
the Allied forces lost a valuable opportunity of capturing the port installations of Kismayu 
                                                        
359  Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 78-79 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV 
Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 
1941- Notes on Conference prior to launch of Juba Ops – Jan 1941. 
360  DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. 12th African 
Division Report on the Operations in Italian Somaliland Feb – Mar 1941. 
361  DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from 
Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Notes on Conference prior to launch 
of Juba Ops – Jan 1941. 
362  DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from 
Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Letter from Godwin-Austen to Pienaar 
6 February 1941. 
363  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 122, File – NarepEA4. 1st Sa Inf Bde Narrative of the 
Jubaland and Giuba River Operations 1-28 Feb 41. 
364  Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 79-81. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
intact, including its Italian garrison. This would have secured a much needed line of 
communication for Cunningham’s East African Force.365 
 
Map 3.2: The Allied advance on the Italian defensive line at the Juba River.366 
On 14 February, Gwilliam was forced to split up No. 3 ACC, in order to render 
assistance to the various fighting patrols of the 1st SA Bde. Pienaar’s main effort was 
directed at capturing Gobwen; however, he ordered Gwilliam’s No. 2 Platoon to take up a 
position astride the Gobwen-Chisimaio road to prevent the Gobwen garrison from 
escaping.367 An armoured car section, under command of Lt L.S. Steyn, assisted the 
Carbineers in preventing a number of Italian troops from retreating north, and subsequently 
capturing a number of them.368 The armoured cars of No. 2 Platoon had meanwhile 
encountered an Italian minefield on the Gobwen-Chisimaio road which, after being reported 
to brigade headquarters, was destroyed by the engineers. By the afternoon, Gwilliam’s No. 1 
Platoon led the advance of the 22nd EA Bde into Chisimaio without encountering any Italian 
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opposition.369 Pienaar realised that something was awry, when hardly any determined Italian 
resistance was encountered along the Chisimaio sector of operations. The South African 
attack on Gobwen was a disjointed affair. The South Africans spent most of the night 
marching across difficult terrain and relied exclusively on the tanks of No. 1 LTC to secure 
their route of advance through the thick thorn bush which was ever present. The tanks acted 
as bulldozers during the night’s advance on Gobwen, with scenes reminiscent of the attack 
on El Wak only two months before. On the morning of 14 February, the South Africans 
occupied Gobwen without a shot fired.370 
The Italian garrison of Kismayu, with the troops until recently in occupation of 
Gobwen, retreated successfully across the Juba River during the night of 13/14 February. 
The South African troops, upon occupying Gobwen, came under sustained Italian artillery 
and machinegun fire. The retreating Italian forces had set the pontoon bridge at Gobwen 
across the Juba River on fire, and when the South African troops attempted to reach it they 
came under such a sustained artillery bombardment, that it was estimated that over 3 000 
rounds had been fired at the South African troops.371 The tanks of No. 1 LTC extricated the 
stricken South African infantry, and successfully helped with the evacuation of the wounded. 
The troops were ordered to find cover amongst the sand dunes and buildings surrounding 
Gobwen.372  
During the afternoon of 14 February, Godwin-Austen visited the forward areas to 
review the situation in person. Pienaar, in the meantime, carried out his own reconnaissance 
of the forward areas to ascertain his force’s position in and around Gobwen. En route to 
Gobwen, Gwilliam’s armoured car, which transported Pienaar, struck a landmine, causing no 
damage to the car or its occupants. The situation around Gobwen, however, remained rather 
dire. The initial plan, as laid out by Cunningham, had come apart owing to the fact that the 
South Africans were unable to immediately cross the Juba River and occupy Giumbo. It 
became evident to both Godwin-Austen and Pienaar that any attempt to cross the Juba 
River at Gobwen would be suicidal. The essence of surprise was all but lost, and Pienaar 
was ordered to reconnoitre a possible crossing to the north of Gobwen after the Italians 
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completely destroyed the remainder of the pontoon bridge during the night of 14/15 
February.373  
Despite the halt in the offensive by the 1st SA Bde, Cunningham’s East African Force 
made immense progress. A mere three days after launching their attack, Cunningham’s 
force captured a string of objectives. These objectives had seemed almost unattainable 
during the previous December. The rapid advance, coupled with the fact that the Italians 
soldiers made no viable defensive stand, ensured that Afmadu, Gobwen and Kismayu were 
captured by mid-February. As limited as these victories were, they did help boost morale.374 
The Juba line seemed almost impregnable to the South Africans at first sight. Prior to the 
attack, the river flowed extremely strongly and was consistently 178 metres wide. Destroying 
the bridges, the Italians ensured that the Juba River would effectively halt any advance. All 
viable crossings were registered as Italian artillery targets. The Duke of Aosta, believing that 
his forces could stem Cunningham’s advance at the Juba line, amassed the majority of his 
forces in Italian Somaliland for its defence. Both Cunningham and Aosta realised that once 
the Juba line was breached, the road into the southern Abyssinian highlands and the vast 
expanses of Italian Somaliland would be open. The forcing of the Juba line thus remained 
crucial to the success of Cunningham’s advance.375 
Pienaar decided that the 1st SA Bde, with No. 3 ACC in support, would attempt to 
force a crossing of the Juba River at Ionte, 22 kilometres upstream from Gobwen. The 24th 
GC Bde, with No. 1 LTC providing armoured support, would attempt a crossing further 
upstream at Mbungo, 48 kilometres to the north of Gelib.376 On the morning of 16 February, 
Pienaar and Gwilliam conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the Juba River up to Ionte, in 
order to ascertain a suitable crossing. Pienaar identified Ionte as such, and immediately 
received permission from Godwin-Austen to conduct a reconnaissance in the direction of the 
proposed crossing point. Two sections of armoured cars from No. 2 Platoon, subsequently 
reinforced by a company of Carbineers, were ordered on a reconnaissance patrol towards 
Ionte via Andaraf. Pienaar personally accompanied a fighting column to follow in the wake of 
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the reconnaissance patrol. Pienaar was advised by the 12th Division’s staff not to attempt a 
crossing of the Juba River, until such permission had been given by Godwin-Austen 
himself.377  
 
Map 3.3: The Juba River crossing at Ionte.378 
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Whilst the aggressive reconnaissance to the north was taking place, the armoured 
cars of No.1 Platoon were ordered to report to the Officer Commanding of the Dukes, Lt Col 
G.T. Senescall, at Gobwen. Senescall and his troops occupied positions to the east of 
Gobwen, and No.1 Platoon was subsequently ordered to conduct a reconnaissance of the 
western bank of the Juba River in order to establish the location of the Italian defensive 
positions.379 The armoured cars came under intense artillery, anti-tank and small arms fire 
from the opposite bank of the Juba when they approached a series of barbed wire 
entanglements on the western bank of the river. It was soon established that Italian fire from 
Giumbo was directed from the vicinity of the barbed wire entanglements. Quick decisive 
action by the armoured cars, through the means of a rapid fire-belt action by all cars, 
ensured that the Italian fire died down, once an Italian observation position had been 
identified and engaged with machinegun fire.380 The armoured cars continued to 
aggressively patrol along the banks of the river whilst at the same time engaging 
machinegun nests and observation posts all along the banks of the river. The cars moved in 
a line ahead formation and halted every 50 yards in order to lay down an immense volley of 
fire on the Italian defenders. The armoured cars, despite being hit frequently, suffered no 
losses during the four days in which they carried out patrols along the western banks of the 
river. This operation was, nevertheless, extremely taxing on the men owing to the weariness 
and shock of having to operate under constant fire between 16 and 19 February.381  
Pienaar’s advance on Ionte continued untroubled, despite various reports of Italian 
activity and movements in their general vicinity. No real opposition was encountered during 
16 February, and Pienaar entered Ionte during the late afternoon, where after the men 
bivouacked 5 kilometres from the river.382 On the morning of 17 February, Pienaar secured a 
temporary bridgehead across a ford in the Juba River at Messandro. The fording of the river 
was unopposed and some men of the 1st Transvaal Scots secured the crossing with the 
assistance of armoured cars from No. 2 Platoon of No. 3 ACC.383 Despite the fording of the 
Juba River at Messandro, Pienaar continued with the remainder of his force towards Ionte 
and the original crossing he had had in mind. The crossing at Ionte was not only more 
conducive for the construction of a pontoon bridge, which could handle heavy motorised 
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traffic, but the river was also only 60 metres wide at this point. An infantry patrol immediately 
crossed the river and secured the eastern side of the river bank at Ionte, where after 
Godwin-Austen gave permission for a crossing to occur at the best time possible. Godwin-
Austen ordered Pienaar to cross the Juba at Ionte, cut the Giumbo-Gelib road, and hence rid 
the Giumbo area of all forms of Italian resistance.384  
 
Fig 3.2: South African armoured car crossing the Union Bridge at Ionte.385 
On the evening of 17 February, the Italians counterattacked at Ionte just as two 
companies of men from the 1st Transvaal Scots were crossing the river. Gwilliam’s armoured 
cars, once again, had to come to the rescue of the stricken infantry, and under immense 
machinegun fire laid down by the armoured cars the Italian counterattack was halted. The 
Italians attacked once more at midnight, and then again at dawn on 18 February, and on 
both occasions the attack was beaten back by the accurate fire of the armoured cars of No. 
3 ACC.386  An Italian officer, who surrendered that morning, informed the South Africans that 
every man of the attacking force had either been killed or wounded. The remainder of the 
day was uneventful, and was spent waiting upon the Engineers to finish the construction of 
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the pontoon bridge. At midday on 19 February ‘Union Bridge’ was completed by the South 
African Engineers. The Juba River was successfully bridged, and the road to Giumbo was 
wide open for the South African advance to continue. Prior to the bridge being completed, A 
Company of the 1st Transvaal Scots moved inland from the river in order to defend the 
Giumbo-Gelib road. These men immediately came under intense fire provided by the 195th 
Colonial Infantry, supported by artillery and anti-aircraft fire.387 
As soon as the bridge was completed by the SAEC, five armoured cars under the 
command of 2Lt H.J. Anderson raced across in order to support A Company of the 1st 
Transvaal Scots. The armoured cars attacked the Italian position from their southern flank, 
and charged their positions in a line abreast formation. The ‘cavalry charge’ by the South 
African armoured cars paid dividends, for Italian resistance crumbled immediately and the 
Colonial infantry broke ranks and fled into the bush.388 The armoured cars sustained no 
losses, whilst the South African infantry suffered only two wounded. The Italian casualties 
were immensely higher, with more than 40 dead soldiers found on the battlefield, and a 
considerable number wounded. The South African crossing of the Juba at Ionte ensured that 
most Italian resistance in the Giumbo-Gelib sector was crushed.389 
Whilst the crossing of the Juba occurred at Ionte, the remainder of 1st SA Bde at 
Gobwen attacked the Italian positions immediately opposite their defensive position. During 
the afternoon of 19 February, 2Lt Halliwell with No. 1 Platoon armoured cars, proceeded 
along the river bank from Gobwen, firing into the palm trees and bushes of the opposite 
bank. A number of Italian colonial troops had concealed themselves in this vegetation. 
Acting in unison with the armoured cars, the South African Artillery (SAA) bombarded the 
opposite bank with 20 rounds of immensely concentrated fire.390 The results were 
instantaneous, with the defenders suffering nearly 100% casualties. During the night of 19 
February, the remainder of the Italian Colonial troops had withdrawn. When the armoured 
cars acting in support of the Carbineers and the 1st Transvaal Scots, closed in on Giumbo 
during the following morning, the remainder of the Italian troops left behind, surrendered. 
The town of Giumbo had formally surrendered to a company of the Dukes who had 
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managed to ford the river at Gobwen during the morning of 19 February, and their haul 
included 14 field guns, a variety of war material, and almost the entire Italian garrison of 
Giumbo.391 
At Mbungo, the 24th GC Bde and No 1. LTC had a relatively easy crossing of the 
Juba River. The immense artillery barrage which had been concentrated on Gelib, gave the 
Italian Command sufficient warning that an Allied attack was forthcoming in this sector. The 
bridgehead at Mbungo was subsequently attacked by an Italian force, however, the attack 
was futile and the attackers showed little, if any, resolve nor determination to fight, again 
reminiscent of the actions at El Wak during December 1940.392 Godwin-Austen decided that 
Gelib should forthwith be enveloped and ordered his Brigades forward. The 22nd EA Bde 
was ordered to cross at Mbungo and cut the Gelib-Mogadishu road to the east of Gelib. The 
24th GC Bde was to attack Gelib from the north, whilst one of its battalions attacked the town 
from the West. Lastly, Pienaar’s Brigade would advance on Gelib from Gobwen and Giumbo 
in the south, straddling the river as they advanced.393 
During the afternoon of 20 February, after having crossed the Juba River at Ionte, the 
men of No. 3 ACC proceeded to advance towards the vicinity of Margherita which was 
situated roughly midway between Giumbo and Gelib. The armoured cars of No. 1 Platoon, 
under command of Halliwell, advanced unperturbed for 22 km, when they encountered 
strong artillery and machinegun fire. Due to the late hour, and the difficult terrain, it was 
deemed too late to bring the brigade artillery into action, and it was thus decided to bivouac 
en route for the night, out of the reach of the Italian artillery. The SAA, however, true to their 
form, worked ceaselessly to be able to move into position during the night so as to be ready 
for action early the next day. The following morning, just after sunrise, the armoured cars 
continued their advance on Margherita and brushed the sporadic Italian resistance aside 
without the South African infantry even needing to debus due to the fact that most of the 
Italian soldiers had withdrawn during the night.394  
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When the South African troops were only a mere 6 kilometres from their objective at 
Margherita, strong Italian opposition was encountered. The defenders, two battalions of 
Colonial Infantry supported by two batteries of field artillery, immediately attacked the 
advancing South Africans. The SAA was rendered ineffective by the dense vegetation, which 
limited their observation and ability to fire. The armoured cars once more proved their mettle, 
and acted as mobile observation positions whilst constantly wiring back information to the 
SAA. The South African gunners attacked with a counter artillery barrage, and succeeded in 
permanently silencing the Italian artillery, whilst at the same time inflicting severe losses on 
their infantry. The South African infantry found the approach march to Margherita extremely 
difficult owing to the thick vegetation, and thus the armoured cars advanced forward without 
the supporting infantry. After the Italian guns had been silenced, Gwilliam’s armoured cars 
advanced forward and routed the remaining defenders of Margherita. By mid-afternoon on 
21 February, Margherita was entirely cleared of its Italian defenders, and the South Africans 
could account for 500 prisoners taken, as well as the capture of 3 field guns, 16 
machineguns, and approximately 20 vehicles.395  
On the morning of 22 February, the final advance on Gelib commenced. The 
advance from the south was fashioned on a two prong approach. The Carbineers and the 
Dukes396, with 2 sections of armoured cars under Halliwell in support, pushed directly on 
Gelib, whilst the Transvaal Scots with support from No. 2 Platoon armoured cars advanced 
on the Gelib-Mogadishu road in order to cut the vital road and link up with the 22nd EA 
Bde.397 The armoured cars, which supported the Carbineers advance, attacked a company 
of Italian Colonial Infantry during the early morning approximately 8 kilometres south of 
Cansuma. The armoured car attack was so unexpected that 22 Italian soldiers were 
immediately killed, which proved enough to convince the remainder of the defenders to 
surrender without a fight. By midmorning, the Carbineers column was 5 kilometres from 
Gelib when the armoured cars again encountered resistance which they brushed aside 
without any trouble. This brief skirmish accounted for the further capture of several 
machineguns, prisoners, and various military stores. The advancing South African troops 
reported that Gelib was clear of all Italians shortly before midday. However, owing to a 
sustained SAA barrage which lasted until 13:20 in the afternoon, the town could not be 
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occupied. Throughout the remainder of the afternoon, sporadic fighting occurred all around 
Gelib, including the well-known white flag incident during which the Carbineers lost several 
men.398 The South African armoured cars continued to lend invaluable fire support to the 
advancing infantry, suffering only two men injured for the day’s fighting when Halliwell’s 
armoured cars were engaged by an Italian Breda anti-tank gun firing from close proximity. At 
13:20 on the afternoon of 22 February, the Carbineers entered Gelib from the south.399 
Meanwhile, the secondary force, ordered to advance on the Gelib-Mogadishu road, 
found the going extremely tough owing to bad terrain and the advance proceeded rather 
slowly. Gwilliam’s No. 2 Platoon led the advance of this column and shortly before midday 
made contact with the remnants of the retreating Italian forces from Gelib. Despite a 
sporadic attack by Italian pockets of resistance, the armoured cars quickly forced their 
surrender after a show of force. By 14:30 on the afternoon of 22 February, the Transvaal 
Scots column managed to cut the Gelib-Mogadishu road and link up with the 22nd EA Bde. 
The haul for the entire day included a vast number of both black and white prisoners taken, 
and numerous military stores and vehicles captured.400  
Within a month, Godwin-Austen and Wetherall’s Divisions crushed the Italian 
presence in southern Italian Somaliland. The crossing of the Juba River ensured a swift, 
calculated advance into Italian Somaliland, accounting for a vast haul of Italian prisoners 
being taken, including the capture of vital military installations, territory, and stores. Despite 
the fact that a large number of Italian forces escaped the clutches of Cunningham’s 
advance, the Duke of Aosta was left to ponder what his next move would be. The successful 
crossing of the Juba before the big rains, and the complete destruction of the Regia 
Aeronautica by the SAAF, meant that the hinterland of Italian Somaliland was now open for 
a rapid advance. The capture of Gelib on 22 February assured Cunningham that he could 
successfully reach, and capture, Harar by simply sustaining his advance against the 
weakened and demoralised Italians in Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia.401  
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Advance on Addis Ababa 
On 23 February Wetherall’s Division assumed command of the advance on Mogadishu, the 
hinterland of Italian Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia. The 1st SA Bde, along with the 
remainder of the 12th Division, now resorted under the Force Reserve of Cunningham’s East 
Africa Force and Godwin-Austen was tasked with mopping up operations in the Gelib-
Margherita area.402 No South African troops formed part of the Allied advance from the Juba 
River on Mogadishu. The tanks of No. 1 LTC, which had since been attached to the 11th 
Division, and formed part of the vanguard of the further advance into Italian Somaliland, but 
due to the tremendous pace of the advance, Clark and his tanks were forced to retire to the 
rear. During the evening of 25 February, the 23rd Nigerian Brigade, along with some East 
African Armoured cars, entered Mogadishu without encountering any resistance. In fact, 
Italian resistance had ceased altogether 32 kilometres before Mogadishu was reached.403 
The rapid Nigerian advance covered a remarkable distance of 440 kilometres between 23 
and 25 February. The capture of Mogadishu ensured a further haul of Italian equipment, 
which included 350 000 gallons of petrol, 10 000 rifles, and vast stores of war material and 
food. By the morning of 26 February, Cunningham could account for 400 000 square 
kilometres of Italian territory being captured since the start of offensive operations in Italian 
Somaliland during 1941. Cunningham’s troops all but completely destroyed the Italian 101st 
and 102nd Divisions, which included over 30 000 combatants captured, killed or dispersed 
across large tracts of East Africa. According to Klein, the armoured cars and tanks of the 
SATC had played a minor, yet crucial, part during the offensive operations up until the 
capture of Mogadishu.404 This remains a fact that is reinforced through the battlefield 
successes of the armoured cars and light tanks of the SATC during the offensive in Italian 
Somaliland.  
Cunningham hence tasked Wetherall’s 11th Division to advance on Addis Ababa from 
Mogadishu, via Harar, whilst Godwin-Austen and his Division would advance into Southern 
Abyssinia in the direction of Dolo and Neghelli. No. 3 ACC, assisted Richards’ 24th GC Bde 
during their advance into southern Abyssinia, and together they captured Bardera, Iscia 
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Baidoia, Lugh Ferrandi and Dolo between 26 February and 5 March.405 Henceforth, the 1st 
SA Bde came under command of Wetherall’s 11th African Division for offensive operations 
towards Harar and then Addis Ababa. The new route of advance negated the effective 
employment of the South African armour.406 The terrain suddenly changed from the dense 
bush and open desert flats which were characteristic of the Somaliland coastal belt, and 
conducive to the employment of armour, to the sweeping mountainous region which 
dominated Southern Abyssinia. The South African armoured cars were, thus, primarily 
confined to roads and tracks owing to the mountains impeding the advance into southern 
Abyssinia, and hence lost complete freedom of movement.407 
 
Map 3.4: The Allied advance on Addis Ababa.408 
When the 11th African Division resumed their advance from Mogadishu, No. 1 LTC 
remained behind in camp owing to the rapid advance. Meanwhile the 23rd Nigerian Brigade 
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started their advance north towards Jijiga along the tarred Strada Imperiale built by 
Mussolini’s engineers during the latter half of the 1930s. The Nigerian advance followed 
closely in the wake of the retreating Italian forces, which were never afforded the opportunity 
to offer any form of organised resistance until the southern Abyssinian mountain ranges 
were reached. By 17 March, the Nigerian Brigade arrived, and briefly halted, on the plains of 
Jijiga. Jijiga was the last barrier between the fixed Italian defences at Marda Pass and 
Southern Abyssinia.409 The advance from Mogadishu, 1190 kilometres in 17 days, secured 
two main objectives for Cunningham’s East African Force. Firstly, by 16 March the Italian 
presence in British Somaliland had completely vanished in turn ensured that the port of 
Berbera could now be used as the main supply port for Cunningham’s advance into 
Southern Abyssinia. This greatly reduced the pressure on Cunningham’s lines of 
communication in East Africa. Secondly, the Italians, having received a severe beating since 
the latter half of January, were forced to retreat into the mountains of Southern Abyssinia. 
Wetherall and Cunningham were convinced that the conquest of Abyssinia was at hand.410 
The Allied operation to capture the Italian defences at Marda Pass was supported by 
men of the SAA, along with five sections from No. 1 LTC who had caught up with the 
advance. The defences at Marda pass, situated just beyond the plains of Jijiga, could be well 
defended by a group of resolute soldiers. The terrain thus favoured the defence. The Italian 
defenders at the Marda Pass, the first organised defence since Gelib, however, only made a 
worthwhile defensive stand for approximately 24 hours, although the fighting at the pass was 
some of the sternest of the entire campaign in East Africa. By 21 March the Nigerian infantry 
had capture all Italian defensive positions under accurate artillery fire from the South African 
gunners.411 The detachment of No. 1 LTC was involved in mopping up operations around the 
flank at Goggiar, and during the ensuing action managed to capture 80 prisoners and 4 
Italian guns. Meanwhile, the men of No. 3 ACC had joined the rest of the 1st SA Bde at Jijiga 
whilst the attack on the Marda Pass was in progress.412 Curtailed by the terrain and 
extensive Italian anti-tank traps built along the top of the pass, No. 3 ACC could not be 
employed effectively at the battle of the Marda Pass. One specific tank trap, encountered 
along the approaches to the summit of the Marda Pass, was almost 5 metres deep. The 
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major problem, however, was the fact that each anti-tank trap was a registered Italian 
machinegun and artillery target. The Italian anti-tank traps were furthermore protected by a 
series of landmines and barbed wire entanglements. All in all, any attempt to commit 
armoured cars in offensive actions against such obstacles would have proved futile. 413 
 
Map 3.5: The Battle of the Marda Pass.414 
After breaching the Italian defences at the Marda Pass, the 11th African Division 
continued with their advance on Addis Ababa in all earnest. By 25 March, the decision had 
been made to relinquish No. 1 LTC to Divisional Command, which meant that it would have 
no further offensive role to play in the advance on the Abyssinian capital. The advance had 
outpaced the offensive speed of the tanks, and their immense petrol consumption placed a 
considerable burden on their attachment to the forward operating brigades. Instead, the men 
of No. 1 LTC, along with the 22nd EA Bde, were redirected to further offensive operations in 
the area where the Battle for the Lakes started during April.415 The employment of No. 3 
ACC also changed drastically after the Allied success at the Marda Pass. The armoured cars 
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would henceforth be confined to road patrols, and would for the remainder of the campaign 
in East Africa, be deployed along the lines of general reconnaissance and protective duties 
owing to their mobility. In essence, the armoured cars were relinquished to act as mere 
mobile machinegun posts, a role they essentially played for the better part of the entire 
campaign in East Africa from December 1940.416 
Following the capture of Harar on 25 March, the men of the 1st SA Bde assumed 
vanguard duties during the advance on Diredawa situated along the Addis Ababa-Jibuti 
railway. The initial 32 kilometres directly beyond Harar passed over a high plateau of rugged 
hills, 2100 metres above sea level, where after the road suddenly dropped 1200 metres 
through a series of spirals towards Diredawa. The route of advance from Harar to Diredawa 
was indeed through some of the wildest mountain country in Abyssinia, and thus not suitable 
armoured car country. The retreating Italian forces, had systematically demolished a series 
of vital bridges across deep gorges along their retreat from Harar. A further five craters were 
blasted into the side of the mountain pass connecting Harar with Diredawa, which held up 
the Allied advance. Sterling work performed by the South African and Nigerian engineers 
allowed the advance on Diredawa to continue within a mere 36 hours from when the first 
obstacle was encountered. Diredawa was occupied on 29 March, without the slightest form 
of resistance being offered by the Italians.417 
The final advance towards Addis Ababa had only one more serious obstacle in its 
way, the Awash River. The Italians retreated via two distinct routes towards Addis Ababa 
from Diredawa. The first group retreated via the Miesso road, whilst the other retreated via 
Deder and Asba Littorio towards Addis Ababa. The men of No. 3 ACC pursued the retreating 
Italians along the Miesso road relentlessly in the belief that they would spearhead the final 
dash towards the Abyssinian capital. Widespread evidence was now forthcoming that the 
Italian morale in East Africa had indeed been broken. The Miesso-Asba Littorio line was 
abandoned after a brief skirmish on 2 April, with the large scale surrender of Italian soldiers 
occurring almost daily across all fronts. The Italian forces in East Africa were disintegrating 
rapidly, and at Deder more than 800 Italian soldiers were made prisoners of war.418 The 1st 
SA Bde was poised to launch the final push on Addis Ababa, but due to inadequate supplies 
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of petrol on behalf of the South Africans, that honour fell to the 22nd EA Bde. The South 
Africans were indeed very disappointed in the decision to award the honour to the East 
Africans, especially when Wetherall argued that it would be impossible to provide adequate 
fuel to the South Africans. Wetherall simply wished to maintain the momentum of the Allied 
advance, in order to take the Abyssinian capital as quickly as possible South African 
disappointment was rather unnecessary, and ill-conceived, as the longest advances from 
Mogadishu had been led by the Nigerians and the honour was rightly afforded to them.419 
The Italian forces demolished the great steel railway bridge, as well as the road 
bridge, across the Awash River on 3 April. Having planned to make their final stand before 
Addis Ababa at the Awash River, the Italians put up a short-lived, spirited, defence. The men 
of the KAR, however, crossed the Awash River and captured a number of prisoners. The 
East African troops found scores of dead Italian soldiers in their defensive positions, a 
testament to their defensive resolve. The SAEC constructed a box-girder bridge across the 
Awash, while six East African armoured cars were manhandled across the river in order to 
advance further along the road to Addis Ababa.420 On the morning of 6 April, the men of the 
East Africa Force occupied the Abyssinian capital. As fitting recognition of the role that the 
armoured cars in general had played in the advance on Addis Ababa, an East African 
armoured car was at the head of the column that first drove into the city to accept the 
surrender. Wetherall formally accepted the Italian surrender of Addis Ababa from Gen 
Mambrini, the Italian Chief of Police on 6 April. On 7 April, the men of the South African 
infantry battalions proudly marched through the streets of Addis Ababa. The men of No. 3 
ACC did not share in the triumphant entry into Addis Ababa, for they were occupied with 
mopping up operations on the outskirts of the city. It was only on 8 April that the Gwilliam’s 
black bereted boys and their armoured cars drove triumphantly through the streets of Addis 
Ababa.421 
The capture of Addis Ababa brought with it a vast number of Italian soldiers captured, 
as well as the seizure of huge piles of Italian arms and equipment. One soldier from the 
Carbineers even described instances where thousands of Italian Lire was found, and ‘a room 
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full of cheese’, of which he naturally ‘liberated’ some for him and his mates.422 The advance 
of the East Africa Force was indeed one for the record books. From the outset of the 
campaign at Bura on the Kenyan frontier, to Addis Ababa, the men of the East Africa Force 
covered 2760 kilometres in a mere 53 days, averaging an advance of 51 kilometres per 
day.423 The Allied advance through Italian Somaliland had been extremely rapid, owing 
partly to the superb work of the South African and East African armoured cars. The 11th and 
12th Divisions could account for 22 082 Italian soldiers captured since the Allied offensive in 
Italian Somaliland started, with total Italian casualties of war amounting to a staggering 
50 000. The 11th Division suffered 100 men killed during the entire advance, with minimal 
South African casualties. The men of No. 1 LTC and No. 3 ACC played an invaluable role 
during the entire advance of the 11th and 12th African Divisions through Somaliland and into 
Southern Abyssinia. Their roles during the entire advance included reconnaissance, patrol 
duties, the laying of ambushes and more notably offensive action.424 
 
Combolcia and Dessie 
The fall of Addis Ababa did not see the end of hostilities in Abyssinia. Seven Italian divisions 
with approximately 200 artillery pieces continued operations in the Galla Sidamo area, 
known for its vast lakes and mountains. In the north, at Amba Alagi and Dessie, the Duke of 
Aosta and his Eritrean and Central Armies occupied a series of well-established 
mountainous defences where they intended making a final stand. The 11th Division’s 
advance from the south and Platt’s advance from Massawa in the north tightened the Allied 
noose on the Italian defenders at Dessie and Amba Alagi. Aosta and his command withdrew 
initially to Gimma, but, under orders from the Commando Superiore, the Duke retreated to 
Amba Alagi where he intended making his final stand. Had Aosta been allowed to surrender 
his forces after the capture of Addis Ababa, further bloodshed would have been prevented 
on both sides, however, Rome ordered that a final stand be made at Amba Alagi and Dessie 
to slow down the transfer of Allied troops from East Africa to the Middle East. During this 
time the German Afrika Korps had scored critical successes in the Western Desert, whilst 
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the Allies were forced to divert valuable manpower to Greece during the subsequent 
German offensives there.425 
 
Map 3.6: The Battle of Combolcia Pass.426 
By mid-April, the Italian position in East Africa was proving rather perilous. Platt’s 
Sudan Force, having fought a hard campaign through Eritrea, had captured Keren, Asmara 
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and Massawa, and was now providing strong pressure from the north on Dessie and Amba 
Alagi. The Shifta revolt, discussed in the next chapter, was steadily advancing from the west 
through some of Brink’s efforts, and the Patriot army successfully occupied Addis Ababa 
following the return of the Abyssinian emperor Haile Selassie. Meanwhile, the South African 
and Gold Coast troops were beginning an investment of the Italian defences in the central 
Abyssinian highlands. Cunningham was forced to clear the road to Massawa, in order to 
allow for the rapid transfer of the South African troops to Egypt once the campaign in East 
Africa had been finalised. After the capture of Addis Ababa, the men of the 1st SA Bde, along 
with its compliment of armoured cars, were compelled to undertake a series of clearing up 
operations in the vicinity of Gimma and the Omo River. During this phase of the offensive, 
the men of No. 3 ACC could not account for any major military encounters,427 but instead 
were preoccupied in rescuing of the stricken Italian civilian population around Addis Ababa. 
Marauding bands of Shifta, with their only goal centred on enriching themselves, caused 
widespread havoc across Abyssinia during 1941. The South African forces were redeployed 
to conduct counter-insurgency operations, a role they were not quite suited to, but yet 
carried out with distinction. The mobility of the cars allowed Pienaar to deploy his vehicles 
across a wide front.428  
During the remainder of April the employment of Gwilliam’s armoured cars changed 
drastically. An increasing number of policing actions were required around Addis Ababa, to 
prevent roving bands of Shifta from massacring the Italian civilian population. The complete 
collapse of Italian civilian and military power around Addis Ababa created a power vacuum 
that was exploited by the lawless Shifta. Gwilliam’s No. 3 ACC was tasked to determine the 
state of certain localities, receive the surrender of outlying Italian outposts, and extricate the 
stricken Italian civilian population and return them to the relative safety of Addis Ababa. The 
various armoured car platoons were hence ordered to conduct patrols towards Addis Alem, 
Ambo, Debra Berhan, Sendefa and Sciano.429 The results were the same for each patrol: 
considerable difficulties were experienced as Shifta bands questioned and tried to prevent 
the passage of the armoured cars to their destinations. Pienaar’s men also experienced 
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considerable difficulties with the Italian civilian population whom they were to extricate, often 
having to wait and commandeer transport in order to return them to the safety of Addis 
Ababa. On occasion, Gwilliam’s armoured cars, returning from Addis Alem, had to take 
offensive action against Shifta who attempted to loot the column under South African escort. 
Pienaar did not take kindly to this employment of his armoured cars by Divisional staff. In 
fact, he became extremely vociferous, blaming the Italians for wasting his soldiers’ time and 
for not providing their full cooperation. This was, all in all, not a happy period for the men of 
No. 3 ACC, occupied as they were with civil and policing actions.430 
 
Fig 3.3: The mountains of Abyssinia largely precluded the deployment of armour.431 
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Map 3.7: The Battle of Amba Alagi.432 
On 13 April, No.3 ACC was recalled from their mopping up operations around the 
Omo River and was instead diverted north to support the attack on the Italian mountain 
fortresses at Combolcia Pass and Dessie. Gwilliam, realising that the topography of the high 
mountains would severely hamper the employment of his armoured cars, argued that his 
vehicles could at most be employed in reconnaissance and support duties for the South 
African infantry patrols. A further hindrance in the deployment of the armoured cars was 
brought about by the arrival of the much dreaded summer rains. On 13 April, the men of 1st 
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SA Bde arrived at the Mussolini Tunnel during their advance on Combolcia Pass, and were 
part of a force that was attacked by three enemy aircraft. The Italians carried out a series of 
demolitions at the Mussolini Tunnel, which in turn impeded the South African advance for a 
couple of days. The sterling work of the South African Engineers meant that the obstacle 
was soon overcome and, during the afternoon of 15 April, the men were able to pass 
through the tunnel and journey to Debra Sina. By 16 April, the vanguard reached Giarri, with 
the remainder of No. 3 ACC moving to the rear of PINCOL until their arrival at Combolcia.433 
By 17 April, the Dukes, with a platoon of No. 3 ACC leading the advance, made contact with 
the Italian defenders at Combolcia Pass.434 The battle for Combolcia Pass itself was fought 
over five days in extremely steep and mountainous country, and this period was marked by 
some of the worst weather conditions of the entire campaign. The South Africans attacked 
the strong mountain fortress in the driving rain and mist, and their advance was met by 
acutely accurate artillery fire. The Italian defences around Combolcia Pass were extremely 
strong, well-positioned, and were defended with more courage and tenacity than shown 
throughout the entire campaign.435 
Throughout the five days of fighting in and around Combolcia Pass, the men of the 
South African infantry battalions continued to advance forward and upward. The Italian 
defences, covered by machinegun and artillery fire, were attacked piecemeal by the men of 
the 1st SA Bde.436 The victory at Combolcia Pass was a purely South African one, bar the 
work of a small band of Abyssinian patriots. The South Africans succeeded in capturing a 
superior mountain fortress which favoured the defenders. The Italians suffered 500 men 
killed, and in excess of 8 000 men captured, together with a host of arms and ammunition. 
The South African casualties were comparatively low, with a mere 10 men killed and 28 
wounded. The South African armoured cars failed to play a major role during the attack on 
Combolcia, and were relegated to providing escort and reconnaissance duties to the 
advancing infantry. The terrain dictated the employment of armour in East Africa. Gwilliam’s 
men provided as much support as possible and succeeded in helping the Dukes clear a 
number of roadblocks which impeded Pienaar’s advance. By 27 April, news was received 
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that the Italians at Combolcia had surrendered, and elements of No. 3 ACC was at once 
ordered to advance on the Assab road and Dessie. The town of Dessie surrendered to the 
advancing South Africans on 27 April without a fight. In conjunction with Platt’s Sudan Force, 
Pienaar’s Brigade was poised to fight its final battle in Abyssinia against the Italian 
stronghold at Amba Alagi. The employment of No. 3 ACC became more precarious by the 
day, as the topography of Italian mountain bastions prevented the employment of the 
armoured cars in an effective fighting role.437 
The battle for Amba Alagi was the final chapter in the complete collapse of 
Mussolini’s East African Empire, save for the battles fought up until the surrender of Gen 
Nasi in November 1941. The defences of Amba Alagi cut through the mountain passes, and 
were embedded into the mountain faces making it a natural fortress which favoured the 
defence. The Duke of Aosta instructed his Italian Engineers to construct vast machinegun 
emplacements which covered all avenues of approach up the mountain fortress. The Italian 
Engineers prepared all the roads for demolition, and they blew great slabs from the mountain 
sides to impede the Allied advance. With more than 10 000 defenders, and over a year’s 
supplies hidden away in secret caves, Amba Alagi seemed impenetrable from the outset.438 
Prior to the commencement of the battle, No. 3 ACC continued to occupy Dessie for the 
remainder of April, providing a picket of armoured cars for the defence of the town during 
each night. Gwilliam’s armoured cars played no active role in the fighting around Amba Alagi 
and, as such, were preoccupied with patrol and escort duties towards Combolcia Pass, 
Gondar, Ualdia, and Mai Ceu. By 18 May, the men of No. 3 ACC received the news of the 
Italian surrender of Amba Alagi. By the latter half of the month, Gwilliam and his Company 
travelled to the Gura Aerodrome where they underwent a period of training once more.439  
The battle for Amba Alagi was a fierce one. Lasting for approximately fifteen days, 
the assault on Amba Alagi pitted the South African, Indian and British attackers against their 
Italian counterparts in some of the harshest fighting conditions of the entire campaign of the 
East Africa Force. The Allied pincers on Amba Alagi steadily closed in from the north and the 
south, and by 16 May the Duke of Aosta was forced to sue for an armistice. The fall of Amba 
Alagi meant the end of the road for the men of 1st SA Bde in East Africa. More notably, the 
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men of No.3 ACC had supported this brigade all the way from the initial attacks on El Wak in 
December 1940 to the final battle at Amba Alagi during May 1941, traversing the thorn bush 
and desert of Italian Somaliland and the great mountain passes of Abyssinia. By mid-June 
1941, the men of the 1st SA Bde, with No. 3 ACC in tow, embarked for Egypt at Massawa to 
join the fight in the Western Desert.440  
 
Conclusion 
Cunningham’s advance on the Italian Somaliland border, and the subsequent Allied victory 
at El Wak, heralded the new impetus for offensive operations in East Africa. The Italians had 
been tried, tested, and found wanting at El Wak, an incident that highlighted the 
inadequacies and willpower of the Italian soldiers to make a concerted stand when attacked. 
This was repeated time and time again throughout the remainder of the Allied offensives 
through Italian Somaliland and Southern Abyssinia. After crossing the Italian Somaliland 
border during early 1941, the rapid Allied advance ensured that Addis Ababa was captured 
within a mere two months. The role which the South African armoured cars and light tanks 
played during the Allied offensive was invaluable, and provided a high degree of mobility and 
firepower to Cunningham throughout the campaign in East Africa. The men of No. 3 ACC 
and No. 1 LTC provided sterling support to the Allied advance when called upon, and 
allowed Pienaar the freedom of movement to employ his forces across a wide front with the 
knowledge that the armour, acting as mobile machinegun posts, would always be at the 
ready to support any attack. The South African armour, more often than not, were called 
upon to extricate the infantry from a perilous position, and ‘save’ the day. By the time 
Southern Abyssinia’s defences were breached, the SATC units’ roles were severely 
diminished owing to the changing nature of the terrain. 
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Chapter 4 – Frontiers, Fighting and Forts: South African Armour with the 1st South 
African Division in Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941 
 
“The terrain, the character of the enemy and his defensive attitude, all 
contributed to compel the use of cars in the manner in which they were 
employed…The nature of operations, called for the closest cooperation between 
Armoured Cars and Infantry…Infantry always followed closely in the wake of the 
cars in all other operations.”441 
 
Introduction 
The fighting history of the 1st SA Div in East Africa is a short, yet colourful, one. By the end of 
November 1940 Cunningham decided that Brink and his division would move north and 
occupy Marsabit and North Horr. From here pensive thrusts and reconnaissance patrols 
would be conducted towards Abyssinia in search of a possible line of advance into Italian 
territory.442 By December 1940, the 1st SA Div occupied a 480 km front, from the Moyale-
Muduma line in the east, to an area well west of Lake Rudolph in the west. Brink’s Division 
commenced its offensive in early January 1941 with an operation aimed at attacking 
Abyssinia on its south-western flank. Pienaar’s success at El Wak in December 1940 meant 
that the time had arrived for Brink’s men to prove their fighting efficiency in offensive 
operations.443 Offensive operations along Brink’s front differed considerably to those 
experienced by the South African soldiers fighting in Italian Somaliland, owing to changes in 
the terrain, climate and communication infrastructure. The South African armour, owing to 
the nature of the terrain and their limited employment, had mixed successes during Brink’s 
offensive. The 1st SA Div’s experiences in East Africa, including those of their SATC 
compliment, proved crucial, for it directly affected the subsequent deployment of South 
African soldiers in the North African theatre only months later.444  
In order to highlight the role that South African armour played in Brink’s 1st SA Div’s 
operations in East Africa, this chapter has three aims. First, the role and employment of the 
                                                        
441  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File 1 SA Div Operations General. Lessons of the E.A, 
Campaign – Armd Cars, undated. 
442  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at GHQ Middle East 
1-4 Dec 1940.  Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with GOC East Africa and GOC Sudan – 2 
December 1940. 
443  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File 1 SA Div Operation Instructions. Secret correspondence 
between Brink Buchanan and Armstrong re General Situation on East African Front – 1 
January 1941. 
444  DOD Archives, WD, Box 203, File D1 Report on Operations. East Africa Force Report on 
Operations from 1st November 1940 to 5th April and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 76-77. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
97 
armoured cars whilst operational in the NFD is discussed. Second, the South African 
advance into south-western Abyssinia, by focussing on the variety of roles in which the 
armoured cars were employed, including the fostering of the Shifta revolt, is described. And 
finally, the chapter focus on the role played by the armoured cars in the final stages of 
Brink’s advance up until the fall of Mega during the latter half of February 1941. The three 
aims combined, provide a clear picture as to how Brink employed the SATC units under his 
command during his offensive operation in East Africa.  
 
Pensive Thrusts and Operational Positioning 
By the end of November 1940, Brink and his staff received operational instructions from HQ 
East Africa Force. These gave a brief account as to the general situation in the area of no-
man’s land directly influencing the operational deployment of the 1st SA Div. The operational 
instruction, East Africa Force Operational Instruction No. 24, informed Brink of the Italian 
dispositions on his immediate front, including the occupation of advanced posts all along the 
Abyssinian frontier by various groups of Banda, which showed their adeptness in attacking 
Allied patrols at every opportune moment.445 Cunningham stated that “The time has now 
come when we must gradually establish complete mastery of the no man’s land between our 
own permanently-occupied positions and those of the enemy…By dominating no-man’s land 
we shall prevent the enemy from getting information, obtain information ourselves from 
prisoners and contact with his posts, and gradually build up complete data of all the tracks, 
roads, water resources etc., between the opposing positions”.446 Cunningham, and Brink for 
that matter, realised that the no-man’s land up to the border with Abyssinia could only be 
effectively dominated through a series of constant fighting patrols, varied in size and in 
operating method, so as to secure successful occupation. Cunningham’s staff indicated that 
highly mobile, yet sufficiently armed patrols would be best suited for this aggressive 
reconnaissance role, and as such armoured cars should be used to “carry out this offensive 
policy and to provide local protection for their columns”.447 The two South African armoured 
car units which served with the 1st SA Div in East Africa, No. 1 ACC and No. 2 ACC, 
provided Brink the ways and means with which to achieve Cunningham’s plan. Brink’s 
immediate problem, however, was that the terrain, which stretched across his immediate 
                                                        
445  DOD Archives, WD, Box 284, File 1 SA Div. 1(S.A.) DIV. Report on Operations in Kenya and 
Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941. 
446  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File 1 SA Div Operation Instructions. Secret correspondence 
between Brink Buchanan and Armstrong re General Situation on East African Front – 1 
January 1941. 
447  DOD Archives, WD, Box 284, File 1 SA Div. 1(S.A.) DIV. Report on Operations in Kenya and 
Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
front in the NFD, included forests, thorn bush, lava masses, rugged mountain ranges, and 
waterless deserts. It was this exact terrain that severely curtailed the operational efficiency 
and employment of the South African armoured cars during the coming offensives.448 
By the end of December 1940, Brink yet again received further orders from the HQ 
East Africa Force pertaining to the commencement of Allied offensive operations across the 
East African theatre during early 1941.449 East Africa Force Operational Instruction No. 35, 
which had a direct bearing on the future offensive role of Brink’s Division, stated that “The 
regrouping of Divisions on a three-divisional front will be completed by 9 Jan. By then all 
Divs. will be ready to begin operations for advancing the line in closer contact with the 
enemy. To avoid drawing attention of the enemy to any particular sector the operations on all 
three Div. fronts will begin as far as possible on or about 15 Jan”.450 Brink, delighted by the 
fact that a date for the commencement of offensive operations had been confirmed for early 
1941, took stock of the 1st SA Div’s objectives allotted by Cunningham’s staff. The 1st SA Div 
had been tasked with securing the area around Dukana, Hobok and Gebel Affur, with the 
object of protecting and developing communications in this area to assist in the eventual 
invasion of Abyssinia from this sector. Brink was furthermore tasked to use flying columns, 
invariably consisting of both SATC units in his Division, to support the Shifta Rebellion 
forming in the general area of Gardulla and Kalam. Brink was lastly ordered to capture 
Namaraputh, Todenyang and Kalam in conjunction with elements of the Equatorial Battalion 
of the Sudan Defence Force.451 
By the beginning of January 1941, Brink manoeuvred his Division into the no-man’s 
land of the NFD in order to be ready for the commencement of offensive operations on 15 
January. Brink ordered Armstrong and his 5th SA Bde, which included No. 1 ACC, to move to 
Marsabit between 4 and 5 January, where they relieved Buchanan’s 2nd SA Brigade of its 
defensive duties. Brink had ordered Buchanan, whose troops already occupied Gamra, 
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Kalacha and North Horr, to advance to the Paradise Lake area in anticipation of the 
commencement of offensive operations.452 By 9 January Brink had detailed his operational 
plan for his Division’s operational commitments in the 1st SA Div Operational Instruction No. 
5. Simplified, Brink ordered Buchanan to occupy Dukana, where after the area around El 
Yibo-El Sardu would have to be cleared of all Italian soldiers. Once this area had been 
cleared, Brink argued, active patrols would be undertaken to the Abyssinian frontier along 
the road Dukana-Gorai. The operational order vehemently expressed the fact that the South 
African forces should not be too anxious to cross the frontier, as time was needed for the 
SAEC to develop the water supply in the Dukana and North Horr areas to such an extent 
that it could support the eventual South African advance into Abyssinia.453 Throughout the 
period 9-14 January, Buchanan’s troops moved out from Marsabit and established a strong 
South African presence across the area Kalacha-North Horr-Gamra-Dukana. The majority of 
the 2nd SA Bde, including No. 2 ACC, was concentrated at Dukana, poised to commence 
offensive operations on 15 January.454 The only intelligence which Brink had on his future 
area of operations in Abyssinia was that provided by Lt J. Bonham, referred to by Brink as 
‘Bulldust’, who operated with the Shifta. The Shifta intelligence, as seen later, proved 
completely inaccurate, with wild statements to the effect that cross-country movement in 
motorised transport was possible anywhere, without difficulty, once the Abyssinian frontier 
had been breached. The Shifta intelligence reports of ‘Bulldust’ Bonham were useless to the 
South African fighting columns during the ensuing offensive operations.455 
On the morning of 2 January, prior to the 2nd SA Bde leaving Marsabit for Dukana, 
two sections of armoured cars from No. 2 ACC managed to establish contact with Italian 
troops occupying ground around the Turbi Hills. The armoured cars, under command of Lt 
G.J. Labuschagne, were ordered to conduct a reconnaissance from Marsabit towards the 
Turbi Hills. The armoured car patrol, however, was forced to break contact upon instruction 
form Labuschagne, and return back to Marsabit due to the fear of being ambushed by a 
strong body of Italian troops. During the next morning, Buchanan had ordered Labuschagne 
to turn around his armoured car patrol and to once more advance on the Turbi Hills, this time 
with the explicit aim of expelling all forms of Italian resistance from the area.456 After a brief 
skirmish with the Italian defenders at the Turbi Hills, which numbered between 30-40 troops 
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with a light and heavy machinegun between them, the Italian troops withdrew. Acting as 
mobile machinegun posts, the South African armoured cars provided covering and 
suppression fire to the accompanying South African infantrymen, whilst they cleared the 
objective. After the brief skirmish, the armoured cars reconnoitred for a further 10 km beyond 
the Turbi Hills, but made no renewed contact with the retreating Italian defenders, where 
after the patrol returned to Marsabit.457 
 
Map 4.1: 1st SA Div Area of Operations in southern Abyssinia.458 
For the men of No. 2 ACC, their sojourn at Marsabit proved most interesting to say 
the least. Apart from the mundane spells of camp life, the men remembered Marsabit for one 
single reason only – the lack of water. Under Divisional instructions, the men were only 
allowed a water ration of two gallons per day, which had to be carefully consumed, and 
controlled by armed guards, in the extreme heat of the NFD. There was, however, also some 
serious melancholy present whilst the men were stationed at Marsabit. The staff of the 1st SA 
Div, hoped to establish a domestic touch to camp life, and went on to suggest that the men 
could even do shopping in the surrounding villages. There was even a drive to encourage 
the men to grow their own vegetable gardens, so as to supplement their daily rations with 
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the above-mentioned shopping and home-grown foodstuffs. Nevertheless, the men of No. 2 
ACC realised the folly in such an endeavour and chose to consume their water rations for its 
intended purpose – not to cultivate vegetables.459 On 5 January, Armstrong’s 5th SA Bde 
occupied Marsabit, devoid of any vegetable gardens. By 9 January Walker and Klein 
conducted a series of tests on the machineguns of their armoured cars, in order to verify the 
use of oil and grease graphite as lubricants in these weapons. The lubricants used in the 
machineguns, and tested under stern, dusty, conditions, caused no stoppages whatsoever. 
These tests reaffirmed the reliability of the machineguns, thereby ensuring the men that the 
weapons would not fail them once the offensives started.460 
On 10 January, No. 2 ACC left Marsabit in the first of a series of moves culminating 
in a flanking attack on the Mega-Moyale escarpment. Cunningham, realising that a frontal 
attack up the steep, forested, slopes of the Moyale escarpment was impossible, ordered 
Brink to conducted a wide flanking movement across the Chalbi desert which separated 
northern Kenya from southern Abyssinia. The road across the Chalbi desert northwards, 
passed through the Dida Galgalla (Desert of the Night), via North Horr, and onwards to 
Dukana. By the afternoon, Buchanan’s men had reached North Horr after having advanced 
for 176 km across dried salt lakes and a lava belt. On 12 January, No. 2 ACC advanced 
towards the Abyssinia border, and reached Dukana by sunset without any incident.461 The 
armoured cars encamped at Dukana, where they formed part of an advance guard who 
awaited the arrival of the remainder of the 2nd SA Bde. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the 
remainder of Buchanan’s men, the SAEC tried to establish a greater water supply around 
Dukana in order to meet the growing requirements of the troops. By 13 January, the 2nd SA 
Bde had still not arrived at Dukana, whilst a number of armoured car patrols were sent to 
reconnoitre the Gorai road towards the wells at El Yibo. The armoured cars accompanying 
these patrols, however, suffered severely owing to the bad state of the roads in the NFD.462 
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First Blood at El Yibo 
The majority of the 2nd SA Bde, poised to strike at a moment’s notice from their base at 
Dukana, anxiously awaited the start of Brink’s offensive on 15 January. Brink had by this 
time realised that water, and the access to it, would be the single biggest factor which would 
either confer success, or defeat, upon his Division during the coming offensive into 
Abyssinia. In order to sustain the physical and mechanical needs of his men and their AFV’s, 
and to deny the Italians the use thereof, Brink accepted that his Division would have to 
capture and control all the water sources along the Kenyan frontier. Brink argued that the 
occupation of all the water wells would greatly ease the advance of his forces into Abyssinia, 
by directly relieving pressure off his already stretched lines of communication.463 Prior to 15 
January, Brink had instructed Buchanan to use his Brigade to rid the crucial water wells of El 
Yibo and El Sardu of their Italian garrisons. In reaffirming the importance of water to his 
offensive success, Brink simply ordered Buchanan to “occupy and hold the wells at El Yibo 
and El Sardu”.464 Buchanan ordered a fighting patrol comprising of the 1st Natal Mounted 
Rifles (NMR), two Platoons of Abyssinian Irregulars and seven armoured cars of No. 2 ACC 
to move against El Yibo on 16 January. The fighting patrol came under the command of Col 
MacMillan, Officer Commanding NMR, with Walker offering valuable support as he took 
personal command of the seven armoured cars accompanying this fighting patrol.465 
The planning for the operation against El Yibo and El Sardu suffered from one major 
problem, the precise location of El Yibo was not known to Buchanan or his staff. All that was 
known was that El Yibo was located approximately 16 km to the north of Dukana, and that 
the wells were situated in the luggar Bulat. A luggar is presumably something similar to a 
canyon or a ravine, for Walker judged it to be 60-100 metre deep upon closer investigation. 
The entire ravine was, however, dominated by a central feature known as Sugarloaf Hill.466 It 
was gathered, from some of the intelligence reports which were forthcoming, that Sugarloaf 
Hill was invested by a number of Italian soldiers who dominated all approaches to the wells 
at El Yibo and El Sardu from this strategic point. The Italians defenders had fortified their 
dispositions to such an extent, with walls made from lava rock that included well-sited 
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machinegun nests, that it was seen from the air by SAAF aircraft conducting aerial 
reconnaissance. The attack on El Yibo and El Sardu, the 2nd SA Bde Staff argued, was 
planned so as to enable MacMillan to envelop the Italian forces occupying the area. 
MacMillan strongly emphasised that the attack would be carried out by the armoured cars 
and infantry acting in a mutually supportive role in order to prevent the Italians from 
retreating when the attack commenced. The three main obstacles facing MacMillan and his 
patrol were the extreme heat, the lack of adequate maps, and the severe shortage of water, 
not the Italian troops immediately facing them.467 
 
Fig 4.1: Barren, waterless, stretches often impeded the South African advance.468 
By daybreak on the morning of 16 January, MacMillan’s fighting patrol had left 
Dukana and was steadily making their way towards the luggar Bulat. No sooner had the 
patrol left Dukana, when they arrived on the outskirts of the ravine, only to find a different 
picture to what they had in mind. The terrain was almost impassable to the armoured cars, 
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and upon closer inspection by Walker and Maj Harris of the Abyssinian Irregulars, it was 
found to be most discouraging from an AFV point of view. The ravine was, in essence, a 
series of smaller gulleys which prevented Walker from splitting up his armoured cars and 
moving some of them ahead towards El Yibo and, as such, MacMillan had no option but to 
deviate from the original plan of attack. Walker causally redeployed his armoured cars to 
various points along the high ground surrounding the luggar Bulat, from where it was 
reported that movement had been spotted in the bed of the ravine. Upon receiving 
confirmation that Italian soldiers were indeed occupying the dry river bed, Walker ordered his 
cars to open fire where after the Banda soldiers fled towards Sugarloaf Hill. Walker 
subsequently redirected his armoured cars to occupy positions directly facing Sugarloaf Hill, 
where immense fire was drawn from the Italian machinegun posts. Walker casually states 
that he “received a very warm welcome from machinegun and rifle fire”,469 where after he 
called for reinforcements to move forward whilst he engaged Italian soldiers that occupied a 
series of defensive potions at the foot of Sugarloaf Hill. After a series of long machinegun 
bursts silenced this position, Walker could concentrate on dislodging the remainder of the 
Italian defenders at the top of Sugarloaf Hill. The defences on top of the hill were of such a 
nature that Walker realised that he would need mortar support in order to dislodge the Italian 
defenders. By late afternoon, in conjunction with the mortar attack, the South African troops 
had managed to inflict a number of casualties on the Italians, where after MacMillan ordered 
his troops to return to camp for the night.470 
During the early hours of 17 January, Walker ordered a section of his cars to once 
more occupy the position directly facing Sugarloaf Hill in order to observe any Italian 
movement there or in the surrounding countryside. Whilst Walker and his car also occupied 
a domineering position from the high ground, he ordered two further cars to proceed down 
the river bed so as to see how far they could advance forward. The armoured cars operating 
in conjunction with the advancing infantry of the NMR, however, failed to make contact with 
the Italians. It was only during the late afternoon that movement was noticed amongst the 
fortifications on Sugarloaf Hill. However, owing to confusion and the disobeying of orders, a 
combined South African attack failed to develop.471 The state of confusion was partly owed 
to the fact that the South African infantrymen, and their officers, did not fully appreciate the 
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nature of the combined arms approach in mobile operations. As such, the mutual support 
was lost during the action, owing to the infantry and armour working against one another.472 
 
Map 4.2: The attack on El Yibo and El Sardu.473 
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 By nightfall, MacMillan had ordered his troops to remain in, and hold, their positions 
throughout the night, as a renewed attack would commence during the next morning. On 18 
January, in conjunction with artillery and air support, MacMillan once more tried to dislodge 
the Italian defenders from Sugarloaf Hill. After an eight minute barrage by the guns of the 
SAA, followed by an SAAF aerial bombardment, the infantry and armoured cars once more 
advanced on the Italian positions. Upon reaching El-Yibo, it was found that the Italians had 
fled in strength up the watercourse in the direction of El Sardu. Neither the armoured cars, 
nor the infantry, fired a single shot during the final attack on El Yibo.474 MacMillan ordered six 
of Walker’s armoured cars forward in the direction of the El Sardu wells. After a brief 
skirmish with some Italian Banda around El Sardu, the South Africans realised that the 
Italians had made a hasty withdrawal towards Hobok during the previous night. The South 
African success at El Yibo and El Sardu accounted for 23 Italian dead, and approximately a 
further 51 wounded. The South African casualties were minor, with one soldier killed and a 
further two wounded. The South African fighting patrol had thus managed to capture 
Sugarloaf Hill, El Yibo and El Sardu within three days without meeting any real Italian 
resistance. 475 
The South African attack on El Yibo and El Sardu yielded several lessons for Walker 
and his men. Firstly, the need of accurate and detailed aerial photographs was stressed 
when operating in terrain such as that of El Yibo-El Sardu, due to the fact that the available 
maps proved unsatisfactory for planning offensive operations. Secondly, the importance of 
the maintenance of adequate radio communication amongst the armoured cars remained 
crucial, as no tactical employment could have been carried out without it by Walker. Thirdly, 
the terrain in which the cars were operationally deployed, meant that their flanks were 
continuously exposed to an enemy counterattack, and as such the independent action of 
these cars had to be avoided at all times.476 Fourthly, unity of action and command remained 
an issue throughout the operation to the extent where effective deployment was negated, 
due to the fact that Walker’s orders were often being countermanded by Harris and 
MacMillan. It was felt that infantry officers should not issue orders directly to individual 
armoured cars, unless it was sanctioned by their officer commanding. This was nothing new, 
with scenes reminiscent of the fighting patrol of the Carbineers and No. 3 ACC towards 
Moyale in the exact same timeframe. It seems as if the infantry simply did not understand 
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the doctrine that governed the employment of armour during operations. Lastly, the 
armoured cars’ performance, Walker felt, was exceptional during the offensive operations, 
with the Transport Officer of No. 2 ACC reporting that no mechanical breakdowns were 
experienced.477 
During the three day attack on El Yibo and El Sardu, the armoured cars performed 
exceptionally well over extremely difficult terrain. The armoured cars suffered no mechanical 
breakdowns, and could account for only two bullet-proof tyres that were punctured during the 
operation, albeit not by Italian rifle fire. The men of No. 2 ACC provided exemplary service 
throughout the operation by continuously fighting in the van and providing the necessary 
covering and supporting fire if, and when called upon.478 The 1st SA Div Headquarters 
accrued immense praise for the role which the armoured cars played during the three day 
operation479, with Brink casually stating “The work performed by the armoured cars under 
Major C.G. Walker, M.C., 2 S.A. Armd. Car Coy., merits special mention. The way in which 
these cars moved across country which, up to that time, had been considered impassable 
for any form of wheeled vehicle, and then worked round the enemy’s flanks, undoubtedly 
contributed largely to the collapse of the defence, which had been exceptionally well sited 
and prepared by the enemy”.480 
Whilst the 2nd SA Bde busied themselves with northwards patrols from Dukana, 
Armstrong’s 5th SA Bde completed regular reconnaissance patrols in the vicinity of the Turbi 
Hills and to the plains below the Moyale escarpment. In order to maintain surprise, Brink 
decided to aggressively patrol the road leading to the Italian stronghold at Moyale, whilst his 
true intentions remained hidden from the Italians. The reconnaissance patrols, sent out by 
the Armstrong from Marsabit, always comprised of a detachment of infantry, armoured cars, 
engineers, signallers and a medical party. Intimate knowledge of the terrain was gained 
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through these patrols, and the men were in turn able to locate waterholes, landing grounds 
and alternate avenues of approach whilst awaiting the approach of 15 January.481  
The cars of No. 1 ACC were used by Armstrong to patrol towards the Moyale 
escarpment, in order to determine the best possible route of advance for Brink’s Division into 
Abyssinia. The first of these reconnaissance patrols conducted by elements of No. 1 ACC 
occurred on 6 January, when Klein was ordered to reconnoitre along the road Marsabit-Turbi 
Hills-Sololo and investigate the terrain around the Turbi Hills with a view to forthcoming 
employment of armoured cars in this area. The terrain report which Klein submitted to 
Armstrong was not favourable. But Klein did state that, despite the dense scrubland, 
armoured cars would be able to pass through albeit at very slow speeds. Daily patrols 
towards the Turbi Hills were there after carried out by the men of No. 1 ACC without meeting 
any Italian resistance.482 By the end of January some armoured cars from No. 3 Platoon, 
under command of Lt J. Irwin, were involved in a particularly bloody engagement in the 
vicinity of Sololo. Under orders to accompany a fighting patrol consisting of ‘B’ Company, 3rd 
TS, and ‘C’ Company, 2nd Regiment Botha (RB), two sections of cars from No. 3 Platoon 
escorted the fighting patrol in the direction of the Turbi Hills.483 When reaching these hills in 
the late afternoon, the men bivouacked for the night, where after Maj G.S. Sturgeon of the 
Transvaal Scottish, commanding the fighting patrol, sent out another reconnaissance 
towards Sololo early the next morning. It was believed, from intelligence gained from the 
locals, that there was a sizeable force of Italian Colonial Infantry and Banda in the vicinity of 
Sololo, and thus Sturgeon’s primary aim was to seek out, establish contact with, and engage 
the Italian foe at Sololo.484  
During the morning of 25 January Irwin was instructed to take four armoured cars 
from No. 3 Platoon and reconnoitre from the Turbi Hills in the direction of Sololo, acting in 
support of ‘C’ Company 2nd RB. The patrol came under the direct command of Capt E.A. 
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Delaney of 2nd RB. The remaining three armoured cars from No. 3 Platoon acted as a mobile 
protection element and remained behind with Sturgeon’s force in the vicinity of the Turbi 
Hills.485 By sunrise the fighting patrol, with two armoured cars in the van, had left their 
overnight camp at the Turbi Hills, whilst the remaining two armoured cars brought up the rear 
of the column. Restricted by the dense bush all along their route of advance, the fighting 
patrol was forced to advance in a line ahead formation along the road. The freedom of 
movement of the armoured cars was thus severely curtailed by the terrain, and Delaney’s 
patrol was critically exposed to an ambush whilst travelling in this formation. Approximately 
two hours into their patrol, whilst approaching an ‘S’ bend 32 km from the Turbi Hills, Irwin’s 
two leading armoured cars came under sustained machinegun fire from a hillock on their 
immediate front.486 Immediately, Delaney sent the two armoured cars from the rear of the 
column forward, in conjunction with two sections of infantry. This brought the desired effect. 
No sooner had Irwin’s four armoured cars deployed in the vicinity of the hill in a line abreast 
formation, when two of them started to work around the flank of the Italians under covering 
fire laid down by the remaining two cars. Firing on the move, the armoured cars’ tactical 
employment not only provided the advancing two infantry sections with ample cover, but their 
accurate machinegun fire soon silenced the Italian defensive outpost on the hill. Upon closer 
inspection by Delaney’s infantry it was found that the Banda had fled, but had sustained 
severe injuries in the ensuing action, evident by a large pool of blood found at an abandoned 
machinegun post on the hill. The two armoured cars which attempted to flank the Italian 
outpost arrived too late, and the Italians retreated.487 
The fighting patrol briefly halted to reform, and then set forth again in the direction of 
Sololo, in the same formation as before, travelling along the narrow dirt track. Approximately 
six km from the initial encounter with the Italians, and a mere three km from their final 
objective at Sololo, Delaney’s patrol passed through an area of dense scrubland.488 This area 
of scrubland severely hampered the movement and employment of the armoured cars to 
such an extent that the armoured cars were confined to the limits of the dirt track once more, 
unable to deploy along the flanks of the fighting patrol. The leading armoured car, upon 
seeing a Banda soldier run across the track, immediately became immobile as it fell into a 
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cleverly concealed Italian tank trap. The tank trap almost effortlessly blended in with the road 
surface, and was impossible to detect by the armoured car crew.489 The tank trap was, 
furthermore, covered by a heavy machinegun on the left of the road, and a light machinegun 
on the right, both of which, quite surprisingly, had not opened up on the now stricken 
armoured car. The Italian defenders were entirely caught off-guard by the sudden 
appearance of the fighting patrol, and through sheer luck none of the Banda could reach 
either of the machinegun posts.490 The Banda soldier who dashed across the road was, 
however, on his way to detonate an electrically-operated mine which was situated in the 
tank-trap. A quick, sharp succession of machinegun bursts from the two armoured cars in the 
van halted the soldier in his tracks. The fact that the Italian troops were not manning their 
posts naturally prevented a host of South African casualties from occurring. The armoured 
car that was stuck in the tank trap was hastily pulled out by one of the other cars, thereby 
extricating it from its perilous position.491 
After the brief encounter with the Italian force, the fighting patrol regrouped and 
Delaney ordered two armoured cars and a section of his infantry to reconnoitre towards 
Sololo Hill. The remainder of the fighting patrol deployed to both sides of the road, while the 
third armoured car advanced forward to beyond the tank trap. The fourth armoured car 
remained behind with the remaining infantry in order to provide them with adequate fire 
support, while they covered the SAEC troops clearing the road block. The decision by 
Delaney to split his armoured cars into separate groupings, immediately worked to his 
detriment. As soon as the fighting patrol was divided, a large grouping of Italian colonial 
infantry stormed out of the dense bush to the rear and left of the now stricken fighting 
patrol.492 The Italians attacked with such ferocity, that the sudden attack by hand grenades 
and firearms immediately set the surrounding scrubland alight. To make matters worse, the 
fighting patrol’s wireless truck was rendered ineffective after having been caught by a hail of 
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rifle fire, this severely impeded cooperation with the two forward armoured cars, which were 
now well on their way to Sololo. Furthermore, a three-ton truck had been set alight, and it 
blocked the road causing a certain feeling of pandemonium to descend on the patrol.493 
The two leading armoured cars were meanwhile engaged in a separate engagement 
with a Banda outpost in the vicinity of Sololo Hill, and could not return to help the stricken 
fighting patrols as a result of the breakdown in communication. Delaney, realising that the 
two leading armoured cars could not be contacted by wireless communication, nor for all 
practicality hear the fighting in their rear, set it upon himself to establish contact with Irwin’s 
two leading armoured cars.494 The fourth armoured car, in the meantime, made utmost use of 
the ‘dire’ situation in which it found itself. Under the guidance of its crew commander SSgt A. 
Khan, the armoured car moved up and down the road firing all of its weapons at the attacking 
Italian Colonial Infantry and Banda. The Italians pushed forth their determined attack on 
Khan’s armoured car, and at times surged forward to within 10 metres of the vehicle 
constantly attacking it with hand grenades. Remarkably no damage was recorded to the 
vehicle by this constant hand grenade attack.495 This reflected positively on the armour 
plating of Irwin’s cars, but, perhaps also tongue-in-cheek, spoke volumes of the quality of 
Italian hand grenades in East Africa. The driver, temporarily blinded by the flashes of two 
exploding hand grenades, accidentally crashed the armoured car into a tree. The effects of 
the crash had immediate consequences, for a damaged radiator and a jammed machinegun, 
immediately placed the vehicle temporarily out of action. But “Lady Luck” favoured Kahn and 
his crew, for almost immediately after the crash, the third armoured car returned firing all of 
its weaponry in a fire-belt action in order to extricate Khan’s stricken car.496 The Italian 
colonial infantry and Banda, coming under severe fire from the returning armoured cars and 
the men of 2nd RB, hastily beat their retreat towards the Burrolli Hills. Owing to the dense 
bush around Sololo Hills, the armoured cars were unable to pursue the retreating Italians, 
and they were thus able to escape from the clutches of the South African fighting patrol.497 
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Fig 4.2: South African armoured car crew with a captured Banda soldier.498 
The brief engagement fought at Sololo Hills was all but over by midday on 25 
January. The fighting patrol on its return journey towards the Turbi Hills, could account for 
approximately 50 Italians killed, whilst its own casualties amounted to one infantry officer 
killed and 10 men wounded. Apart from the armoured car which had crashed headlong into 
the tree, and was being towed back to Turbi Hills, Irwin’s men had suffered no casualties 
whatsoever. The damaged armoured car was repaired by the Light Aid Detachment 
workshop upon arrival at Turbi Hills, and was once more ready for offensive action by 
nightfall.499 The armoured cars of No. 1 ACC had performed outstandingly during the day’s 
fighting, and was utilised in a variety of roles which included reconnaissance, providing 
covering fire, a direct attack up a hill, close fighting in attack and defence whilst under 
sustained attacked, and the transportation of wounded soldiers. After the action at Sololo, 
Klein argued that the armoured car section, the smallest possible tactical unit allowed in 
armoured car operations, should be kept intact in order to avoid a similar occurrence of the 
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chaos which ensued at Sololo Hills once the armoured cars were split up.500 As sound as his 
argument was in theory, and according to the accepted doctrine, the practical employment 
thereof often differed as infantry commanders often disregarded the most feasible way in 
which to employ their accompanying armour. Furthermore, the nature and speed of the 
operations called for the accepted doctrine to be abandoned in lieu of tactical and operational 
requirements.501 
Whilst Brink’s South African brigades were probing the Abyssinian frontier looking for 
the Italians’ weak spots, the Shifta revolt within Abyssinia was actively taking shape. The 
Shifta, occupying strong mountain defences in southern Abyssinia, continued to remain a 
thorn in the flesh of the Italian colonial authorities of Abyssinia well after the country was 
subjugated in 1936.502 Through constant attacks on Italian logistical convoys, to pillaging and 
harassing the far-flung Italian outposts, the Abyssinia fighting chieftains and their bands of 
Shifta made it known that they would not accept Italian authority. Realising the potential that 
an all-out revolt in southern Abyssinia would have on the Italian ability to wage an effective 
campaign, Wavell through Cunningham, instructed Brink to use all means possible to foster a 
revolt amongst the local Shifta whilst at the same time crushing the Italian forces in the 
Mega-Moyale complex. The South African armoured cars would play a leading role in this 
gamble, as it was stated before that, South African regular troops would have to be deployed 
along irregular lines in order to meet Cunningham’s offensive demands.503 The ability of the 
armoured cars to traverse vast distances meant that they were best suited to act as a link 
between Brink and the Shifta leaders in southern Abyssinia, operations allowed for by the 
South African doctrine.504 During January, the men of Klein’s armoured cars established 
contact with Haille Degaga, an influential Shifta leader from the south, in order to forge a 
strong partnership which would benefit Brink’s advance into southern Abyssinia and reignite 
the Shifta revolt, lingering throughout the countryside since 1936. The men of No. 1 ACC met 
Robi, an emissary of Haille Degaga, during which the Shifta rebel examined the full extent 
and capabilities of the South African fighting machine. Enormously impressed at the 
firepower exhibited by the armoured cars, Robi and his fellow emissaries agreed that the 
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Shifta rebels of Haille Degaga would join the Allied fight against their common Italian foe in 
southern Abyssinia, as soon as they could get word through to him.505 
 
Across the Abyssinian Frontier: Gorai, El Gumu and Hobok 
With the frontier regions of the Kenyan border cleared of the Italian presence by the end of 
January, the time arrived for Brink to close his pincers on southern Abyssinia from the west. 
On 28 January, Armstrong and his 5th SA Bde relocated from Marsabit towards Dukana in 
order to join forces with Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde. This move, and indeed the marrying up of 
the 1st SA Div brigades at Dukana, signalled the start of Brink’s battle for Abyssinia.506 Brink 
and his Staff planned a wide flanking movement around the Mega-Moyale escarpment with 
the 1st SA Div, in order to catch the Italian defenders off-guard, and establish complete 
control over the Mega-Moyale complex. A host of intelligence reports, some as dubious as 
before, had informed Brink that a strong Banda presence existed at Afurr, Hobok, El Gumu 
and Gorai, and that a move against these would cause the Italians to abandon this area and 
retreat further back into Abyssinia.507 Whilst the 2nd RB, and a detachment of No. 1 ACC with 
some ancillary troops, was left behind at Marsabit in order to act as a stopper group in case 
the Italians decided to counterattack from Moyale, the remainder of the 1st SA Div anxiously 
awaited the start of Brink’s offensive from Dukana. The subsequent attacks into southern 
Abyssinia by the men of the 1st SA Div, and the quick succession of battlefield victories which 
they accrued, was a true testament to the tenacity, efficiency and versatility of the men of the 
SATC, and indeed the South African soldier in general.508 
Late during the afternoon on 31 January, the lead elements of Brink’s 1st SA Div 
started to cross the Kenyan frontier into southern Abyssinia. The South African soldiers, at 
this stage highly mobile owing to the armoured cars and motorised transport, advanced 
across fertile grass plains to a spot between Dibbandibba and Murdur, where they 
bivouacked for the night under the protection of the armoured cars. Throughout the 
afternoon’s advance, the cars acted as scouts and flanking troops, ensuring that no Italian 
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interference stemmed the South African advance.509 The South African advance must have 
been an impressive sight indeed to the casual observer, had there been any, with the entire 
1st SA Div moving forward in two parallel groups with the armoured cars covering the flanks, 
rear and the van of the column during the entire advance. During the morning of 1 February 
1941, the two South African brigades formed up into battle order, and advanced in a box 
formation with a myriad of vehicles making up the fighting column. However, the advance 
into Abyssinia by Brink’s Division was impeded by the presence of two separate Italian 
outposts.510 Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde was tasked to attack towards the vicinity of the Gorai 
crater, which was on the eastern extremity of Brink’s axis of advance. Meanwhile, 
Armstrong’s 5th SA Bde was to advance on the Italian fort at El Gumu, which commanded the 
critical road junction between Yavello-Gianciaro-Hobok.511 
The fighting column had steadily advanced in a northerly direction for approximately 
two hours on 1 February, when a sudden halt was called by Buchanan and Armstrong. The 
maps and aerial photographs which the divisional staff had provided to them, failed once 
more to accurately pin-point a 32 km dense area of scrubland which covered the entire axis 
of advance of the motorised fighting column towards Gorai and El Gumu. Realising that the 
momentum of the advance had to be maintained at all costs, Brink ordered Walker and Klein 
to take the armoured cars and work a way through the dense scrubland. At some point, 
simply acting as bulldozers through the dense scrubland, the cars managed to lead the 
fighting column in a line ahead formation through the impeding obstacle.512 Had the Regia 
Aeronautica been present over the southern skies of Abyssinia, the South African advance 
could not have gone as effortlessly, for the fighting column provided an ideal target from the 
air. Navigating by compass, and through assistance rendered by aircraft from the SAAF, the 
South African troop movements remained undetected by their Italian foe. During the early 
afternoon Buchanan and Armstrong’s brigades emerged from the dense scrubland, and 
instantaneously turned their separate ways to launch the surprise attacks on the Italian 
outposts at Gorai and El Gumu. The South African advance across the frontier ranked as an 
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outstanding manoeuvre, for never before had a South African motorised column been called 
to advance through bush so dense that normal marching infantry would have found it difficult 
to force a passage.513 
 
Map 4.3: The attack on Gorai.514 
The men of Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde immediately made for the fort at Gorai, supported 
by Walker and No. 2 ACC. The Italian fort at Gorai, at first glance, appeared to be extremely 
difficult to attack due to the fact that it was situated on the southern tip of a crater. This 
precarious position, brought about by the location of the fort, meant that the Italian defences 
could not be approached from the south due to the presence of a series of fixed defences, 
including a myriad of machinegun nests, and the nature of the broken ground.515 The attack 
on Gorai was thus carried out from the northern approaches of the fort by the men of the 2nd 
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Field Force Battalion (FFB) under the command Lt Col C.L. Engelbrecht. Preceding the 
attack of the 2nd FFB, six armoured cars of No. 2 ACC, under the command of Capt C.A.C. 
Saunders, attacked an Italian outpost approximately 13 km from Gorai.516 The slight 
resistance encountered at the Italian outpost was quickly brushed aside by the cars, where 
after Engelbrecht’s fighting column steadily continued their advance on Gorai. By mid-
afternoon on 1 February, Walker’s leading armoured cars sighted the rough Italian stone fort 
on the southern tip of the Gorai crater. It was noted that the fort was surrounded by barbed 
wire, and that it was defended by a number of machinegun emplacements situated all along 
the perimeter of the fort. At first sight, the defences at Gorai seemed impenetrable if 
defended by resolute men.517 
The attack on the Italian stone fort at Gorai was preceded by another brief encounter 
against a roadblock approximately 1200 metres from the fort. Having brushed aside the 
Italian defenders at the roadblock, the armoured cars advanced beyond the obstacle in the 
road by moving up a gully on the right of the road. The main attack on the fort proceeded 
down the right gully, whilst a company from the 2nd FFB and six armoured cars advance 
along the left of the road in a gully that would allow them to outflank the fort in a move aimed 
at a total envelopment. The main attack was conducted by two companies of Engelbrecht’s 
2nd FFB, with four of Walker’s armoured cars offering them mobile fire support. During the 
late afternoon the attack on Gorai commenced with an aerial bombardment by aircraft from 
the SAAF, where after a deadly accurate fire-belt action from the mortars and machineguns 
of the 2nd FFB was directed on the Italian defences.518  
This initial attack by the infantry yielded almost immediate results, with the Italian 
commander of the fort decapitated by the accurate, and at time lucky, South African mortar 
fire. Two South African infantrymen were killed by Italian machinegun fire during the initial 
exchange of fire, where after Saunders’ four armoured cars were ordered forward to attack 
the Italian positions.519 The advance of the cars ensured that the barbed wire entanglements 
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surrounding the fort were almost immediately breached by the South Africans, where after 
Saunders’ vehicles dashed from point to point silencing the Italian machinegun 
emplacements piecemeal. The swift and sharp attack of Saunders and his cars caught the 
Italian defenders off-guard, causing them to flee in all directions to escape the accurate 
South African rifle and machinegun fire.520 
The men of the 2nd FFB, which followed in the wake of the Saunders’ advance, had 
merely to ensure that the position at the Gorai fort was consolidated, due to the sterling work 
done by the cars during the attack. The six armoured cars which had attempted to outflank 
the fort were, however, unable to completely cut-off the Italian retreat, but in working their 
way to a position astride of the fort they inflicted severe casualties on the fleeing Banda.521 
The South African armoured cars suffered no casualties during the attack on Gorai, whilst 
the infantry suffered only two men killed and seven wounded. The Italian defenders of Gorai 
were, however, not so lucky, with 28 men killed and a further 49 wounded. The South African 
attack on Gorai was a well-executed affair, which included a mutually supportive attack by 
infantry, armour and the air force. It would seem that Brink’s men, by this time, understood 
the merits of the combined arms approach during offensive operations.522 
During roughly the same time as the attack unfolded at Gorai, the armoured cars of 
No. 1 ACC broke through the dense scrubland before El Gumu. The men of the 1st South 
African Irish, commanded by Lt Col J. Dobbs, followed closely in the wake of Klein’s 
armoured cars which had spearheaded the advance of Armstrong’s 5th SA Bde. The South 
African approach march had been extremely accurate, for almost immediately when the 
armoured cars exited the dense vegetation, they advanced on, and attacked, an Italian 
roadblock barring their way to El Gumu.523 Having quickly brushed aside the Banda 
defenders with a rapid fire-belt action from his cars, Lt L.G. Williamson took two sections of 
armoured cars from No. 1 Platoon and formed them up in a line abreast formation for the 
final advance on the Italian defences at El Gumu. Reminiscent of a cavalry charge of old, 
and possibly in line with the mounted infantry type of warfare which Collyer advocated during 
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the interwar years, Williamson’s armoured cars led a fine charge on the defences of El 
Gumu.524  
 
Map 4.4: The attack on El Gumu.525 
The Banda defenders fired cursory bursts from their machinegun positions in the 
trenches directly facing the South Africans, but soon turned to flee from the South African 
armoured advance. Under the leadership of SSgt C.W. Hallowes, six armoured cars cleared 
the village in hot pursuit of the fleeing Banda. The Banda defenders fled in the direction of 
Hobok and Gianciaro, where it was known that larger Italian forts were situated. Unbeknown 
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to the fleeing Banda, however, Klein had instructed a section of his armoured cars to move 
through the bush and cut the Italian line of retreat from El Gumu. Despite two cars breaking 
down during this move, the four remaining cars delivered such accurate fire, that the fleeing 
Banda scattered to the right of the village.526 
The entire contact at El Gumu lasted no longer than an hour, and bore testament to 
the offensive capabilities of the men of the SATC. Under the efficient leadership of Klein, and 
with individual brilliance shown by Williamson and Hallowes, the armoured cars had routed 
the Italian defenders and captured El Gumu by themselves. The men of the South African 
Irish were left with the relatively simple task of securing the village and rounding up a number 
of Banda prisoners. The advance of the 1st SA Div into Abyssinia on 1 February, and the 
subsequent victories at Gorai and El Gumu on the same day, bore testament to the varied 
employment of the South African armoured cars during offensive operations.527 Cunningham 
laments the fact that, had it not been for the gallant action of the South African armoured 
cars during the attacks on Gorai and El Gumu, Buchanan’s and Armstrong’s Brigades would 
surely have suffered more casualties during that day’s combat.528 
The South African success at Gorai and El Gumu on 1 February was followed by a 
further offensive thrust towards the Italian fort at Hobok on the next day. The fighting at Gorai 
and El Gumu, though not as intense as expected, was, however, only possible through poor 
Italian intelligence which allowed for Brink’s advance to go entirely unnoticed. The Italian 
defensive actions fought at El Gumu and Gorai also remained wanting, and at that stage it 
even seemed if the Italians were completely aloof as to the South African presence in 
Abyssinia. For example, during the night of 1 February, a South African anti-tank detachment 
had immobilised an Italian transport truck with supplies destined for the garrison at El Gumu. 
Unbeknown to the Italian driver and through inference from his higher headquarters, El 
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Gumu was in South African hands, and yet it seemed as if no word had reached the Italian 
headquarters of Brink’s impeding advance.529 
The Italian fort at Hobok was situated approximately 32 km west of El Gumu. After 
their defeat on 1 February at the hands of Brink’s men, the remaining Italian garrisons of 
Gorai and El Gumu retreated towards Hobok in the hope of consolidating their unattainable 
position, and making good the defence of the immediate area. In the meanwhile, Brink 
decided that the 5th SA Bde would lead the attack on Hobok, with the men of the 3rd TS and 
Klein’s No. 2 Platoon spearheading the advance.530 Whilst the remainder of No. 1 ACC acted 
as flank and rear guards for the fighting column, Klein, with the three armoured cars of his 
Company Headquarters, assumed a roving role in order to control the armoured advance. 
The approach march from El Gumu to Hobok, furthermore, displayed the excellent use of 
wireless communication between Klein’s armoured cars and 5th SA Bde Headquarters, which 
allowed Armstrong to receive constant reports on the column’s movements and progress 
throughout the day’s fighting.531 
The South African attack on the Italian fort at Hobok, according to Harry Klein, 
occurred according to the accepted UDF armour doctrine.532 The approach march to the fort 
was conducted through open country, which offered the armoured cars good visibility and the 
ability to deploy in a line abreast formation straddling the El-Gumu – Hobok road. The open 
terrain held up until about 5 km from the fort, where after the open terrain fell away to badly 
broken, dense, scrubland crisscrossed by a series of small ravines. The Italians whilst 
retreating towards the safety of Hobok, had, in the meanwhile, set fire to the surrounding 
scrubland in an attempt to force the armoured cars acting in the van of the column to return 
to the narrow confines of the road. This move forcibly removed the freedom of movement 
from Klein’s armoured cars and effectively channelled them into a predetermined Italian 
ambush.533 
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Fig 4.3:  Planning the South African attack on Hobok.534 
Approximately three km from the fort, the two leading armoured cars established 
contact with an Italian roadblock. Whilst these armoured cars chased away the Italian 
defenders, men from the SAEC cleared the roadblock. This move allowed for a further two 
armoured car sections to bypass the roadblock, where after they made a dash for the 
outpost’s defences. The three armoured car sections, under Irwin’s command, immediately 
came under sustained machinegun and rifle fire from the vicinity of Hobok fort. Under Irwin’s 
instructions, the armoured cars made for an area of dead ground provided by a lugga, where 
after he radioed back valuable information to Klein detailing the Italian defences around the 
fort.535 The men of the armoured cars calculated, in conjunction with aerial intelligence 
reports received from the SAAF, that the defenders numbered approximately 800 Banda. 
The lull in the fighting allowed Klein enough time to order Irwin to redeploy his vehicles in the 
lugga to the south and east of the fort, whilst the men of the 3rd TS readied themselves for 
the attack. The final attack on the Hobok defences, decided by Armstrong, was to consist of 
a combined aerial and artillery bombardment followed by an infantry advance, with the final 
coup de grace being an armoured car dash towards the Italian defensive positions.536 
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Map 4.5: The attack on Hobok.537 
The combined armoured car and infantry attack on Hobok started during the late 
afternoon of 2 February. Prior to the commencement of the attack, all radio communications 
between forward elements and brigade headquarters had worked superbly, but, when the 
actual attack commenced, all radio communications failed instantaneously. “Murphy’s Law”, 
it would seem, was prevalent even in the East African bush. Just before the attack 
commenced, a futile effort was made by three armoured cars to cut-off the Italian retreat of 
from Hobok.538 The opening salvos of the offensive operation, delivered by the SAAF and 
SAA, indicated the start of the attack on Hobok during the late afternoon. The armoured cars 
surged forward into the attack and immediately drew an immense volume of machinegun and 
rifle fire from the vicinity of the Hobok defences. Acting on his own initiative, Irwin decided to 
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disregard his orders to wait for the advancing infantry, and hence ordered his armoured cars 
forward to their objectives whilst Klein’s three armoured cars steadily moved towards the fort 
along the road.539 
The armoured car advance was so sudden, that the SAA commander had to call off 
his artillery bombardment for a fear of hitting Irwin’s armoured cars as they neared the fort. 
The dash and tenacity of the men of the armoured cars brought about the desired 
consequences, for the Banda defenders broke cover and tried to rush the armoured cars as 
they passed through the wire entanglements surrounding the Italian fort.540 Close 
cooperation between Irwin’s and Klein’s armoured cars quickly ensured that the entire fort 
was surrounded, and subsequently cleared of all Banda defenders. The Banda had 
meanwhile fled down a ravine just below the fort, whereupon Klein reorganised his armoured 
cars to effectively deal with them.541 It took more than one sweep to clear the entire area of 
the Banda, where after the armoured cars took up strategic positions around the fort whilst 
awaiting the 3rd TS to secure and consolidate their position. Some Banda were seen fleeing 
in the direction of El Dima, but the armoured cars were, however, unable to catch up to those 
before darkness fell. The attack on Hobok was a text book affair for the men of the SATC, 
despite Irwin’s blatant disregards of orders, and furthermore highlighted the advantages of 
close cooperation with the SAA and SAAF which yielded desirable results throughout the two 
days’ actions. Throughout the actions at El Yibo, El Sardu, El Gumu, Gorai, Hobok and 
Banno, the armoured cars showed immense courage and dash in the operations whilst 
helping to inflict more than 300 casualties on the Italian defenders.542 
 
Banno and the Shifta Revolt 
With the Italian outposts of Hobok and El Gumu secured, Brink decided that the time to 
launch the Shifta revolt in southern Abyssinia had arrived. Brink, however, faced one major 
problem in sparking off the Shifta revolt. The leader of the local Shifta, Haille Degaga, had 
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his headquarters in the Hadu Mountain which formed part of the Gundile range. This fortress 
was situated on the extremities of the Yavello plain, which was approximately 58 km to the 
north of the South African positions at Hobok.543 By the time Hobok had been occupied, Brink 
realised that Robi, the Shifta emissary, had failed to bring word to Haille Degaga of the start 
of the South African offensive. It had previously been agreed upon, that if Robi had 
successfully contacted Haille Degaga, he would have re-contacted the 1st SA Div at Hobok 
after their occupation. Robi did, however, not arrive. Whilst planning the general strategy of 
the campaign, Brink decided that the 1st SA Div would have to capture Banno in order to 
secure the western flank of the South African area of operations, prior to the launch of his 
penultimate assault on the Italian mountain fortress at Mega. The successful South African 
occupation of Banno would, furthermore, afford the South Africans the ability to make easier 
contact with the Shifta leaders in the Yavello area.544 
The 1st SA Div Staff had decided, in conjunction with Brink, that Banno would be 
enveloped by two fighting patrols from Buchanan’s and Armstrong’s brigades. Such a move, 
Brink argued, would yield the best possible operational results without compromising the 
defence of the two fighting columns. The 2nd SA Bde was at that time stationed at El Gumu, 
whilst the 5th SA Bde occupied the fortress at Hobok. The 5th SA Bde fighting patrol, 
comprising of Dobb’s 1st South African Irish with Klein’s No. 1 ACC and ancillary troops 
attached, were to advance on Banno cross country via Obot. The 2nd SA Bde fighting patrol, 
consisting of one company of the 1st FFB and a section of Walker’s No. 2 ACC, were to 
advance on Banno via the road from Gianciaro in order to avoid an Italian counterattack 
developing from Yavello.545 The overall commander of the operation was Dobbs, who took 
personal charge of the 5th SA Bde column as well, whilst Maj J. Bester commanded the 2nd 
SA Bde column. Collectively, the entire fighting column was known as Dobbs Force for the 
duration of the operation.546 
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During the early hours of 8 February, the 5th Brigade fighting patrol left Hobok en 
route to Banno. The armoured cars of No. 1 ACC were interlaced throughout the entire 
fighting patrol, whilst two sections of cars, under Williamson, acted as scouts in the van of 
the column. A third section of cars brought up the rear of the column, in order to prevent 
possible Italian infiltration from the flanks and rear.547 The remainder of Klein’s armoured cars 
travelled with the main body of Dobbs’ South African Irish. The South African approach 
march on Banno was reminiscent of the approach a couple of days earlier on El Gumu. Poor 
terrain intelligence and maps, coupled with even worse aerial reconnaissance provided by 
the SAAF, ensured that Dobbs and his men were unaware of the harsh terrain which they 
were to cross. According to SAAF aerial reconnaissance, however, the route of advance lay 
across an open plain covered by light bush which would not hamper the South African 
advance.548 
The opposite was, however, true. In fact, the actual terrain encountered slowed down 
Dobb’s advance to a mere five km per hour. This was partly due to the poor quality of an 
Abyssinian guide, the harsh soil of the ‘open’ plain which exacted a severe strain on the 
South African armoured cars and troop-carriers, and the excessive heat which measured 
approximately 43°C in the shade. The advance was, however, sustained by the tireless 
efforts of the South African workshop mechanics that repaired the stricken vehicles of the 
fighting column whilst on the move. The severe temperatures experienced, fluctuated by a 
hot wind which caused the radiators of the armoured cars to overheat, was countered by 
ensuring a plentiful supply of radiator water from the ‘B’ Echelon vehicles.549 During the two 
day march to Banno, the fourteen armoured cars each used approximately 181 litres of water 
per day. Thus a grand total of over 4540 litres of water was used to sustain the motorised 
advance of Dobb’s fighting column. Realising that his fighting column would not be able to 
reach Banno by nightfall, Dobbs was forced to leaguer the night approximately 11 km from 
the Italian defences at Banno. The men of the 2nd SA Bde fighting column had meanwhile 
advanced rather easily along the Gianciaro-Banno road without encountering any Italian 
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opposition, and in keeping with the movements of the rest of Dobbs Force also bivouacked 
approximately 11 km short of the final objective.550  
At dawn on the morning of 9 February, Dobbs Force resumed the march towards 
Banno. By mid-morning the Italian outpost was sighted. Approximately 5 km from Banno, 
Dobbs contacted Bester to inform him of his position and to ensure that they carried out a 
well-coordinated attack on the Italian defences around Banno. The armoured cars 
accompanying Dobb’s fighting column, had managed to advance unopposed across the 
Gochi valley floor and in the process reconnoitred the approaches towards the Banno 
defences. By noon Klein’s armoured cars had rapidly advanced to within close proximity of 
the fort, with the South African infantry following slowly in their wake, without a shot of anger 
being fired in their direction.551 There were also no visible signs of the Italian defenders of 
Banno, which were expected to number at least two Colonial Infantry battalions according to 
intelligence reports. Realising that something was awry, Dobbs had in the meanwhile 
requested an aerial reconnaissance of the Italian fort by the SAAF, which yielded no results 
despite a low-level attack on the fort by the South African aircraft. Despite the ominous quiet, 
Klein and some of his armoured cars had moved to within the four walls of the fort, whilst his 
remaining cars were ordered to reconnoitre along the ridges to the left and right of the fort. 
Both of these actions had failed to draw any response from the Italians which were still 
nowhere to be seen, where after Klein reported that he could see the lead elements of the 1st 
South African Irish approaching the fort.552 
The Italian defenders at Banno showed the most tenacity and tactfulness of any of 
the Italian forces encountered during Brink’s entire campaign in East Africa. By cleverly luring 
the South African soldiers forward to within the close proximity of the fort, the Italians had 
planned to ambush these troops once they had entered the killing area. Fortunately the 
South African Irish carriers did not tarry in a clearing whilst en route to the fort, for at their 
abrupt arrival, an immense volley of accurate machinegun fire was laid down by the 16th and 
60th Italian Colonial Infantry Battalions.553 The Italian defenders had remained hidden in well-
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sited defensive positions on a ridge to the northwest of the fort, and by luring the armoured 
cars ever closer in the belief that the fort was abandoned, the Italians planned on decimating 
the soft-skinned vehicles of the advancing South African infantry.554 Fortunately for Dobbs’ 
men, the Italians had misjudged the timing of their attack, and the South African infantry was 
able to safely debus and continue their advance on the fort by foot. The ensuing fire fight at 
Banno has been described by some sources as the most intense of Brink’s entire campaign. 
The South African Irish could only advance to take over the brunt of the fighting around 
Banno, after two sections of armoured cars from No.1 ACC, operating from hull down 
positions, delivered such an immense fire-belt action that the Italian fire was temporarily 
silenced.555  
The soldiers of the 5th SA Bde fighting column continued their attack on the left side of 
the ridge, while Bester’s fighting column had meanwhile arrived on the scene and started 
their attack across the valley floor towards the right edge of the ridge which the Italians 
occupied. By midday, the full weight of the attack of Dobbs Force had materialised, when 
elements of the SAA started to arrive in the vicinity of Banno. The combined firepower of 
Dobbs Force, supplemented by the arrival of the SAA, struggled to silence the Italian fire until 
late in the afternoon, where after it was noticed that the Italians were retreating towards the 
Gundile Mountains.556 The poor mechanical state of the armoured cars, owing to their 
advance over the rough terrain during the preceding days, prevented Dobbs from pursuing 
the Italian forces. During the night of 9 February, and for a couple of nights thereafter, the 
Italian Colonial Infantry yet again occupied their positions around the Banno fort in order to 
harass its South African occupants. Despite the successful capture of the Italian positions at 
Banno by Dobbs Force, the South African operations in its immediate vicinity was not yet 
complete. In an attempt to establish the best routes of advance towards the Italian outpost at 
Yavello, Brink ordered long-range reconnaissance patrols towards the vicinity of Yavello in 
order to ascertain the best possible route of advance for the 1st SA Div. The most important 
task for Dobbs Force was, however, to establish contact with Haille Degaga in order to start 
the Shifta revolt in southern Abyssinia.557 
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On the morning of 10 February, the mechanics of the Light Aid Detachment repaired 
a sufficient number of armoured cars in order for Dobbs to send out a reconnaissance patrol 
in force towards the area between the Orbatte Hills and Yavello. The primary aim of the 
reconnaissance patrol was to establish the accuracy of the South African maps covering the 
approach march towards Yavello and its surrounds in order to avoid the problems associated 
with their previous advances across open country, whilst the secondary objective was to try 
and determine the location of the Hadu Mountain in order to try and contact Haille Degaga. 
By mid-morning one of the Abyssinian guides that were attached to the reconnaissance 
group, casually pointed out the location of the Hadu Mountain.558 During that night, the 
Dobbs Force patrol bivouacked in the area between Banno and the Hadu mountains. During 
the night, Dobbs had to decide how to best make contact with Haille Degaga, much to the 
irritation of Armstrong’s Headquarters, who had to remind him what the primary aim of the 
patrol was. During the early morning hours of 11 February, Dobbs indeed found the answer 
to his predicament, for Robi and some Shifta emissaries made their appearance out of the 
blue. Robi explained to Dobbs that he was unable to reach to the Hadu mountains and bring 
word to Haille Degaga of the start of Brink’s offensive, due to the presence of widespread 
Italian patrols which blocked his way towards the Hadu Mountains. In order to ensure that 
Robi and his men deliver word to Haille Degaga to rise against the Italians, he requested that 
Dobbs order some armoured cars to break through the Italian patrol area, and deliver him 
and his men to the Hadu Mountains.559 
Without much hesitation, Dobbs ordered Klein to take four armoured cars and a 
motorised section of the South African Irish, and deliver Robi and his men to the Hadu 
Mountain on the opposite end of the Yavello plain. The journey to and from the Hadu 
mountain, situated approximately 96 km distant, had to be completed within one day. Under 
strict orders from Dobbs, Klein and his men had to be back at Banno before sunset. The men 
under Klein’s command was ordered to maintain strict radio silence throughout the day’s 
patrol in order to not give away their position for the fear of an Italian attack on the patrol. 
The fighting patrol crossed a tank trap on their outward journey, where after they 
encountered fire from the Italian Colonial Infantry which had reoccupied the heights to the 
northwest of Banno.560 The remainder of the journey to the Hadu Mountain occurred without 
incident across the yellow-grassed Yavello plain. The sudden appearance of four Italian 
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Caproni bombers caused the patrol to scatter in a herringbone formation off the road, but the 
Italian planes continued their journey without attacking the South African column. During the 
early afternoon, Robi suddenly called the patrol to a halt and indicated towards a high 
mountain peak and shouted ‘Hadu!’. After Robi and his men had disembarked from the 
armoured cars, he once more shouted ‘Haille Degaga!’ whilst gesturing to the Hadu 
Mountain. Robi and his men started out towards the mountain, and left Klein and his men 
with the simple words ‘Kwaheru’ – We shall meet again.561 
The return journey to Banno occurred without incident, and Klein and his men even 
found enough time to call a brief halt to their patrol and hunt some gemsbok (East African 
Oryx) on the Yavello plain. A sudden gathering of rain clouds prompted Klein to hasten their 
return journey to Banno, in fear of being left stricken on the Yavello plain. The patrol arrived 
safely at Banno, without any incident, just before sunset on the night of 11 February. The 
successful completion of the day’s task was celebrated that night, when all the defenders of 
Banno was able to feast on grilled gemsbok steaks courtesy of Klein and his men. During the 
morning of 13 February, the men from Dobbs Force moved out from Banno to rejoin the 5th 
SA Bde for the penultimate attack of the 1st SA Div on the Italian stronghold at Mega. The 
defence of Banno was handed over to the men of No. 2 SA Motor Cycle Company, who had 
to endure intermittent fighting around the fort until 18 February when the Italians was finally 
driven from the vicinity of the fort.562 
 
Final Showdown at Mega 
The strongest Italian bastion left in southern Abyssinia, and indeed the last thorn in Brink’s 
flesh, was the fort at Mega. Dominating the surrounding plains from its position on the high 
mountain plateau, Brink’s intelligence estimated that Mega was protected by experienced 
Blackshirt and Colonial Infantry battalions, which was further reinforced by heavy artillery and 
a series of minefields protecting its approaches. Brink was indeed anxious whilst planning for 
the attack on Mega, for the assault on the fort would be the first instance during the entire 
campaign where South African fighting skills would be matched against a predominantly 
white Italian force.563 Brink’s plan for the assault on Mega was based on a two pronged 
approach, aimed at cutting the Italian line of retreat into the Abyssinia hinterland, whilst 
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concurrently preventing any Italian reinforcements from Yavello or Neghelli from interfering 
with the South African attack on Mega.564 As such, Brink tasked Buchanan to advance with 
the 2nd SA Bde along the Gianciaro – Mega road and then turn and cut the Mega – Neghelli 
road by occupying El Sod. Buchanan, upon clearing the Mega-Yavello road, was to occupy 
Madaccio, which would in turn give him complete control of the Mega-Yavello and Mega-
Gianciaro roads as well. Once this move was completed, Buchanan was to leave a holding 
force at El Sod, whilst moving the remainder of his force to the south and east in order to cut 
the Mega – Moyale road. During this part of the campaign, Dobbs Force was temporarily 
attached to Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde. Brink had, furthermore, tasked Armstrong to threaten 
Mega from a northerly direction whilst he advanced with the 5th SA Bde from El Gumu. Once 
these moves were completed, Brink argued, Mega would be effectively enveloped by the 1st 
SA Div, where after Buchanan’s and Armstrong’s brigades were to launch a combined attack 
on Mega. It was hence decided that the 1st SA Div’s offensive on Mega were to start on 14 
February.565  
The 2nd SA Bde’s advance towards El Sod was pre-empted by a reconnaissance 
patrol, consisting of four of Walker’s armoured cars and a company of men from the 1st FFB, 
towards the Italian locale of El Dokelle. Having advanced to El Dokelle without interference 
from the Italians, the South African patrol bivouacked in the town during the night of 13 
February. The movement of the main body of Buchanan’s men, with Dobbs’ men in the van, 
occurred without any opposition during 14 February. Having advanced unopposed along the 
Gianciaro – Mega road, Buchanan’s column continued their advance and effectively cut the 
Mega – Yavello road as planned. The men from the 1st South African Irish, strengthened by 
cars from No. 1 ACC, turned south and occupied Madaccio without any interference 
whatsoever by Italian soldiers.566 No sooner had Buchanan’s troops crossed the Yavello 
road, when he opted to deviate from Brink’s plan and decided to act on his own accord. 
Buchanan opted to leave ‘C’ Company of the 2nd FFB and two armoured cars, under 
command of Lt D.A. Wood, astride the Yavello road in order to protect the rear of his brigade 
and in turn to deny the Italians the use of the Yavello-Mega road whilst he continued his 
advance. Having only enjoyed successes up to this point of the campaign, and being lulled 
into a false sense of security by the lacklustre attitude of the Italian defenders which they had 
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previously encountered, the stopper grouped failed to adhere to the necessary safety 
precautions during the night.567 
 
Map 4.6: The South African attack on Mega, February 1941.568 
During the early morning hours of 15 February, Wood was awakened by the sound of 
approaching vehicles. Two Italian trucks, laden with supplies and destined for Mega, had 
driven unopposed into the undefended South African leaguer. The South African soldiers 
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were of the opinion that they were friendly forces that were simply passing through their 
camp, but the 20 accompanying Banda soldiers, upon debussing, soon opened fire on the 
unsuspecting men. The two armoured cars soon drew the majority of the Italian fire during 
the ensuing confusion. After having readied his crew, Wood manoeuvred his vehicle into a 
good firing position, from where he proceeded to engage the Banda troops with his 
machineguns.569 The Banda troops soon fled, and Wood was ordered to move his two 
armoured cars to a position a couple of hundred yards up the road. In the event of an Italian 
tank attack, Wood was ordered to immediately withdraw his armoured cars to a position 
behind a Boys anti-tank rifle, which in turn would engage the Italian armoured threat. By 
sunrise a strong Italian fighting patrol, which included 15 light tanks, attacked the South 
African position.570 The Italian attack, possibly the most effective of the entire campaign 
experienced by Brink’s troops, succeeded in completely surrounding the South Africans. At 
one stage the Italian tanks managed to break through the haphazard South African defensive 
line, and scattered the infantry of the 2nd FFB in all directions. Meanwhile, Wood’s armoured 
cars were unable to find the safety of the anti-tank rifle, and in the ensuing confusion they 
were unable to effectively counter the Italian attack whilst covering the retreat of the infantry 
towards El Sod. Badly shaken, the South Africans retreated across country towards the 
safety of Banno. The Italian patrol, content at having caused the South Africans to flee, and 
not intent on a further pursuit, returned to Yavello.571 
Upon hearing the news of the South African defeat, Buchanan ordered a fighting 
patrol from El Sod to immediately pursue the Italian force. The patrol, under command of 
Engelbrecht, consisted of ‘A’ Company 2nd FFB in their troop carriers, a section from the 3rd 
Anti-Tank Battery and six armoured cars of Walker’s No. 2 ACC. The South African losses 
during the morning’s skirmish amounted to two men killed, four wounded, and a further 10 
taken prisoner. The South African patrol made good its pursuit, and was soon closing in on 
the Italian force whose return journey to Yavello was being considerably retarded through the 
efforts of the SAAF. The fighting column soon caught up to, and captured, a truck full of 
Italian soldiers. This swift action ensured the release of a number of the South African 
prisoners.572 The SAAF, in an effort to allow Walker and his armoured cars to catch up to the 
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Italian column and engage the Italian armour, had carried out a concentrated bombing run on 
the convoy in the hope of delaying its withdrawal. Not able to stem their withdrawal, the 
SAAF planes managed to, at least, cause damage to a number of Italian armoured cars and 
light tanks, with some being abandoned along the road. The South African pursuit of the 
Italian forces, however, soon petered out, and Buchanan recalled his men. Whilst acting on 
sparse information concerning the exact location of the returning Italian column, and fearing 
that Engelbrecht’s patrol might be ambushed, Buchanan thought it better to recall his men to 
the safety of El Sod. Walker, however, believed that, had he been allowed to continue the 
pursuit of the Italian column, he might have captured all off the Italian light tanks. Despite the 
South African defeat during the morning, the brief action fought, and the subsequent South 
African pursuit, had prevented the Italians from reinforcing Mega from Yavello with a strong 
compliment of armour and infantry.573 
The principal attack on Mega was primarily a South African infantry affair, with the 
men of SATC only being able to offer assistance to Armstrong’s and Buchanan’s brigades in 
the form of long-range reconnaissance patrols and the provision of rear-guard and flanking 
duties. The attack on Mega, however, was initiated by a section of No. 1 ACC acting under 
the command of 2Lt D. Hellen. Whilst accompanying a patrol of Dobbs’ men towards the 
approaches of Mega, Hellen’s armoured cars attacked two Italian motorcyclists who were 
travelling along the road from the fort. The two motorcyclists appeared totally oblivious as to 
the presence of the South African armoured cars on their immediate front. The armoured 
cars readily dealt with the motorcyclists after a series of rapid machinegun bursts, where 
after Hellen and his cars were subjected to an immediate counter barrage from the Italian 
artillery batteries situated around Mega. The Italian fire was, however, so inaccurate that no 
shells landed within 50 metres of any of the three armoured cars, thus causing no 
damage.574  
The ensuing battle between the South Africans and the Italian defenders of Mega was 
fought in some of the most appalling weather conditions present during the entire East 
African campaign. When the fighting started on 16 February, the average daily temperature 
was in excess of 37°C. During the ensuing night, however, the East African weather closed 
in and torrential downpour engulfed Mega and its surroundings which ensured that the South 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41 and Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian 
Campaigns, pp. 138-145 and Birkby, Uncle George, pp. 140-141. 
573  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
1/2/41 to 28/2/41 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 70-71 and Birkby, Uncle George, pp. 
141-142. 
574  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File A – 2 S.A. Inf Bde Mega-Moyale. Report on Operations 
Mega 14-18 February 1941 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 214, File E.A. 25. No. 1 Armoured 
Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
African attackers had to endure an extremely cold and uncomfortable night out in the open. 
The South African infantrymen had to deal with severe exposure, owing to the fact that they 
were fighting in summer issued field dress. Their ordeal was further heightened by the fact 
that their blankets were unable to reach them, owing to the intermittent Italian artillery 
barrages emanating from Mega. Needless to say, the South African fighting positions 
throughout the night were rather precarious, with the men enduring an extremely 
uncomfortable night before the attack was resumed on the morning of 17 February.575 
The mountainous country around Mega, the torrential rain and the ensuing mud, 
severely curtailed the operational deployment of the armoured cars during the South African 
attack on Mega. To the south-east of Mega, Walker’s No. 2 ACC, operating with the 2nd SA 
Bde, undertook numerous patrols towards El Sod and Yavello. These patrols were 
conducted, in order to pre-emptively halt any Italian attempts at a counterattack or reinforcing 
Mega from their outpost at Yavello. When Walker’s patrols failed to make contact with 
Italians towards Yavello it was, however, suspected that the Italian garrison of Yavello had 
withdrawn to, and reinforced, their positions at Neghelli.576 The cars of No. 1 ACC, operating 
with the Armstrong’s 5th SA Bde, supported the attack of the 3rd TS on the right flank of 
Mega. After the first day’s fighting, with support from Klein’s armoured cars, the 3rd TS had 
managed to take Kirby Hill. By the following day, Lt Rees and his section of armoured cars 
had managed to work their way forward to a feature aptly named ‘Two Tree Hill’. The 
armoured cars, however, found the going extremely tough owing to the muddy terrain and a 
number of cars got bogged down in the ensuing advance. Having managed to work his 
armoured cars around the ridge, and despite being unable to advance any further, Rees and 
his cars provided valuable suppressing fire to the advancing South African infantrymen.577 By 
18 February, Engelbrecht had led his 2nd FFB up a cliff, previously thought of as unscalable, 
and managed to capture the main Italian artillery positions surrounding Mega. The South 
African infantrymen, sensing the final victory was at hand, and according to Klein, fixed 
bayonets, adamant at charging the Italian fort in a scene reminiscent of the final coup de 
grace of yesteryear. With more than 1000 men, 7 pack guns, numerous machineguns of 
varying calibres, petrol, food stores and anti-aircraft guns, the Italian garrison of Mega 
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surrendered on 18 February, before being induced to do so by a Springbok bayonet 
charge.578 
After the occupation of Mega, Walker and Klein’s armoured car companies continued 
to undertake long range reconnaissance patrols throughout southern Abyssinia without 
meeting any noticeable Italian resistance.579 During this time Brink had learned that Haille 
Degaga and his Shifta bands had successfully occupied Yavello without a fight. During the 
1st SA Div’s offensive in southern Abyssinia, No. 2 platoon of No. 2 ACC was detached to 
Fowkes’ 22nd EA Bde. The 22nd EA Bde formed part of Cunningham’s attack on Italian 
Somaliland, and Lt Heard and his platoon of armoured cars formed the spearhead of 
Fowkes’ attacks on Liboi, Haweina, Beles Gugani and a diversionary attack on Italian 
positions in the vicinity of El Wak. By 13 March 1941, Heard’s armoured cars rejoined their 
company at Isiolo.580 Operating south of Moyale, Lt W.H. Penny and four armoured cars from 
No.1 ACC, operating in conjunction with the 2nd RB, was instructed to harass the Italian 
forces at Moyale in order to prevent them from interfering with the 1st SA Division’s 
operations towards Mega. During these operations, Penny lost two cars to land landmines, 
but was subsequently able to extricate these vehicles. Moyale was captured on 22 February 
by a party of Abyssinian Irregulars from the 2nd SA Bde, where after it was established that 
the Italians had abandoned Moyale on the same day that Mega fell to the Brink.581 The 1st SA 
Div’s fighting role during the East African campaign was over, and Brink and his men was 
subsequently ordered to Nanyuki, where they were to remain ready to act at the request of 
Cunningham. The campaign in Somaliland, however, proceeded without the need of 
reinforcement by the 1st SA Div. Subsequently, the 1st SA Div Headquarters and Armstrong’s 
5th SA Bde embarked for Egypt where their services was needed in the western desert, whilst 
Buchanan’s 2nd SA Bde was to remain in East Africa and back up the Allied invasion of Italian 
Somaliland. 582 
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Conclusion 
The successful occupation of the fort at Mega by the 1st SA Div ensured that Brink had 
effectively cleared southern Abyssinia of all forms of Italian resistance. Under his good 
leadership the 1st SA Div had accumulated a string of operational victories, including the 
capture of a vast number of Italian men and equipment, whilst at the same time ensuring the 
successful fostering of a Shifta revolt in southern Abyssinia. Brink’s offensive across the 
Kenyan frontier into southern Abyssinia, ensured that the first purely South African campaign 
since the end First World War, was a resounding success not only for the men of the 
Division, but for South Africa and indeed the Allies. The men of the SATC provided sterling 
work when called upon and acted as the vanguard of the 1st SA Div from the NFD through to 
the battle of Mega. The armoured cars companies, which saw service with Brink’s Division, 
were employed in a variety of roles throughout the campaign. Often operating in the van of 
the 1st SA Div, they provided flank, defensive and offensive support. The advantages, at 
times rather haphazard, of close cooperation between infantry, armour and the air force 
became paramount throughout Brink’s offensive in southern Abyssinia. The waning fighting 
efficiency and determination of the Italian military forces in East Africa directly influenced the 
bold South African employment of armoured cars, where cars at times delivered the final 
coup de grace in a full frontal attack reminiscent of an old-style cavalry charge. 
 By the time Mega had been captured, and the East African rainy season had arrived, 
the deployment capabilities of the SATC units under Brink was severely limited. The 
combination of the East African topography, climate and communications, and the fighting 
efficiency of the Italian soldiers in Brink’s area of operations, afforded the South African 
armoured cars the ability to project their offensive force in an unrivalled manner across the 
East African operational theatre until the finale at Mega in February 1941. By April 1941, the 
1st SA Div had embarked for service in North Africa, where they were to be tested against 
German military might. The military successes won by Brink in Abyssinia in no way 
effectively prepared his men for service in North Africa, for the nature of the enemy and the 
terrain differed vastly between the two theatres. The campaign in Abyssinia was, however, 
not yet complete, for the Italian presence still had to be crushed in central and northern 
Abyssinia. It was here that the men of the SATC would once more show their tenacity and 
fighting efficiency in driving the Italian presence from East Africa. 
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Chapter 5 – Bogs, Bluffs and Bastions: South African Armour in the East African 
Campaign’s ‘Sideshows’ – March 1941 to November 1941 
 
“The organisation of the Armd C Coys was on the typically South African 
principle of a self-contained unit, a relic of the Commando days ... able to exist 
independently for a considerable time. The employment of the cars in this novel 
tactical role, was a deliberate policy, decided upon in the light of experience 
gained in East Africa in 1914-1918, and was not merely the accidental discovery 
of a new use for an old arm.”583 
 
Introduction 
The Battle of the Lakes especially, and the assault on Gondar to a lesser extent, are areas in 
the military historiography of the South African deployment to East Africa that remain largely 
untouched and unknown. The Allied conquest of central Abyssinia in 1941 was fought under 
difficult circumstances throughout the East African rainy season by the men of 
Cunningham’s East Africa Force. It is mostly believed that the Allied campaign in East Africa 
had ended after the capture of Addis Ababa, and the surrender of the Duke of Aosta and his 
Italian forces at Amba Alagi. The UDF troops, contrary to popular belief, did not all leave 
East Africa by mid-June 1941 for service in North Africa, some men would continue to see 
active service with the East Africa Force until November 1941. The Battle of the Lakes, 
however, never truly received the recognition it deserves in the annals of South African 
military history, for they were more often than not seen as mere sideshows. Advancing from 
the north and the south, the 11th and 12th Divisions bore the brunt of the fighting during the 
campaign in central Abyssinia, with units from the SATC once more called upon to conduct a 
variety of roles during the offensive operations. The forested mountain ranges of the central 
Abyssinian highlands, crisscrossed by several lakes, and the northern Abyssinian mountain 
ranges, were the last designated bastion of the Italian East African Empire, and it was here 
that the culminating battles for complete control over the territory were fought.584  
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, the Allied offensives in central Abyssinia, 
where the men of No. 1 ACC distinguished themselves operationally, are discussed. 
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Second, the role that No. 2 ACC and No. 1 LTC played during the Battle of the Lakes fought 
in central Abyssinia will be discussed. Last, the role which the men of the Light Armoured 
Detachment (LAD) played in the culminating battles fought around Gondar during the latter 
half of 1941 is highlighted. These three aims combined, provide the reader with an 
understanding of the varied employment of the SATC during the final battles fought in 
Abyssinia. 
 
The Consolidation of Southern Abyssinia –Soroppa and Giarso 
The capture of Addis Ababa, Asmara and Massawa was Cunningham’s strategic objective, 
along with removing the Italian threat from the Middle East supply route through the Red 
Sea. Whilst the strategic aim had been realised, the remaining Italian troops in the field still 
posed a considerable threat to the Allied lines of communication which remained severely 
extended across the East African theatre. Cunningham realised that he had to swiftly deal 
with the Italian threat in central Abyssinia, which was defended by approximately seven 
resolute Italian Divisions with more than 200 artillery pieces in their arsenal. The Italian 
defensive bastions were situated in strong positions throughout the mountain ranges, high 
valleys and impenetrable forests that traversed central Abyssinia, similar to that encountered 
in Italy during the South African deployment in 1944-1945. Furthermore, the large number of 
Italian soldiers committed to defend central Abyssinia outnumbered Cunningham’s East 
Africa Force by at least three to one. Occupying their strong defensive positions, covered by 
a myriad of heavy artillery, minefields, tank-traps and demolitions, the Italian defenders 
readied themselves for a hard fight. The Italian soldiers, however, realised that the imminent 
rainy season, and the deteriorating terrain, would be their closest ally in denying the East 
Africa Force ease of access across the muddy quagmires brought about by torrential 
downpours.585 By March, the men of No. 1 ACC were attached to Maj Gen Godwin Austen’s 
12th Division, which carried out offensive operations in central Abyssinia across a 480 km 
wide front from Neghelli towards Maji.586 
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The men of No. 1 ACC never again deployed as a complete operational entity after 
the February battles around Mega and Moyale. Whilst attached to the 12th Division, calls for 
armoured assistance from the Allied brigades in Abyssinia were so great, that Klein was 
forced to break No. 1 ACC into several smaller sub-units, in order to render assistance 
where needed across the operational theatre. These armoured sub-units were deployed 
across the length and breadth of Godwin Austin’s 480 km wide front, at times completely 
disregarding the South African armour doctrine.587 During March, however, the men of No. 1 
ACC were bound to leave Mega and journey towards Nanyuki in the rear for a well-earned 
period of rest, recuperation and refit.588 The men of No. 2 Platoon were immediately 
detached to Ritchie’s 21st EA Bde and they joined their new outfit at Yavello in time for its 
attack on the Italian stronghold at Soroppa. The 21st EA Bde attacked the Italian mountain 
positions, defended by 1000 troops of the 61st Colonial Infantry, around Soroppa on 31 
March. The Italian defenders at Soroppa, expected the Allied attack to materialise along the 
road, and thus subsequently concentrated all of their defensive efforts in the said sector by 
covering all the approaches with minefields, and machinegun and artillery fire.589 The Allied 
flanking attack caught the Italian defenders unaware when the South African armoured cars, 
in conjunction with the men of the KAR, stormed their positions. In the ensuing defeat, the 
Italians lost 50 men killed, and over 200 soldiers were taken prisoner. Arms and ammunition 
of various calibres were captured, but the treacherous country towards Alghe prevented the 
armoured cars from pursuing the retreating Italians any further.590 
The initial success at Soroppa was followed by a subsequent attack on the Italian 
outpost at Giarso, approximately 80 km west of Yavello. Aerial reconnaissance of the area 
by the SAAF indicated that there was a strong Italian presence in the hills surrounding 
Giarso. Ritchie decided immediately to send a fighting patrol comprising of the Northern 
Rhodesian Regiment, 7th SA Field Battery SAA and a section of No. 1 ACC to capture the 
position.591 On 4 April the fighting patrol left Yavello and made steady progress across the 
Sagan River in the direction of Giarso. The Allied march on Giarso did not go unnoticed, for 
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Italian observation posts watched their every move in anticipation of the forthcoming attack. 
The rainy season had by then arrived in East Africa, and a considerable torrential downpour 
severely hampered the movement of the SAA and armoured cars to such an extent that 
Giarso was only attacked on 9 April.592 During the early morning attack on Giarso, the men 
of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment led a full frontal assault on the Italian positions.  They 
captured their first objective without meeting strong opposition. The subsequent assault on 
the Italian main positions at Giarso was met by much stiff resistance and accurate fire than 
expected, and the attack failed completely. Ritchie, realising that the battle for Giarso was 
lost, ordered the section of cars from No. 1 ACC forward in an attempt to prevent a complete 
rout of his forces.593 Through the combination of the firepower delivered by the South African 
armoured cars, and the relentless ground-strafing attacks of the SAAF aircraft, Ritchie was 
able to extricate his Brigade from their perilous position without suffering any further losses. 
By 9 April, as the men of No. 2 Platoon supported the attack at Giarso, the remainder of No. 
1 ACC was withdrawn from Brink’s Division. The men of No. 1 ACC would henceforth see 
service with the Godwin-Austen’s 12th Division for the remainder of their campaign in East 
Africa.594 
 
The Assault of the Hills 
By 16 March the remaining men and machines of No. 1 ACC had arrived at Nanyuki, from 
Mega, for their intended period of rest, recuperation, and refit. En route to Nanyuki, Lt A.W. 
Thompson and his section of armoured cars was also detached for service with Ritchie’s 21st 
EA Bde. Thompson and his men reported to Moyale in due course. By 25 March, Lt R.D. 
Meeser took delivery of five new armoured cars at Nairobi, where after he and his men 
subsequently journeyed to Lokitaung in western Abyssinia where they were attached to Brig 
Owen’s 25th EA Bde.595 Meeser’s cars were reinforced by the arrival of Capt G. De Marilac 
and a further two armoured cars at Lokitaung a couple of days later. By 18 April, after Klein 
and the remainder of No. 1 ACC took delivery of a new batch of armoured cars, the 
remnants of No. 1 ACC steadily found their way to Yavello where they also joined the 21st 
EA Bde. By 21 April, after having journeyed 720 km in a mere three days, Klein and his men 
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arrived at Yavello, ready once again to assume an offensive role in the East African 
campaign.596 
 
Map 5.1: Area of operations during the battles for central Abyssinia.597 
 Shortly after their arrival at Yavello, Klein and his men were ordered to support 
Ritchie’s advance into the lakes region of central Abyssinia. Ritchie had decided that Klein 
and his compliment of armoured cars would support the attack of the 21st EA Bde on the 
Italian defensive position at Magado. Before No. 1 ACC could advance on Magado, 
however, the remainder of Klein’s AFV, contrary to accepted doctrine, was once more split 
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into two sub-units.598 This was necessitated after a squadron of the East African Armoured 
Car Regiment, attached to the 24th GC Bde, suffered such severe losses at the intense 
fighting at Uaddara, that Klein and 17 of his armoured cars were at once ordered to Godwin 
Austen’s divisional headquarters at Neghelli. Upon reaching Neghelli, Klein and his men 
were ordered to join the Allied attack on Uaddara. The remainder of No. 1 ACC, under 
command of Capt E.H. Torr, remained with the 21st EA Bde and supported their attack on 
Magado and Alghe.599 
The 21st EA Bde’s attack on Magado occurred, once again, under some of the most 
trying of weather conditions prevalent during the entire East African campaign. The 
exceptional performance of the South African armoured cars was only achieved through the 
sheer determination, and tenacity of their crews under the most trying of operational 
circumstances. The intermittent torrential rain had turned large tracts of the central 
Abyssinian highlands into a muddy quagmire, which ensured that the operational conditions, 
under which the attack on Magado took place, stretched the limits of both man and machine 
to the utmost.600By 30 April, a battalion of the KAR had moved to the vicinity of Magado, 
ready to launch an attack once the remainder of the 21st EA Bde had arrived. Exceptionally 
heavy rain meant that the remainder of Ritchie’s Brigade only arrived in the vicinity of 
Magado by 6 May. The Italian defensive positions at Magado were centred on two prominent 
hilltops, Brown Hut Hill on the left flank and Path Hill on the right flank. Ritchie’s plan of 
attack on Magado meant that the 1st/4th KAR would threaten Brown Hut Hill, whilst the 1st/2nd 
KAR would advance on Path Hill. It was subsequently decided that, if at all possible and 
weather and mud permitting, the South African armoured cars would move forward and join 
the separate infantry attacks, by being divided into two sections of three cars each, under 
command of Irwin and Torr respectively.601 
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Fig 5.1: Muddy quagmires impeded the fighting ability of the South African armour.602 
Eager not to miss out on the fighting around Magado, Torr and Irwin ensured that 
they conducted an in-depth reconnaissance of the area in and around their respective 
objectives, in order to ascertain the best avenues of approach for their armoured cars. 
Ritchie expressed serious doubts as to whether the South African armoured cars would at all 
be able to join in on the attacks at Magado, owing to the rain and the mud prevalent 
throughout his Brigade’s route of advance. Torr, through his post reconnaissance patrol 
report, persuaded Ritchie of the ability of armoured cars to traverse the muddy terrain.603 
Ritchie at last conceded to the point where Torr and Irwin’s cars were at least included in the 
plan of attack. The armoured cars were ordered to lend support along the road, and if 
possible to advance across country in support of the advancing infantry. During the night of 5 
May, a further rainstorm engulfed the Magado area, and by the next morning Ritchie had 
confined Torr and Irwin’s cars to operations along the roads alone. The attack on Brown Hut 
Hill by the KAR was entirely successful, and by mid-morning the East African infantrymen 
had occupied their respective objectives. The Italian soldiers did not retreat immediately, but 
                                                        
602  Ditsong National Museum of Military History, Reference Library, Photographic Collection. EA 
– 540 The main barrier to victory in the battle of the Lakes were the muddy bush roads which 
were turned into quagmire by the incessant rains of the rainy season. 
603  DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File B 12 AFR DIV. 12th (African) Division Report on Operations 
in Abyssinia March to June 1941 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 214, File E.A. 25. No. 1 
Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/4/41 to 30/4/41 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 214, 
File E.A. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/5/41 to 31/5/41. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
chose to harass the Allied troops from entrenched positions along a ridge to the north of 
Brown Hut Hill.604 
The intermittent rain of the previous night had in the meanwhile stopped, and Torr 
decided, of his own accord, that he would attempt to reach Brown Hut Hill with his armoured 
cars, and lend support to the soldiers of the KAR occupying that position. Advancing at best 
possible speed across the waterlogged terrain, the armoured cars had to contend with 
sliding everywhere owing to the muddy quagmire in which they found themselves.605 During 
this advance, another heavy downpour engulfed the area, and temporarily prevented the 
armoured cars from proceeding towards Brown Hut Hill. By the early afternoon the vehicles 
were once again able to continue their advance, and attempt to clear two ravines which 
obstructed their path of advance. The second ravine, proved the most difficult to cross, and 
only through the help of men of the 1st/4th KAR, who hacked a path through some dense 
undergrowth, were Torr’s cars able to proceed.606 After a three hour ordeal across muddy 
approaches and ravines, Torr’s armoured cars finally reach their intended objective. The 
armoured cars manoeuvred into positions around Brown Hut Hill under cover of darkness, 
and were ordered to remain with the East African infantrymen and help to repel any 
counterattack by the Italians. If the position was counterattacked by the Italians during the 
night, Torr’s cars were to advance forward of the Allied perimeter and engage the attackers 
headlong. Shortly after midnight on 7 May, the Italians counterattacked, and the armoured 
cars at once moved forward to repel the Italian foe. Torr’s armoured cars, after a brief fire 
fight with the Italians, twice succeeded in routing the attacking force by carrying out 
successful sweeps of the area.607 
During 7 May, Irwin’s three armoured cars had, meanwhile, advanced to a point 
along the Alghe road, form where they were ordered to join in the subsequent attack on the 
Italian’s left flank at Path Hill. Unable to advance any further along the road owing to the 
presence of Italian roadblocks and mines, Irwin and his armoured cars had to be content 
with providing the attacking Allied troops with ample covering fire.608 Torr’s armoured cars 
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enjoyed further success during the morning when they engaged the retreating Italian soldiers 
from the safety of Brown Hut Hill. The cars under Torr’s command, ceased to play any 
further operational role during this part of the campaign, owing to the limited deployment 
capabilities of the armoured cars in the adverse weather conditions and harsh topography 
present in western Abyssinia.609 The armoured cars were engaged in further patrol and 
escort duties, and proceeded to support the Ritchie’s Brigade whilst they captured Alghe and 
Giabassire. A severe shortage of petrol and supplies meant that Ritchie and his men were 
forced to withdraw to Yavello by 26 May, and were unable to conduct further offensive 
operations in western Abyssinia. Torr and his detachment of armoured cars were in the 
meantime ordered to join Owen’s 25th EA Bde at Mega, but they saw no further action on 
that front either. By mid-July, Torr and his armoured cars were withdrawn to Nairobi, where 
they returned their AFV’s and military stores, and awaited the arrival of the remainder of the 
men of No. 1 ACC returning from across Abyssinia.610 
 
Subjugating Central Abyssinia: Uaddara and Rees’ Rout 
At the same time as the battle was shaping on the Magado front, Klein’s compliment of 
seventeen armoured cars was struggling through the mud north of Yavello, in an attempt to 
reach Godwin-Austen’s 12th Division’s Headquarters which was situated at Neghelli. The 
relentless rains turned the 245 km stretch of road between Yavello and Neghelli into a 
muddy quagmire, and the further passage of a supply convoy to Godwin-Austen’s Division 
had decimated it.611 Realising the difficulties which would be encountered during their 
advance across the impeding terrain, Klein seized a crawler tractor en route to Neghelli 
which greatly aided their journey. The 245 km journey to Neghelli was accomplished in three 
days through the help of the crawler tractor, which at times had to drag each vehicle of the 
convoy over the severe stretches of mud. No sooner had Klein and his armoured cars 
reported to Godwin Austen’s headquarters, when he was ordered to take his cars and 
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proceed with all haste to join Richard’s 24th GC Bde, and the operations aimed at capturing 
Uaddara.612 
The mountain fortress of Uaddara, well known for its natural defences, was situated 
on a defendable mountain ridge surrounded by a dense forest. The Italian defenders of 
Uaddara included one battalion of Blackshirts, five battalions of Colonial Infantry and 
approximately twelve artillery pieces. During the battles fought for the conquest of Abyssinia 
during 1936, the Italians had fought for eleven desperate months to dislodge Ras Desta’s 
men from their defensive position of Uaddara.613 The Italians were thus well aware of the 
considerable defensive advantage which they had on their side, by the mere investment of 
Uaddara alone. The dense forests surrounding Uaddara was the Italian defender’s greatest 
ally, for it limited Richard’s use of aircraft, artillery and armoured cars. The same forests 
concealed the whereabouts of the Italian defenders. The battle for Uaddara lasted for about 
three weeks, and was marked by some of the most courageous Italian fighting of the entire 
campaign. The Italians, for once, decided to fight. By the end of the third week of fighting, 
the forest at Uaddara were riddled with decomposing bodies of men and animals, a 
testament to the fierce battle that had been fought in the heavy rain and bitter cold of the 
central Abyssinian highlands.614 
During the third week of April, the men of the 3rd Gold Coast Regiment, supported by 
some East African Armoured Cars, managed to drive the Italians back towards their main 
defensive positions at Uaddara. During the following ten days, pensive patrols were 
undertaken to try and determine the flanks of the Italian positions, and their defensive 
strengths. During the second phase of the battle, the Italians scored one of their most 
notable successes against Allied armour during the East African campaign, when they 
managed to completely destroy three East African armoured cars by artillery fire from point-
blank range. The destruction of the East African armoured cars was brought about by the 
lacklustre attitude of its crews, owing to the preceding Allied successes and the poor Italian 
fighting spirit shown until then during the campaign. During the third phase of the battle, 
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fought between 3-10 May, Richard’s Brigade launched its final assault on the main Italian 
defences at Uaddara.615 
On 7 May, Klein and his cars from No. 1 ACC were placed under the command of the 
24th GC Bde. Richards immediately ordered Klein and his cars forward in order to join the 
final push on Uaddara. Klein’s armoured cars played a negligible role in the central sector of 
the ensuing attack, but two sections of his cars offered valuable covering and suppression 
fire to the Gold Coast infantrymen fighting through the Uaddara jungle.616 By the morning of 
10 May, the constant pressure affected by the 24th EA Bde on the Italian defenders paid off. 
The Italians had abandoned their entire Uaddara position, and retreated northwards towards 
Adola. The men of the 1st Gold Coast Regiment, with Klein and his cars following in their 
wake gave immediate pursuit and during the same day still fought another action with the 
retreating Italian rear-guard, which resulted in heavy casualties being inflicted on the Italian 
Blackshirts.617 
After Richards succeeded in dislodging the Italian defenders from their mountain 
bastion at Uaddara, he ordered his Brigade to pursue the retreating Italian forces towards 
the vicinity of Uondo. The harassing attacks on the retreating Italians, was supported by Lt 
E.J.W. Rees and four armoured cars of No. 1 ACC, who accompanied the men from the 1st 
Gold Coast Regiment that formed the vanguard of Richards’ advance on Uondo. The Italians 
were steadily retreating further up the Afrara escarpment towards the Hula plateau, where it 
was believed that they would concentrate their forces in a series of fixed mountain 
defences.618 Richards correctly believed that through a well-executed pursuit he could avoid 
another ‘pitched’ battle with the Italians similar to Uaddara, and strike a swift final blow to the 
Italians forces in central Abyssinia. Richards’ Brigade, however, had a severe shortage of 
logistical supplies by this time, including much needed petrol for a further advance. The 
severe weather and appalling road conditions ever present across central East Africa 
caused serious doubts as to whether the pursuit of the Italians would at all be successful. 
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The commanding officer of the pursuing force, Capt Styles, ordered Rees to pursue the 
retreating Italians at best speed with his armoured cars.619 
 
Fig 5.2: The wild mountainous country of central Abyssinia.620 
The Allied pursuing force advanced for three days over the period 20-22 May, 
traversing some of the worst possible terrain experienced in East Africa. The armoured cars 
followed in turn by truck load upon truck load of Gold Coast troops, crisscrossed the 
Abyssinian highlands, jungles and swamps steadily closing the gap between themselves and 
their retreating Italian foe. Italian attempts to make the Allied advance as treacherous as 
possible were evident all around, as numerous causeways and bridges had been blown to 
try and stem the Allied advance. At some points even dead animals were littered across the 
roads in an attempt by the Italians to block the Allied route of advance. The South African 
armoured cars and West African soldiers quickly dealt with each obstacle that barred their 
way, and steadily closed the gap between themselves and the Italians.621 For Rees, there 
seemed to be growing signs of an Italian surrender all along their route of advance, as 
numerous weapons and ammunition were simply left at the side of the road by the retreating 
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and demoralised Italian troops. The Italian troops, believing they would stem the Allied 
advance completely, even went as far as to abandon 33 ten-ton supply trucks on a stretch of 
road flanked by a seemingly ‘impassable’ area of mud. The abandoned Italian supply column 
effectively blocked the road for nearly 500 metres, but the obstacle was soon overcome 
when the wooden bodies of the Italian trucks were used as running boards for the advancing 
column across the muddy morass. The Italians believed that the road block was so effective, 
that no further attempts at roadblocks were seen or encountered during the entire Allied 
advance the next day.622 
Having spent the preceding night in a valley below a forested escarpment, Styles’ 
pursuing force was yet to establish contact with the retreating Italian forces. Owing to a 
limited supply of fuel, Styles decided to reduce the size of the fighting column under his 
command, in order to have more fuel available for a further advance towards Uondo. By only 
including three truckloads of Gold Coast troops, with Rees’ four cars, Styles’ advance guard 
was now reduced to sixty infantrymen and seventeen armoured car personnel. During the 
early morning of 21 May, the now reduced convoy set forth once again, and slowly 
proceeded up the heights of the mist-covered forested escarpment. When the mist finally 
lifted, Styles and his fighting column found themselves in the midst of a group of Italian 
Colonial Infantry. The Italian force, numbering approximately 500, was casually enjoying 
their breakfast along the side of the road when Styles and his men surprised them.623 The 
Italian troops, not realising that their pursuers had caught up with them, continued enjoying 
their meal, oblivious to their impending fate. Realising that he enjoyed the tactical advantage 
of surprise at that very moment, Styles leapt from one of the armoured cars and casually 
informed a group of Italian officers that they, and their men, were now his prisoners. Whilst 
the Italian officers were arguing with Styles as to where all of his men were, Rees noticed a 
group of Italian cavalry officers dashing up a hill to where a group of mules, carrying 
mountain guns, were stationed. An immediate pursuit of the Italian cavalry officers was 
carried out by Rees’ remaining three armoured cars, which succeeded in reaching the guns 
before they could be assembled and brought to bear on Styles’ fighting patrol. These 
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mountain guns, it was found later on, were the same guns that obliterated the three East 
African armoured cars at Uaddara a few days before.624 
Realising that the impetus of surprise had to be maintained, Rees left one armoured 
car behind to cover the mountain guns, and with his remaining two cars raced towards the 
Italian brigade headquarters situated further up the road. The Italian officers at Brigade 
Headquarters at first believed that Rees’ armoured cars were indeed German ones which 
had come to help them from North Africa, and upon learning the contrary, a moment of 
severe pandemonium and confusion engulfed them. Leaving another armoured car to cover 
the group of Italian officers at their brigade headquarters, Rees took his remaining two cars 
and searched for the Italian brigade commander. The Italian brigade commander, a colonel, 
realising that he had been duped into surrendering to a small group of Allied soldiers, 
immediately lost his temper with his own officers.625 The Italian soldiers already started 
stacking their rifles in front of the armoured cars, as company after company marched out of 
the forested surroundings to surrender. During the action that morning, Styles’ fighting patrol 
took the surrender of 1400 Italian troops and their artillery without having to fire a single shot 
in anger. After a fresh supply of petrol was delivered from Richards’ Brigade Headquarters, 
the 1st Gold Coast Regiment arrived in strength to take over control of the Italian prisoners of 
war from Styles’ men. After having overseen the speedy refuelling of his vehicles, Styles and 
his party resumed their advance towards the Italian positions at Hula. Styles, and indeed 
Richards for that matter, had realised that if the momentum of the pursuit was kept going, 
the Italian soldiers at Hula might be surprised before they could learn of the tragedy that had 
befallen their comrades during the morning.626 
Styles’ fighting patrol reached Hula just before sunset on 21 May, where a further 
group of Italian soldiers was once more dumbstruck at the sudden appearance of the small 
party of Allied soldiers in their midst. A large number of Italian officers were milling around 
Rees’ armoured car, when Styles informed him that the Italian commander had refused to 
surrender to a junior officer such as himself. The Italian commander, furthermore, demanded 
a written order from his brigade commander before he would even consider surrendering to 
Style’s party. Unbeknown to this Italian officer, his brigade commander had already been 
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duped into surrendering earlier during the morning.627 After having casually demanded the 
unconditional Italian surrender within ten minutes, stating that if they did not oblige he would 
be forced to carry forth an attack on them with Rees’ armoured cars, Styles once more 
bluffed a large group of Italians soldiers into surrendering to his miniscule force. Ten tense 
minutes passed by before 1600 Italian troops emerged from their defences and piled their 
weapons on the ground as they surrendered en masse to Styles’ men. Within one day, 
Styles’ 60 infantrymen, and Rees’ four armoured cars, had succeeded in capturing 3000 
Italian soldiers without a single shot being fired in anger, a feat unsurpassed during the 
entire campaign.628 
During the morning of 22 May, Styles and his fighting patrol once more continued the 
advance to their final objective at Uondo. Throughout the three day advance, Rees and his 
men had continuously operated in the van of Style’s patrol, by constantly pushing the 
armoured cars to their operational limits. Whilst advancing towards Uondo, a constant 
stream of Italian troops marched along the road with white flags, indicating their intention to 
surrender to Richards’ Brigade at Hula.629 
At the edge of the Hula escarpment, at a hill called Garbachita, the road towards 
Uondo descended through a mountain pass, characterised by a series of hairpin bends, to 
where Uondo lay 3000 metres on the plains below. Despite the possibility of well-constructed 
Italian defences that might have been situated along the mountain pass, Styles ordered 
Rees to speed up his advance as best he could. When Rees’ cars rounded a hairpin bend, 
the South Africans almost collided with three Italian Autoblinda armoured cars making their 
way down the pass as well.630 These Italian armoured cars were armed with impressive anti-
tank guns, causing some trepidation for Rees and his men. In order to prevent the Italian 
armoured cars from engaging his own cars with their anti-tank guns, Rees moved his car 
forward to astride the nearest Italian car, thereby preventing the Italian crew commander 
from traversing his turret round and engaging the South African cars. The Italian crews of the 
armoured cars surrendered in due course, without having been afforded the opportunity to 
even engage the South African cars. The advance on Uondo was continued once more, and 
a West African infantry picket was left behind to guard the captured Italian armoured cars. 
                                                        
627  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File East African Campaigns. 1 SA Armd Car Coy 15 
Dec 1940 – 15 Aug 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 120-121 and Orpen, East 
Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, pp. 292-293. 
628 DOD Archives, WD, Box 214, File E.A. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
1/5/41 to 31/5/41 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 120-121 and Orpen, East Africa and 
Abyssinian Campaigns, pp. 292-293. 
629  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File East African Campaigns. 1 SA Armd Car Coy 15 
Dec 1940 – 15 Aug 1941. 
630 DOD Archives, WD, Box 214, File E.A. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
1/5/41 to 31/5/41 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 121-122. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
153 
Upon proceeding to the outskirts of Uondo, an entire company of Italian Colonial Infantry, 
supposedly acting as a rear-guard, surrendered to Rees and his crews when they made a 
sudden appearance. Uondo was, henceforth, occupied by the men of the 24th GC Bde, and 
its capture bagged a further 600 white Italian prisoners, as well as an entire colonial infantry 
battalion. 631 
Proceeding north from Uondo after its capture, Godwin-Austen’s 12th Division made 
contact with the leading elements of the Wetherall’s 11th Division who were advancing from 
the north. This historic juncture was brought about when Rees and his men met the leading 
platoon of Walker’s No. 2 ACC at a bridge five km north of Uondo on 22 May. The conquest 
of the southern and central Abyssinian highlands was completed in record time under the 
most trying of weather conditions experienced during the entire East African campaign. The 
remainder of the Italian forces still at large retreated steadily in a north-westerly direction 
towards Soddu and Gimma, where they came face to face with the men of No. 2 ACC and 
No. 1 LTC who, in conjunction with the 22nd EA Bde, would give them further battle.632  
By 24 May Richards had arrived at Hula with his headquarters, which included Klein 
and his two headquarters cars. The Shifta revolt in southern Abyssinia was now completely 
underway and, at Hula, Richards met Dejazmath Abeba, commander of the southern Shifta 
army. The Shifta revolt was difficult to control, and murdering bands of Abyssinian patriots 
roamed the countryside, ransacking, and pillaging as they pleased.633 In an attempt to 
protect the remaining Italian colonials in southern Abyssinia, and to protect their own supply 
lines now threatened by the patriotic Abyssinia forces loyal to Haille Selassie, the men of No. 
1 ACC conducted daily, long range, patrols from Dalle in order to subdue the lawless Shifta 
bands roaming the countryside.634  
The Allies succeeded in capturing Soddu mere days after the Italian front around 
Uondo collapsed, which in turn severely threatened the retreat of the 21st and 24th Italian 
Divisions towards Gimma. The cars that had been detached to Owen’s 25th EA Bde, under 
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command of De Marilac, was tasked with an assault on Maji, where after they were to 
threaten the Italians at Gimma. Torrential rains, as experienced elsewhere across southern 
Abyssinia, prevented the Allied attack on Gimma from materialising. Despite 60 percent of 
his men suffering from malaria by this time, De Marilac and his men aided the Allied efforts 
in clearing south-western Abyssinia of an Italian presence by 27 May. By the middle of June, 
further torrential rain had severely deteriorated the Allied logistical lines of communication, 
and to such an extent that Richards’ Brigade was unable to continue its advance. A lack of 
fuel, coupled with the poor state of the roads, exacerbated supply problems.635 
By 20 June, Klein was ordered to escort Richards back to the 12th Division’s 
Headquarters at Neghelli. Upon arrival there, Klein was once more ordered to escort 
Richards for his entire journey back to Nairobi. In Nairobi, Klein started to reassemble his 
scattered cars of No. 1 ACC from across the operational area in East Africa. Upon their 
regrouping in Nairobi, No. 1 ACC were to ready themselves for service in the Middle East. 
The men of No. 1 ACC arrived in Nairobi piecemeal, from across central, southern, and 
western Abyssinia. Throughout the campaign in East Africa, the men of No. 1 ACC had 
rendered an invaluable service, with Klein’s armoured cars playing a crucial part in a series 
of some of the most important actions fought during the entire campaign. By 15 August, 
Klein and his men sailed for North Africa, where they were once more employed in an 
offensive role during the campaign in the Western Desert.636 
 
The Battle Around the Seven Lakes 
The Allied advance from the north to the area where the Battle of the Lakes was fought had 
but one aim - the complete destruction of a strong, mobile, Italian column at Sciasciamana. 
Under the leadership of Gen Bertillo, an Italian column of infantry, tanks and artillery was 
poised to strike north and recapture Adama from the Allies. If Adama was recaptured by the 
Italians, the Allied lines of communications stretching northwards to Dessie and Amba Alagi 
would have been severely threatened.637 In order to prevent an Italian advance on Adama, 
Cunningham ordered Fowkes and his 22nd EA Bde to move south and clear the northern 
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lakes region of all Italian resistance. The 22nd EA Bde’s fighting strength was bolstered by 
the addition of No. 2 ACC, No. 1 LTC, the 1st and 5th SA Field Artillery Batteries of the SAA, 
the 1st NMR, the 1st FFB, and a squadron of East African armoured cars. Collectively, the 
force under Fowkes’ command was known as ‘FOWCOL’ during the campaign in the 
northern lakes region.638  
 
Fig 5.3: An armoured car crew scanning the horizon for the Italian foe.639 
Whilst planning the advance of FOWCOL from the north into the lakes region, 
Fowkes was faced with two options whilst determining his route of advance. His Brigade 
could either follow the road from Adama, through Ponte Malcasa, around the eastern shore 
of Lake Zwai, or he could send his troops down the road towards Mojjo through Bole around 
the western shore of Lake Zwai. Opting to initially use the eastern route, FOWCOL 
advanced and successfully bridged the Awash River, where after they reached the safety of 
Aselle by 9 April. Up to this stage neither the South African armoured cars, nor the light 
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tanks, had joined FOWCOL.640 When the men of No. 1 LTC were withdrawn from Diredawa 
in Somaliland during March, the tanks were ordered to move towards Addis Ababa owing to 
a petrol shortage. Indeed, owing to the extensive petrol consumption of No. 1 LTC, Clark 
struggled to find an Allied brigade willing to burden themselves with the logistical problems 
associated with the attachment of the South African tanks to their ranks. The South African 
tanks indeed consumed more petrol over the broken East African ground, which in turn 
made armoured cars mores suitable for offensive operations. By 11 April, and only after the 
personal intervention of Wetherall, did Fowkes agree to take Clark and No. 1 LTC under his 
command. By 13 April, Clark and his men effectively came under the command of the 
Fowkes’ Brigade at Aselle.641 The men of No. 2 ACC were meanwhile stationed at Nanyuki 
for a period of rest and refit after the battle at Mega, when Walker was ordered to proceed to 
British Somaliland and assist in its liberation. Having crossed 2400 km after leaving Nanyuki 
on 15 March, the men arrived too late to help liberate the territory, and eventually leaguered 
back at Harar on 3 April. The men of Capt Heard’s No. 2 Platoon was in turn ordered to join 
FOWCOL, whilst the remainder of Walker’s men moved to Hargeisa in order to help conduct 
mopping up operations in Italian Somaliland and all along the Abyssinian frontier.642 
By the middle of April FOWCOL’s advance southwards had become bogged down on 
the Mount Carra-Cacci pass just south of Bocoggi. The torrential rains, as elsewhere across 
the Allied fronts in East Africa, had severely impeded FOWCOL’s advance further south. 
Fowkes realised that his force’s forward momentum had been stemmed along the eastern 
axis of advance, and thus decided to rather try and advance along the western shore of Lake 
Zwai. The rebuilding of the bridge at Bole, allowed for the entire FOWCOL to be amassed at 
Bole by 24 April. With Walker’s armoured cars leading the advance south, FOWCOL soon 
cleared the town of Adamitullo, only for Fowkes to realise that Bertillo had withdrawn his 
mobile column towards the vicinity of Sciasciamana.643 Realising that his offensive could not 
tarry any longer, and in an effort to sustain the momentum of his advance, Fowkes 
concentrated FOWCOL at the Dadaba River on 10 May. It was Fowkes’ intention that 
FOWCOL was to strike at the Italian positions around Bubissa from their positions astride 
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642 DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
1/3/41 to 31/3/41 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car 
Company War Diary from 1/4/41 to 30/4/41 Klein 128-130 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 290, 
File B 2 SA ACC. History of 2 South African Armoured Car Company. 
643 DOD Archives, WD, Box 298, File B Ops Reports: 22 EA Inf Bde Garissa-Gimma. A Report 
on Operations of 22 (E.A.) Infantry Brigade 23 January – 21 June 1941 (Garissa – Gimma). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
the Dadaba River. The Italian positions at Bubissa were believed to be heavily defended by 
artillery and tanks. When Heard’s armoured cars reached the vicinity of the Bubissa hill 
during the late afternoon, the men noticed the tracks of Italian medium tanks in the mud. 
This was a clear indication of the fight that was yet to come.644  
 
Map 5.2: The Battle of Dadaba.645 
During the night of 10/11 May, the infantry of the 5th KAR attacked the Italian 
defences at Bubissa. While a section of armoured cars under the command of Lt C.K. Brown 
provided covering fire to the advancing infantry, Heard and his remaining cars threatened 
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the Italian left flank. During the early morning hours of 11 May, the SAA started with the 
shelling of the Italian positions around Bubissa, where after the East African infantry steadily 
advanced over the marshy ground. The terrain had once more affected the employment of 
the South African armoured cars, and Heard was forced to leave one of his vehicles behind 
after it got bogged down in the mud.646 By mid-morning, the Allied troops had taken control 
of Bubissa hill, where 80 Italian soldiers were captured during the action. The Italians 
immediately launched a counterattack with a mobile force of seven medium and three light 
tanks, which forced the East African infantrymen to retreat from their hastily occupied 
positions on Bubissa Hill. When the Italian tanks made their appearance on the battleground, 
Heard immediately ordered his armoured cars to retreat back to the safety of the SAA 
batteries, for a fear of the repetition of the calamity that befell the men of the SATC at the 
skirmish at El Sod during that February. The bogged down armoured car of Brown’s section 
was subsequently stripped of all of its arms and ammunition, and abandoned on the 
battlefield by the retreating South Africans.647  
In order to draw the Italian tank fire away from the retreating East African 
infantrymen, Brown and three of his armoured cars had in the meanwhile moved forward 
from their cover. During this move, one of Brown’s armoured cars also became bogged 
down in the muddy terrain, whilst his remaining two cars engaged three Italian medium tanks 
at close range. When a further three tanks tried to outflank his position, Brown realised that 
he had to withdraw in order to prevent the complete destruction of his armoured cars. The 
stricken car’s guns were removed before the vehicle was torched. In the ensuing confusion 
another of Brown’s cars also got bogged down. After this vehicle’s weapons were also 
removed, Brown’s armoured car, with the crews of the stricken cars also on board, reached 
the comparative safety of the SAA positions. The arrival of a heavy torrential downpour 
prevented the Allied attack on Bubissa Hill from being renewed once more. For once, it 
seemed, the arrival of rain had saved the men of the SATC from complete destruction.648 
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Fowkes had decided that a different avenue of approach for FOWCOL towards 
Sciasciamana was needed, and subsequently moved his force towards the Little Dadaba 
River, which he wished to cross en masse. Early on 11 May, Lt J.G. Potts took a patrol of 
No. 1 LTC towards the vicinity of a crossing over the Little Dadaba River, in order to 
establish the strength on the Italian flanks. When Potts’ lead tank came to within 500 metres 
of the Italian positions, it was met by a heavy artillery and anti-tank barrage. One of Potts’ 
tanks received a direct hit. The occupants of the tank, however, survived the artillery strike 
despite the fact that the light tank was completely destroyed.649 FOWCOL crossed the Little 
Dadaba on 12 and 13 May, with the fighting mainly conducted by the South African infantry 
and artillery, whilst the Italian positions were outflanked by the men of the 1st NMR. 
Individual acts of brilliance, heroism, and foolhardiness saved the day, as Capt Blamey, also 
of the 1st NMR, succeeded in capturing a group of Italian tanks. By attacking the leading 
Italian tank with a headlong charge, Blamey jumped on the tank and subsequently used his 
revolver to kill the driver. The battle of the Little Dadaba was a South African victory, which 
accounted for 800 prisoners and a number of Italian tanks and guns captured. The South 
African casualties were negligible to say the least, with a mere two killed and 12 wounded.650 
During the morning of 14 May, a patrol of No. 1 LTC occupied Sciasciamana 
unopposed. By 17 May, an infantry patrol, supported by some of Walker’s armoured cars 
occupied the Abyssinian town of Dalle. The FOWCOL offensive southward had been so 
effective that the 21st and 24th Italian Divisions were now boxed in between FOWCOL in the 
north, and the GC Bde’s advance from the south.651 FOWCOL was in the meanwhile ordered 
to attack the Italian positions at Soddu. On 17 May an advance party was ordered forward 
towards Soddu in order to locate the Italian defensive positions. The advance party of the 
1st/6th KAR was accompanied by seven armoured cars under Heard’s command. After an 
advance of 28 km, without meeting any Italian resistance, the men of the KAR made camp 
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for the night, while ‘C’ Company and Heard’s cars continued with a reconnaissance patrol to 
a point approximately 10 km east of Colito. Upon their arrival at Colito, two Italian patrols 
were sighted and by mid-afternoon these patrols attacked the East African infantrymen, who 
had continued their advance under the cover provided by Heard’s cars, until their patrol 
leader, Capt Cresswell, was killed. The Allied patrol subsequently withdrew, under the cover 
of Heard’s cars towards Dalle.652  
The main attack on Colito only commenced on 19 May, after which FOWCOL 
believed to have emerged victorious by the afternoon, only to be attacked quite 
unexpectedly by six Italian medium tanks that suddenly advanced on the Allied troops. The 
SAA was not able to come to the assistance of the East African infantrymen, nor could 
Walker’s armoured cars cross the swollen Billate River in order to counterattack. Through an 
act of sheer gallantry, Sgt N.G. Leaky of the KAR, managed to rout the six Italian medium 
tanks when he jumped on the leading tank and overcame it with his revolver. His selfless 
action, singlehandedly routed the attacking Italian tanks, and prevented serious loss of life 
on the Allied side. The Allied victory at Colito was the penultimate victory during the Battle of 
the Lakes, where after the remaining Italian forces were forced to retreat across the River 
Omo towards Bottego.653 The victory at Colito ensured the capture of approximately 800 
Italian soldiers, 10 field guns, 38 machineguns, three medium tanks, and a variety of other 
military stores. The men of a No. 1 LTC patrol, under command of Lt P.G.F. Shaw, 
subsequently entered Soddu during the afternoon of 22 May effectively capturing it. 
FOWCOL had succeeded in capturing Gens Liberati and Baccari, and their 25th and 101st 
Italian Divisions, which included 4800 officers and men, six medium tanks, four light tanks, 
100 machineguns and some of the remnants of the 21st Italian Division. The capture of 
Soddu marked the final withdrawal of Walker’s No. 2 ACC from offensive operations in East 
Africa. Heard and his detachment of armoured cars subsequently returned to Hargeisa, 
where after Walker and his men departed for service in the Middle East on 3 June.654 
                                                        
652 DOD Archives, WD, Box 290, File B 2 SA ACC. History of 2 South African Armoured Car 
Company and DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War 
Diary from 1/5/41 to 31/5/41 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 295, File A South African Artillery 
Narratives. Report on Arty Engagements – Fowcol’s Advance from Moggio to Soddu 1 May to 
22 May 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, p. 133 and Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian 
Campaigns, pp. 289-295. 
653  DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 
1/5/41 to 31/5/41 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 290, File B 2 SA ACC. History of 2 South 
African Armoured Car Company and DOD Archives, WD, Box 295, File A South African 
Artillery Narratives. Report on Arty Engagements – Fowcol’s Advance from Moggio to Soddu 
1 May to 22 May 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 133-134 and Orpen, East Africa 
and Abyssinian Campaigns, pp. 289-295. 
654 DOD Archives, WD, Box 216, File C1-12 1 SA LT Tank Coy. War Diary of No. 1 Light Tank 
Company May 1941 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File E.A. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
161 
Finale in Abyssinia – Assault on Gondar 
The penultimate phase of the Abyssinian campaign was highlighted by the Allied advance 
across the River Omo and the final push on the Italian stronghold at Gimma to the north of 
the country. The men of No. 1 LTC were the last of the original SATC units which still 
remained operational in Abyssinia, and they subsequently played a valuable part in the final 
offensives aimed at capturing Gimma. The River Omo ranked as one of the three largest 
rivers in Abyssinia, and was the last natural defensive obstacle that the retreating Italian 
forces could use to their defensive advantage. Across the Omo River in the vicinity of the 
Galla Sidamo, the Italians attempted to defend the last town they controlled – Gimma. The 
advance on Gimma was led by the 22nd EA Bde from the south and the 23rd Nigerian 
Brigade from the north, who both crossed the River Omo during the latter half of May. The 
two-pronged Allied advance occurred over extremely rugged and mountainous terrain, amid 
heavy torrential downpours, which were now familiar to the men of the East Africa Force.655 
The men of No. 1 LTC, still under Clark’s command, were attached to Fowkes’ 
Brigade for the upcoming offensive operations. The severe weather and nature of the terrain 
encountered after the crossing of the River Omo, and the fact that all bridges towards 
Gimma had been blown, meant that the South African light tanks had an extremely limited 
role to play during the entire advance of the 22nd EA Bde. During the initial advance up to the 
River Omo, Clark and his light tanks provided sterling work as they spearheaded the 
advance of the East African troops on Gimma.656 By 7 June, the men of the 5th KAR had 
managed to ford the River Omo, and through shear tenacity and brute force managed to 
ferry a section of Clark’s light tanks to the opposite bank. This section of South African tanks, 
commanded by Lt L.F. Gallimore, relentlessly pursued the retreating Italians, making 
constant harassing attacks on their rear-guard. By keeping up a constant pressure on the 
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retreating Italians, Fowkes forced the Italian surrender at Gimma on 21 June, where he and 
his Brigade managed to capture 12 Italian generals, 8 000 troops, 500 vehicles and a vast 
quantity of military stores of all types.657  
After the fall of Gimma, Allied offensives across Abyssinia were subsequently halted 
until the summer rains had ceased all together, owing to the fact that all lines of 
communication had been rendered useless by the impassable stretches of mud across large 
tracts of East Africa. The final Italian resistance in Abyssinia was situated in the north-west 
of the country around the forts of Gondar.658 It was there that Gen Nasi, by far the best 
Italian commander in East Africa, according to Klein, had decided to make his final stand. 
For the majority of the men of No. 1 LTC the successful capture of Gimma had signalled the 
end of their campaign in East Africa.659 For five officers and thirty-eight men of No. 1 LTC the 
campaign in East Africa was not yet over. During September, Clark sent a detachment of 
men to Nairobi to collect six new light tanks and deliver it to Godwin-Austen’s 12th Division’s 
Headquarters. The men were immediately ordered to form a LAD, and then proceeded at 
best speed to assist Fowkes’ newly formed East Africa Command in their attack on the 
Italian strongholds at Gondar. On 1 October, the men and machines of the LAD sailed from 
Mombasa, and disembarked at Massawa on 19 October in order to shorten their route of 
advance to the frontline in the north of Abyssinia. The LAD consisted of three light tanks, 
four Bren-gun carriers, four mechanical workshops trucks, and a couple of supply trucks. 
The ranks of the LAD were bolstered by the arrival of a further six men from No. 1 LTC, and 
the unit soon advanced on Asmara. By 22 October the men had advanced towards the 
vicinity of Dessie, where after they were ordered to the area of Amba Giyorgis, via Adigrat, 
on 27 October. The men and machines struggled across the entire 640 km advance to Amba 
Giyorgis, and henceforth only arrived at their destination by 6 November.660 
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Map 5.3: Map of Gondar Area of Operations - 1941661 
The 12th Division was amassing around the area of Amba Giyorgis by early 
November, in order to attack the Italian outpost at Kulkaber at the southern end of the 
Gondar defences. The men of the LAD were ordered to support the attack of the 25th and 
26th EA Bdes at Kulkaber and then to support the advance on Gondar. On the morning of 7 
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November the LAD under command of Capt G.A. Elliott proceeded to reconnoitre the 
countryside around Kulkaber in order to find a way through the harsh terrain. A myriad of 
dense thorny bush, rock strewn ledges, and deep gorges and valleys, severely hampered 
the advance of Elliott’s vehicles towards the ancient Portuguese forts which Nasi and his 
men occupied. After an ancient mountain track had been discovered, the light tanks and 
Bren-gun carriers of the LAD advanced 82 km over the following three days over very rough 
terrain. By 10 November Elliott’s men managed to break through onto the plains near Lake 
Tana, where they spent the following three days servicing their vehicles after having 
established a leaguer halfway between Azezo and Kulkaber.662 
On 21 November, the men of the 1st/6th KAR took the offensive and attacked the 
western flank of the Kulkaber defences, supported throughout by the LAD. The Italian 
soldiers, resolute in defending their last bastion, put up such a stiff defence, that they 
managed to inflict serious casualties on the Allied attackers. During the early morning Lt D.T. 
Kenyon and his light tanks successfully captured their first position around Kulkaber, and 
henceforth supported the East African infantrymen in their attack on Ferkaber Hill. The 
Italians on Ferkaber Hill were quickly silenced by the arrival of Kenyon’s light tanks, which 
lent ample support in the form of suppressive and covering fire to the East African 
infantrymen. The South African light tanks, refuelled by the headquarter elements of the 
KAR, advanced once more, and by acting independently, they were able to support a 
number of infantry attacks across their front. The four Bren-gun carriers had meanwhile 
supported an infantry attack which had developed around the south-western flank of 
Kulkaber. The Bren-gun carriers, divided into two sections under Elliott and Lt LA. Larson, 
were used to support the main attack and to clear the area of isolated Italian machinegun 
positions. After having successfully helped to clear the first objective, Elliott’s vehicles 
continued to advance up the main valley towards Kulkaber bringing down a steady 
machinegun fire on the Italian defensive positions as they did. The final attack on the Italian 
positions at Kulkaber was conducted by the infantrymen of the 2nd/4th KAR, who succeeded 
in capturing in excess of 1500 Italian soldiers, whom the men of the LAD guarded 
overnight.663 
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The men of the LAD continued to carry out further reconnaissance duties between 22 
and 24 November, where after they successfully supported the infantry attack on Tada Hill, 
which was taken without a shot being fired. During the penultimate battles fought around 
Gondar, the men of the LAD distinguished themselves in conducting extremely valuable 
reconnaissance work. The Bren-gun carriers especially bore the brunt of the work for they 
were able to operate in country where the South African light tanks and East African 
armoured cars were unable to operate. On 25 November the final battles for Gondar 
commenced with the advance of the 25th EA Bde on the Italian defensive positions around 
the Azezo forts. The men of the LAD were restricted by the terrain during the day’s fighting, 
but nevertheless spearheaded the final advance of ‘C’ Company 2nd/4th KAR on Azezo. 
Having successfully occupied the Italian positions at Azezo the road to Gondar was now 
open, and Nasi subsequently surrendered with the remainder of his forces during the 
afternoon of 27 November.664 The war in East Africa had finally been concluded, and by 26 
December the men of the LAD departed from Massawa for further service in the Middle 
East. The history of the SATC in East Africa had finally been concluded.665 
 
Conclusion 
From March 1941 through to that November, the men of the SATC continued to play an 
active operational role in the final battles fought for control over Abyssinia, and in fact East 
Africa. The sterling assistance provided by the men of No. 1 ACC, No. 2 ACC, No. 1 LTC, 
and the LAD to Cunningham’s East Africa Force is seldom acknowledged in the South 
African secondary sources. Despite the encroaching rainy season, the vast distances 
covered, the often impassable muddy terrain, and the at times stiff Italian resistance, the 
men of the SATC rendered valuable assistance throughout the Allied operations. The AFV’s 
of the SATC fought gallant actions during the infantry battles around Soroppa, Giarso, 
Magado, Uaddara, the Battle of the Lakes, and during the final offensive push on Gondar, 
continuously lending support to the infantry attacks whilst employed in a variety of offensive, 
defensive and supporting roles. The South African armoured cars were for the most part in 
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the van of the advancing Allied forces in East Africa, and as such captured a number of 
Italian soldiers and much military equipment during the latter half of 1941. The collapse of 
the Italian military foothold in central Abyssinia by mid-1941 ensured that the South African 
armour was deployed more boldly across the operational theatre for the want of any effective 
Italian resistance. It was only once the broken terrain of Gondar was reached, in conjunction 
with the stout resistance offered by Nasi, that the South African armour was tested for a final 
time against their Italian foe in Abyssinia. The perception that the battle for Abyssinia was 
effectively over when Addis Ababa was occupied, and the Duke of Aosta surrendered at 
Amba Alagi, is obviously false. 
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Chapter 6 – Ingenuity, Improvisation and Innovation: A Strategic and Operational 
Analysis of the Employment of South African Armour in East Africa 1940-1941 
 
“The training in bush warfare that the UDF carried out, for several years before 
the War, saw us through.”666 
 
Introduction 
The tactical employment and operational successes of the South African armour during the 
East African campaign is discussed in the preceding chapters. In order to successfully 
evaluate the role which the South African armour played in East Africa, it is necessary to 
reflect on the unique strategic and operational employment of this arm throughout the 
campaign. This, however, cannot be achieved without understanding the unique South 
African doctrinal approach to armour operations, which was shaped by interwar British 
theoretical models on armoured warfare and South African thinking on irregular warfare. The 
UDF did not rely on British doctrine alone, and instead developed its own unique doctrine on 
the operational employment of armour. In order to reach a crucial understanding of the 
strategic and operational employment of South African armour in East Africa, this chapter 
has two aims. First, to discuss the unique South African strategic and initial doctrinal 
approach to armour operations that underpinned the tactical employment of this arm in East 
Africa. The second is to reflect on the employment of South African armoured units 
throughout the campaign, through an analysis of the actual deployment and factors that 
inhibited this.667 
 
An Analysis of the South Africa Armour Doctrine  
The most sought after factors on the battlefield throughout the ages have been firepower, 
protection and mobility. The right combination of these factors, in no uncertainty, confirmed a 
distinct advantage upon any military force on the battlefield throughout the twentieth century. 
The combination of all three underpinned the doctrinal models which governed the battlefield 
application of armoured forces throughout the First and Second World Wars. The tactical 
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and operational employment, and indeed successes, of armoured forces was also directly 
related to the ‘right’ combination of firepower, protection and mobility of the AFV. Whilst 
armour doctrine governed the operational deployment of armoured forces, the doctrine more 
often than not was ageing, irrelevant, and failed to take the operational exigencies of warfare 
into account. Only through a continued process of innovation, largely determined by the 
notion of the ‘first battle’ of the said forces, were defence forces able to develop an AFV 
which effectively harnessed the three core principles of firepower, protection and mobility. 
The offensive potential of armoured forces, when harnessed correctly, promised a decisive 
action on the battlefield which had the potential to change the outcome of battles, campaigns 
and indeed wars.668 
 On the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War the UDF did not have its own 
unique armour doctrine that governed the tactical and operational application of armour, let 
alone in a situation of war. The little institutional knowledge within the UDF on the operational 
employment of armour was centred in a few individuals with limited operational experience 
emanating from interwar operational deployments in South-West Africa, Brink’s visit to 
various European militaries during 1937, and from British Army manuals dealing with the 
theoretical employment of that specific arm.669 The rapid developments that occurred within 
the UDF following the South African declaration of war on 6 September 1939, was no more 
evident than within the ranks of the SATC. With a clear indication within the UDF of where 
future operational deployments in case of war would take place, the SATC was in essence 
established along the organisational lines of a self-contained unit, with deployment in Africa 
in mind.670 The interwar training policies of the UDF were geared at preparing South African 
soldiers for deployment in Africa, and more notably East Africa from 1935 onwards owing to 
the growing Italian threat.671 
 A UDF manual on the operational and tactical employment of armoured cars in the 
event of war appeared in 1940. This manual was, however, a direct adaptation of the 1931 
War Office manual covering the same topic, which meant that the UDF doctrine for armour 
                                                        
668  T. Clancy, Armoured Warfare: A Guided Tour of an Armoured Cavalry Regiment (London: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1996), pp. xxi-xxii and D.J. Fletcher, ‘The Origins of Armour’ in J.P. 
Harris & F.H. Toase (eds.), Armoured Warfare (London: B.T. Batsford, 1990) p. 5. 
669  Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 1-4 and DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted 
Pamphlet Collection – UDF Armoured Car Training Manual 1940 (Volume I & II). 
670  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File 1 SA Div Operations General. Lessons of the E.A, 
Campaign – Armd Cars, undated. 
671  DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in connection with 
matters discussed with the Minister by Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha at and 
Collyer at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 1936 and DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 498, 
File 898. Ethiopia – 30 October 1935 and DOD Archives, CGS, Group 2, Box 519, File 
944/11a. Memorandum in connection with matters discussed with the Minister by Major-
General Brink and Brigadiers Botha at and Collyer at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 1936. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
169 
operations essentially remained British in nature, and was antiquated. Nevertheless a careful 
analysis of this manual gives valuable insights as to the perceived characteristics which the 
UDF attached to the armoured units of the SATC prior to their operational deployment in 
East Africa. The greater mobility that armour provided the UDF in offensive operations meant 
that operational and tactical surprise could be affected over vast distances.672 This mobility 
was, however, hamstrung by the limited ability of the South African armour to deploy across 
the East African countryside, unlike Europe which had a vast road network, extensive open 
fields, and gas pumps in even the smallest locale. The East African theatre was exactly the 
opposite. This meant that the practical application of both armoured cars and tanks was 
indeed confined to roads and level country, a fact that limited their deployment during 
offensive operations in the African battle space.673 Armour had two more distinct advantages, 
the protection which the car provided to its crew, and the ability of the vehicles to deploy fire 
whilst on the move. As such, prior to its deployment to East Africa, armour was essentially 
seen as a weapon of opportunity and of promise to the UDF.674 
 In terms of the organisation and the command of the SATC units in the UDF, the 
primary unit remained organised at company level. The armoured car company essentially 
consisted of a headquarters and three platoons, with each platoon formed around the 
nucleus of a headquarters car and three sections. Each section comprised of two cars. The 
platoon was the smallest advisable armour component to deploy operationally, as mutual 
support remained key to armour’s offensive capability, a fact that could not be guaranteed at 
a lower tactical level. Constant maintenance and repair inhibited the operational deployment 
of AFV for extended periods away from their base depots. The mobility which armour 
promised the UDF was indeed limited by the cumbersome maintenance and supply 
organisation which was needed to keep the SATC armoured units deployed operationally. 
This specific supply and maintenance organisation was, however, situated in the rear 
echelons, and the SATC units deployed operationally relied on their attached light aid 
detachments for immediate battlefield repairs.675 In terms of the employment of armour, the 
War Office manual, and by extension that of the UDF, explicitly stated that “[a]rmoured car 
units will normally form part of the larger mounted and armoured formations, but owing to 
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their characteristics they will often be employed independently rather than in close 
cooperation with other arms”. As such, theoretically, the UDF would deploy armoured cars in 
three specific roles, moulded around the core concepts of reconnaissance, defence and 
attack.676 
 The South African doctrine, which governed the employment of armoured units during 
the East African campaign, changed from the moment that the SATC units arrived in the 
operational area. Klein categorically states that, “[e]ither the South African armoured car 
commanders in Abyssinia had not studied their tactics, or they had set out to write a new 
handbook of their own. From the very first clash with the Italian forces, they revised the 
accepted tactical use of their vehicles in the light of what they were called upon to meet, and 
took on the role they were obliged to undertake throughout the campaign – that of infantry 
tanks”.677 According to the notion of “first battles”, as advocated by Heller and Stofft, the 
process which Klein so vividly describes, is a natural process which all militaries undergo 
during periods of war. The accepted doctrine for the employment and employment of a 
specific arm, in this case South African armour, was only tested during its first operational 
deployment, and indeed during the first battles fought in East Africa during the latter half of 
1940 and early stages of 1941.678 
 Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millet argue that militaries that undergo successful 
reorganisation often follow patterns of innovation underlined by rapid changes in the fields of 
doctrine, organisation, technology, weapon systems development, and sometimes 
personnel.679 The doctrinal framework which underpins military innovation includes the rigid 
assessment of the various arms of services’ commitment to redeveloping ageing doctrine, 
and adapting this to future warfare trends. The ability to which armed forces, including of 
course the UDF, were adept at learning and drawing lessons from their First World War 
experiences, remained paramount through the innovation cycle during the interwar period.680 
Other concerns raised, and included in the doctrinal framework, centred on the way in which 
doctrine was developed to curtail the potential threat of political and military opponents, and 
the extent to which these doctrinal principles were instilled during training.681 The military 
innovation which thus occurred in the sphere of the South African armour doctrine, and 
indeed the greater military organisation of the UDF, was guided by a number of factors. The 
nature of the South African armour operations, the character of the Italian military forces and 
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irregular levies, and the geography, climate and communications of the East African theatre 
of operations, combined to directly influence the way in which the UDF implemented, 
innovated, and adapted the ageing doctrine that governed the employment of armour during 
offensive operations.682 A single document, drafted by the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Staff 
Officer, Lt Col G.K. Roodt683, of the 1st SA Div in September 1941, gives some indication as 
to the armour doctrine available to the SATC prior to deployment to East Africa, and how a 
particularly South African armour doctrine developed during the campaign. Roodt also 
highlighted the lessons learned by the UDF in terms of armoured warfare throughout the 
campaign in East Africa, and is thus an extremely valuable tool for any analysis of the 
campaign.684 
 
An Analysis of the SATC Deployment in East Africa  
The single biggest obstacle to the effective operational employment of the SATC units was 
the unique, ever-changing, topographical characteristics of the East African theatre of 
operations. In fact, the rough nature of the terrain severely hampered the effective 
employment of the SATC units throughout the campaign and would lead to the novel South 
African employment of armour in East Africa. The tactical and operational advantages and 
disadvantages offered by the terrain favoured the Italian defence. The cover and 
concealment offered by the undulated bush country, which covered the approach marches to 
Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, conferred a distinct advantage upon the Italian defenders 
during the early stages of the campaign. It was realised that small groups of Italian soldiers 
were able to ambush South African soldiers at a moment’s notice, launch surprise attacks, 
and then disappear once more into the bush.685 The South African soldiers were aware of 
this, owing to similar tactics used against the UDF in East Africa during the First World War. 
The prior operational deployments of the South African forces in similar terrain as that of 
1914-1918, naturally allowed the UDF to adapt their tactics in the light of previous “lessons” , 
as so vividly described by Collyer in his East African treatise of 1939.686 
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Fig 6.1: The East African campaign was decided by the access to water.687 
 The nature of the terrain meant that UDF infantry units were at a disadvantage from 
the outset of offensive operations, owing to the defensive advantage which the bush country 
offered to the Italian defenders, and the fact that the surprise attacks could be launched 
against the infantry at any time. The terrain directly influenced the operational employment of 
the South African armour, owing to the fact that the protection which the cars and tanks 
afforded its crews, meant that the AFV’s could be used to advance across country in the 
relative safety of their vehicles, when compared to an infantry advance on foot. The nature of 
the terrain ensured that armoured operations received primacy during the Allied offensives, 
due to the resourcefulness shown by the South African armour during offensive 
deployments. The ever changing East African terrain at times favoured the employment of 
armour, whilst at other times it severely inhibited it.688 
                                                        
687  Ditsong National Museum of Military History, Reference Library, Photographic Collection. EA 
405 – After the battle of El Yibo, South African engineers visit the wells that have been 
captured and clean and purify them. 
688  DOD Archives, WD, Box 283, File 1 SA Div Operations General. Lessons of the E.A, 
Campaign – Armd Cars, undated. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
173 
 The operational employment of armour was furthermore determined by the availability 
and quality of the road network, including bridges and other transport infrastructure, 
throughout the East African theatre of operations. If, and where, roads existed, they were 
often mined or earmarked as possible ambush points, and thus largely avoided during 
operational employment.689 The South African tanks were at a disadvantage because their 
tracks were unable to take the strain of the terrain. Coupled with long approach marches 
during the Allied offensive, and their constant need for mechanical maintenance and high 
fuel consumption, the tanks were only operationally efficient for certain periods of the 
campaign, depending on the terrain and road surfaces encountered. The South African 
AFV’s were often called upon to break roads through the bush, clearing a road for the 
accompanying infantry during the advance on the Italian defences, with prime examples of 
this during the attack on El Wak and the 1st SA Div’s advance into Abyssinia (see chapters 3 
and 4).690  
 The cross-country performance and bush-breaking capacity of armour was directly 
linked to the terrain which changed from large tracts of waterless deserts along the fringe of 
Italian East Africa, to the mountain bastions and lakes of central and northern Abyssinia. 
During the opening salvos of the campaign, the terrain allowed for the varied employment of 
cars and tanks owing to the ability of the armour to easily deploy across country and along 
available dirt tracks and roads. With few undulations in the terrain, the armour was used in 
wide flanking movements throughout the bush, often allowing the South African commander 
to effect an envelopment. As the campaign progressed from the vast open spaces of Italian 
Somaliland and the NFD, to the mountainous highlands of central and northern Abyssinia, 
the UDF deployment of armour was limited by the extreme changes in terrain. The 
disappearance of the ever present open flanks encountered during the opening phases of 
the campaign in Italian Somaliland and the NFD, ensured that the armour remained confined 
to roads. Whilst the mobility of the South African armour was indeed increased whilst 
deployed on good road surfaces, the AFV lost their freedom of action, and the ability to 
undertake wide flanking movements in order to gain tactical and operational surprise. During 
the final battles fought around Dessie, Amba Alagi, and Gondar, the South African armoured 
deployments were confined to the roads and dirt tracks, and thus their mobility, and indeed 
fighting effectiveness, was lost (see chapters 3 and 5).691 
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Graph 1: The East African Operational Weather Gap.692 
 The East African climate furthermore influenced the operational effectiveness and 
employment of the South African armour. The single biggest factor determining the pace of 
the Allied operations in East Africa, as Cunningham acknowledged whilst planning his 
offensive of 1940, was the East African rainy season. The availability of water, and access to 
it, was a definite determinant in the separate South African, and Allied, offensives.693 Whilst 
attempting to secure the access to all the available water sources in the regions bordering 
the Italian East Africa Empire, especially in the NFD, armour was often used as a means to 
secure distant wells, and provide protection until occupation troops arrived. The availability of 
water naturally correlated with the arrival of the East African rainy season. It was known that 
the arrival of the big rains would turn the operational theatre into a muddy quagmire 
favouring infantry operations, and hence all available offensives were launched before the 
commencement of the big rains (Graph 1). When the rains did arrive during April 1941, the 
South African armour’s mobility was severely limited, and the offensive operations essentially 
halted for a few months.694 The Italians realised the weather gauge was to their advantage 
from the outset, but failed to take South African determination and bushcraft into account. 
Despite the muddy quagmires across large tracts of the operational area after the arrival of 
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the big rains in March 1941, the South African armour continued to deploy successfully 
despite their limited operability across this type of terrain. It was indeed the determination, 
and often individual ingenuity of armour commanders such as Walker, Gwilliam, and Klein, 
that ensured that the South African AFV remained deployed despite torrential rains.695 
 
Fig 6.2: The SAEC ensured that the Allied offensive kept moving forward.696 
 The character of the Italian armies in East Africa furthermore played a definite role 
in the ever-changing deployment of the South African armour, as the Allied campaign 
unfolded throughout 1940-1941. The bold use of armour as part of the Allied spearhead in 
East Africa was a direct consequence of the waning fighting ability of the Italian soldiers, as 
experienced by the UDF during the initial offensive operations.697 There were a number of 
salient points for the Allies to consider prior to their launching an offensive in East Africa 
during the latter half of 1940: the Italian armies were numerical superior, the fighting quality 
of the Italian soldiers ranged from good to indifferent, and the Italian armoured units and 
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artillery were seldom employed in large numbers.698 The fighting quality of the Italian soldiers 
was, however, first effectively judged during the battles of El Wak, Turbi Hills and El Yibo, 
after the so-called South African ‘first battles’ in East Africa. The poor fighting ability of the 
Italian colonial and irregular soldiers was immediately realised after these first battles, and 
the novel employment of the South African armour during the latter offensive operations 
bears testament to this. As the campaign unfolded, it became evident that the Italian soldiers 
were demoralised, and that they realised the futility of trying to defend their tactical positions 
against an armoured attack.699 
 The general lethargic fighting character of the Italian soldier in East Africa ensured 
that, when a South African armoured attack came, the accompanying infantry was often only 
left with mopping up operations around the objectives. The growing boldness in terms of the 
South African employment of armour annoyed Cunningham to such an extent that in a letter 
to Brink he stated that it should be primarily used as an infantry support weapon, and “that 
their fire power...during this period was protective and not offensive”.700 Brink in return 
scribbled a note on Cunningham’s letter to the extent “...but my object in using the Armoured 
Cars boldly was to put the fear of God into the enemy’s native troops and in this we were 
most successful.”701 The fact that most of the Banda turned at the first sight of the armoured 
cars, or after a brief skirmish, was ample evidence of the effect Brink sought. One can 
perhaps even argue that the South African armoured cars were used as a psychological 
weapon, and that the fear that they instilled in the Italian colonial and irregular levies were 
paramount to its operational successes.702 Brink employed his armoured in exactly that 
fashion during the attacks on El Yibo, El Sardu, Gorai, El Gumu, Hobok, and Banno (see 
chapter 4). Pienaar deployed his armour in a similar fashion at El Wak, the battles around the 
Juba River, and throughout the rest of the advance towards Addis Ababa (see chapter 3).703 
 The UDF armour doctrine was thus only a guide to offensive employment, and Brink 
allowed his officers to employ the armour across a wide spectrum of duties. This included 
using the armoured cars as tanks, owing to the latter’s’ inability to deploy across extremely 
rough terrain. Roodt stated explicitly that the armoured cars were employed as infantry tanks, 
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owing to the car’s ability to act as mobile machinegun nests when called upon. The ability of 
the cars to travers rough terrain, outflank the Italian positions, and deliver a high volume of 
accurate fire at a moment’s notice, all combined to ensure that the South African 
employment of armour during offensive operations became more brash, bold, and at times, 
foolhardy.704 
Type 
Weight 
(Tons) 
Armour 
(mm) 
Armament Horsepower 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Range 
(km) 
Crew 
Italian 
L.3/35 
(Light 
Tank) 
3.2 13.5 
2 X 8 mm 
Breda Model 
38 
Machineguns 
43 41.6 120 2 
Italian 
M.II/39 
(Medium 
Tank) 
11 30 
1 X 37mm 
Anti-Tank 
Gun 
2 X 8 mm 
Breda Model 
38 
Machineguns 
105 32 200 3 
Italian   
AB 40 
(Armoured 
Car) 
6.48 18 
3 X 8 mm 
Breda Model 
38 
Machineguns 
80 73.6 400 4 
South 
African 
Recce Car 
Mk II 
7.37 6 
2 X 7.62mm 
Vickers 
Machineguns 
95 80 320 4 
Table 2: Comparison of Armoured Forces deployed in East Africa 1940-1941.705 
 The boldness underpinning the South African deployment of armour in East Africa, 
however, also suffered from a number of flaws. Despite the fact that Italian armoured units 
were only deployed in relatively small numbers during this phase of the East African 
                                                        
704  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File NAREP EA 2 – East African Campaign S.A.T.C. in 
Action. How Abyssinia Was Won – Lt Col G.K. Roodt. 
705  B.T. White, Tanks and Other Armoured Fighting Vehicles of World War II (London: Perage 
Books, 1983), pp. 154-157 and Marshall, Marmon Herrington, pp. 129-131. 
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campaign, they remained an ever present threat to the men of the SATC. The most 
prominent of these was the arrival of 15 Italian tanks at El Sod on 15 February 1941, during 
which the Italian armoured attack ensured that the South Africans troops were thrown into a 
state of confusion.706 Birkby describes the Italian light tanks, Carri Veloci (CV-3), as sub-
standard, with twin 8mm machineguns and rather thin armour. Yet, Klein’s version of the 
events never makes any mention of the inferiority of the Italian tanks, only of the 
ferociousness of the attack.707 During the Allied attack at the Dadaba River, and more 
specifically Bubissa Hill, the untimely arrival of a force of ten Italian tanks on the battlefield 
ensured that the SATC units were ordered to withdraw amidst great confusion. Yet, one must 
acknowledge that this was not a flaw on the side of the South African armour, but rather a 
reflection on the adversarial nature of the war in East Africa in 1940-1941.708 
 Whilst an effective weapon when attacking infantry, the South African armoured units 
avoided an armoured engagement with their Italian counterparts. This was most likely in 
recognition of the fact that the Italian armour’s armament was superior (Table 2). In fact, 
each time the Italian armoured cars and tanks appeared on the battlefield, the South African 
armour was forced to withdraw, or suffered some losses.709 At times, however, it proved that 
individual infantrymen, like Blamey and Leaky, could ensure the surrender of a number of 
tanks through a headlong assault710, whilst the South African armoured cars simply retreated. 
In hindsight, the provision of an effective anti-tank gun on the armoured cars would have 
enabled them to successfully engage any Italian armour in East Africa. Whilst the AFV’s 
always enjoyed relative success when encountering Banda, the Italian Colonial Infantry and 
Blackshirts put up stout resistance on a number of occasions. By effectively using their 
natural surroundings to their advantage, the Italians even managed to destroy an East 
African armoured car with direct fire from an artillery mountain gun at Uaddara.711 By May 
1941, the majority of the Italian resistance in Abyssinia had been crushed and the soldiers’ 
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morale broken, as was evident by Rees’ unprecedented advance from Uaddara towards 
Uondo with his armoured cars. The bold employment of the South African armour during the 
latter half of the Allied campaign in East Africa was often in contrast to the acceptable 
doctrine covering the deployment of the South African AFV’s, but as such became a hallmark 
of the changing South African doctrine. This is best illustrated by Roodt in his analysis of the 
employment of the South African armour in East Africa, when he states that “The tactical 
employment of the Armd C in East Africa by the UDF provides a very good lesson on the 
adaption of a particular arm to the peculiar conditions obtaining in a particular theatre of 
war”.712 
 
Fig 6.3: SAAF aircraft supporting the South African advance into Abyssinia.713 
                                                        
712  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 120, File NAREP EA 2 – East African Campaign S.A.T.C. in 
Action. How Abyssinia Was Won – Lt Col G.K. Roodt. 
713  Ditsong National Museum of Military History, Reference Library, Photographic Collection. EA 
422 - Different views of the epic journey accomplished by the S.A. troops on their advance 
into Abyssinia. Confronted by a barrier of dense, seemingly impenetrable bush, the convoys 
tore their way through, led by armoured cars, an achievement described by the brigade 
commander as “an epic never before accomplished in the history of modern war”. 
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 The nature of the South African armour operations in East Africa during 1940-1941, 
and the accepted doctrine which underpinned it, essentially revolved around the three core 
armour concepts of mobility, firepower, and protection.714 In terms of mobility, the SATC 
units afforded Cunningham the ability to rapidly deploy his forces across the East African 
theatre of operations. It was indeed the mobility of the South African and Allied armour, 
which ensured that vital objectives, such as the conquest of Italian Somaliland and the 
capture of Addis Ababa, occurred before the arrival of the East African rainy season. The 
mobility of the armour units was, however, directly related to the logistical and mechanical 
ability of the South African and Allied divisions to keep them operational. The fact that the 
South African tanks remained a constant logistical nightmare to any brigade to which they 
were attached (in terms of the provision of fuel and spares) remains crucial to explaining the 
limited deployment of the tanks throughout the East African campaign.715 
 The South African armoured car companies were organised as self-contained units, 
similar to the former Boer commandos. The fact that the armoured car companies were self-
contained entities meant that they could exist independently away from their next higher 
headquarters for a considerable time. This necessitated that each SATC unit needed its own 
repair organisation that could be deployed with it under operational circumstances. The 
ability of the attached mechanical sections to effect adequate repairs on the battlefield 
directly ensured that the speed of the Allied operational advance in East Africa never 
faltered, and that very few AFV’s had to be abandoned on the battlefield. The AFV’s that 
could not be repaired in the field were sent to the workshops in the rear areas. This seldom 
happened during the campaign in East Africa. The mobility of the SATC units was, 
furthermore, influenced by the ability of reinforcement personnel to replace battlefield 
causalities quickly. As such, the SATC units had a ten percent reserve of personnel that 
journeyed with each unit’s B-Echelon vehicles. Owing to the vast operational distances 
concerned, and the speed of the Allied offensive operations, the allocation of reserves to the 
SATC units in this manner remained key to the South Africa ability to maintain it operational 
mobility.716 
 In terms of firepower, the SATC units were pivotal in breaching the gap which 
existed between the artillery and the infantry. Essentially acting as mobile machinegun posts 
                                                        
714  R. De Vries, Mobiele Oorlogvoering: ‘n Perspektief vir Suider Afrika (Menlopark: Harman 
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Operations General. Lessons of the E.A, Campaign – Armd Cars, undated. 
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throughout the campaign, the South African armour was paramount in delivering the required 
volumes of firepower necessary for infantry attacks to proceed mostly unopposed. The ability 
of the South African armour to be integrated with the artillery and infantry during an offensive 
operation ensured that the tactical and operational benefits of such an approach was soon 
realised. The only critique against the South African AFV’s firepower during the campaign in 
East Africa was the absence of an anti-tank weapon on the vehicles. At one stage, Roodt 
argued that all armoured car companies should have their own compliment of attached 
infantry. It was believed that the nature and successes of South African offensive operations, 
coupled with the additional firepower provided by the infantry, would prove pivotal in securing 
a rapid victory in East Africa.717 
 In terms of protection, the South Africana armour units withstood a number of 
concentrated attacks without losing too many vehicles. The armoured protection which the 
AFV offered to its crews was paramount to the limited number of casualties recorded by the 
SATC units whilst deployed operationally. The inferior quality of the Italian ammunition, and 
the offensive employment of Italian weapons, however, also explains the strengths of the 
South African AFV. When considering that a sustained Italian hand grenade attack during the 
action fought around the Turbi Hills failed to destroy a South African AFV, the inferior quality 
of the Italian weapons seems paramount. The protection provided by the AFV to its crews, 
was, however, sufficient for deployment purposes in the operational circumstance of the East 
African theatre owing to the limited offensive use of Italian armour and artillery.718 
 The logistical and maintenance organisation needed to ensure the continuous 
operation of the SATC units in East Africa was organised along a three echelon system. The 
fighting efficiency of the South African armour throughout the campaign was directly linked to 
its support organisation. The maintenance organisation which supported the South African 
armoured operations throughout the period had to ensure the constant supply of ammunition, 
petrol, oil, grease, spare parts, supplies and stores, to the armoured cars and tanks in the 
field under operational circumstances. As such, the three echelon system was adopted by 
the South African Service Corps to transport logistics from the railhead, to the formation 
maintenance and supply companies at divisional and brigade level, where after supplies 
were sent to the first line units on the frontlines. This system ensured that the South African 
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armour received their logistical supplies when needed, save for a few times when the 
weather and terrain intervened and stemmed the flow thereof.719 
 The mechanical maintenance of the South African armoured units was also carried 
in terms of first line, second line, and line of communication repairs. The first line repairs 
were normally carried out by the light aid detachments that were detached from the divisional 
ordnance workshops to the forward operating armoured units of the SATC. The light aid 
detachments could, however, only effect the most basic repairs in the field, where after more 
specialised repairs were carried out in the rear areas at the divisional ordnance workshops. 
Whilst vehicles were undergoing second line repairs they were not removed from the 
strength of their respective units, but returned to the units as soon as possible. In only the 
most severe cases were vehicles completely withdrawn and sent to the rear lines of 
communication for major repairs or overhauling.720 
 
Conclusion 
By September 1939 the UDF did not have its own unique armour doctrine nor was there real 
institutional knowledge within the UDF on the offensive application of armoured forces. The 
available knowledge on armoured operations was borrowed from British War Office manuals 
dating from the early 1930’s. These did not address the peculiarities of an African 
deployment. The SATC units were organised along the lines of self-contained units, 
reminiscent of the Boer commandos that could deliver the required mobility, firepower and 
protection to the UDF during operational deployment. The training of the SATC units prior to 
deployment to East Africa was based on the ageing British doctrine, which could only be 
tested against Africa exigencies once the South African armoured crews received their first 
baptism of fire at the hand of the Italian military forces in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. 
 The SATC’s first operational deployments highlighted a number of positive and 
negative aspects regarding the tactical and operational employment of armoured forces. It 
was indeed these ‘first battles’ that shaped the South African armoured deployments for the 
remainder of the Allied campaign in East African until the fall of Gondar in late 1941, and the 
subsequent deployment in North Africa and Madagascar. These subsequent deployments, 
however, differed considerably to that of East Africa, as the nature of the enemy and his 
fighting efficiency had changed considerably. For the most part, the South African armour 
                                                        
719  DOD Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Collection – UDF Armoured Car 
Training Manual 1940 (Volume I & II). 
720  Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
183 
employment in East Africa was marked by highly mobile combined operations often aimed at 
turning the Italian flanks and delivering a crucial blow. It was indeed the mobility and 
firepower which the SATC units provided to the Allied forces throughout the East African 
campaign that ensured the rapid operational gains throughout 1941 which led to the eventual 
capitulation of all Italian power across East Africa.  
 There were, however, certain difficulties experienced by the SATC units throughout 
their employment in East Africa. These difficulties directly influenced the tactical and 
operational successes of the South African armour, and indeed all UDF units, in East Africa 
during 1940-1941. First, the rapid Allied and South African operational advances throughout 
1941 placed a severe burden on the logistical lines of communication. In terms of South 
African armour, the availability of fuel and motor spares directly influenced the successful 
employment of armour. The South African armoured cars were indeed less of a hindrance to 
the brigade commanders in terms of logistical requirements and mechanical maintenance, 
than when compared to the tanks. Second, the limited availability of wireless sets within the 
AFV meant that the South African armour was prevented from deploying beyond visible 
distance of the next AFV. This severely limited the operational deployment and thus 
negatively affected the mobility of the SATC units. Last, the limited availability, and dubious 
quality, of accurate topographical maps to the SATC throughout the campaign, meant that 
the South African armoured deployments were immediately made more difficult. The limited 
visibility afforded by the South African AFV’s to its crews, meant that the reliance maps for 
accurate navigation remained even more paramount. The SATC units were often called upon 
to navigate, and establish the best possible routes of advance for the South African fighting 
columns, when the reliance on poor maps hampered operational deployments.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to investigate and discuss the role and employment of the South 
African armour during the Allied campaign fought in East Africa 1940-1941. The nature, 
organisation, and the doctrine that underpinned the South African armour deployments to this 
theatre of operations were evaluated and the process of innovation that occurred within the 
UDF throughout the interwar period in terms of armoured warfare was discussed. A fresh 
perspective on the East African campaign, and the important role which the South African 
armoured forces played in the first victorious Allied campaign of the Second World War was 
provided. The thesis focussed primarily on the role which the South African armoured cars 
and tanks played in the campaign, and did not discuss the role of the motorcycle units which 
also formed part of the SATC. 
 During the interwar years the UDF underwent a number of critical changes that 
directly impacted on the organisation, training and equipment of the South African military. 
These changes left the UDF in a perilous state at the outbreak of the Second World War. 
The influence of individuals upon the South African defence policy and the process of 
military innovation throughout this period, more notably Pirow, Collyer and Van Ryneveld, 
ensured that UDF remained focused upon fighting limited wars in Africa. The need for 
modernisation and mechanisation, especially in terms of creating modern armoured forces, 
proceeded extremely slowly as was the case elsewhere. Despite visits by UDF officers to 
Europe during the latter half of the 1930s, the UDF failed to grasp the possibilities that 
greater mobility might confer. This was further exacerbated by financial and procurement 
difficulties which crippled the UDF. The outbreak of the Second World War in September 
1939, served as the impetus for growth and modernisation in the UDF. Smuts proceeded to 
rectify the inadequacies of the ‘Pirowian’ defence force from September 1939, and 
immediately ensured that new armoured cars were procured. As the war clouds gathered 
over East Africa, the South African threat perception naturally changed and the UDF became 
certain of its next deployment. The formation of the ACF armoured car and light tank 
companies during 1940, signalled the start of the UDF preparations for deployment to East 
Africa. The misnomer associated with the South African defence thinking throughout the 
interwar period, ensured that the UDF was quite unprepared to go to war by September 
1939.  
 During 1940 the UDF underwent a number of changes which would ensure that the 
South African military would be able to deploy to East Africa by June 1940. The peacetime 
defence force of the interwar period, which had only been partly mobilised since the outbreak 
of hostilities in September 1939, gradually made way for a professional military force that 
was developing as South Africa mobilised for war. By December 1940, the UDF could 
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account for an entire Division deployed in East Africa. The Italian declaration of war on 10 
June 1940, and the subsequent capture of territory in British Somaliland and areas of the 
NFD, forced Britain to secure the safety of British East Africa. Smuts had promised troops to 
the British government for service in East Africa during 1939.  The British only accepted his 
proposal during 1940 as a matter of imperial defence. The UDF troops steadily arrived in 
Kenya throughout the latter half of 1940, with the SATC units soon taking up positions in the 
operational area. By December 1940 the SATC had four operational companies in the field 
consisting of armoured cars and light tanks. During August and October 1940, two of the 
SATC units were employed in a combat situation for the first time and learnt valuable lessons 
regarding their offensive abilities and the character of their Italian foe. The Italian armies in 
East Africa were a real threat, despite certain misgivings about their quality and fighting 
efficiency. Cunningham’s offensive operations for East Africa were influenced by Smuts, 
Churchill, Eden and Wavell. By the end of December 1940, the South African armoured units 
were deployed to their various operational areas on the borders of Abyssinia and Italian 
Somaliland, ready to take the fight to the Italians during the start of 1941. 
 The Allied offensive launched through Italian Somaliland towards southern Abyssinia, 
started with the successful attack on El Wak on 16 December 1940. The South African 
armoured cars and tanks played a vital part in securing the first Allied victory of the 
campaign, which served as the “curtain raiser” for an all-out offensive operation in East 
Africa. The fighting character of the Italian soldier was immediately found wanting, and during 
the remainder of the campaign, save for a few actions, their fighting efficiency dwindled. After 
crossing into Italian Somaliland during early 1941, the Allied victories at the Juba River 
ensured that Addis Ababa was captured within a mere two months after the start of 
Cunningham’s offensive. As for the role played by the South African armoured cars and light 
tanks in the offensive, the men of No. 3 ACC and No. 1 LTC provided sterling support to the 
Allied advance. The South African armour enabled Allied commanders to deploy their forces 
across a wide front with the knowledge that the armour, acting as mobile machinegun posts, 
would always be at the ready to support any infantry attack. The South African armour was 
mainly deployed in an aggressive reconnaissance role, and by the time southern Abyssinia’s 
defences were breached, the roles performed by SATC units’ roles were constrained by the 
changing nature of the terrain. The mountainous regions of southern Abyssinia prevented the 
successful employment of the South African armour, and by the time the Duke of Aosta 
surrendered at Amba Alagi the armoured cars were no longer deployed in an offensive role. 
 The 1st SA Div’s campaign in southern Abyssinia was indeed South Africa’s first 
external operational deployment since the end First World War. The South African operations 
were a resounding success from the moment that 1st SA Div commenced offensive 
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operations in January 1941. The men of the SATC, which accompanied Brink’s Division, 
provided sterling work. The South African armoured cars acted as the vanguard of the 1st SA 
Div from the NFD through to the Mega battles, and were constantly deployed in a number of 
roles which ranged from reconnaissance, to attack and defensive duties. The ability of the 
South African armour to deploy across rugged terrain ensured that the Italian flanks 
remained under constant threat throughout 1941. Through the combination of the firepower 
and mobility which the armoured cars provided, Brink had indeed managed to turn the tide of 
the war in East Africa by February 1941. By the time Mega had been captured, and the East 
African rainy season had arrived, the deployment capabilities of the SATC unit under Brink 
became severely limited. By April 1941, the 1st SA Div had embarked for service in North 
Africa, where they were to be tested against what might be best termed - German military 
might. However, the military successes won by Brink in Abyssinia in no way effectively 
prepared his men for service in North Africa, for the South African notion of armoured 
warfare was no match for that of Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Corps.  
 The campaign in Abyssinia was not yet complete, for the Italian presence in central 
and northern Abyssinia still had to be subjugated. Elements of the SATC were once more 
deployed in the final Allied offensives in East Africa. The role which the South African armour 
played in these final battles is not always appreciated, yet the men of No. 1 ACC, No. 2 
ACC, No. 1 LTC, and the LAD provided sterling armoured assistance to Cunningham’s East 
Africa Force throughout March to November 1941. Despite the encroaching rainy season, 
the vast distances covered, the often impassable muddy terrain, and at times stiff Italian 
resistance, the men of the SATC rendered valuable assistance during the Allied operations 
in central and northern Abyssinia. The AFV’s of the SATC provided offensive support to the 
Allied attacks at Soroppa, Giarso, Magado, Uaddara, the Battle of the Lakes, and at the final 
offensive push on Gondar, continuously lending support to the infantry attacks whilst 
employed in a variety of offensive, defensive and supporting roles. The SATC units were 
often deployed contrary to accepted doctrine, yet it was the immediate battlefield exigencies 
which governed their offensive employment – not doctrine.  
 The South African employment of armour throughout the Allied campaign in East 
Africa was determined by a deliberate policy shaped by the operational experiences gained 
by the UDF in East Africa during the First World War. The South African armour doctrine, 
although taken directly from an out-dated War Office manual of the 1930’s, shaped the 
operational deployment of the SATC units during the campaign. The novel UDF employment 
of armour in East Africa, and the tactical and operational roles which it assumed throughout 
the campaign, was not the product of the accidental discovery of a new use for an old arm. 
The South African armour doctrine written during 1940, and more notably the chapter dealing 
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with ‘Operations against Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Enemies’, reinforces the argument 
that theoretical considerations underpinned the operational employment of the SATC in East 
Africa. Klein states that the armoured car commanders indeed rewrote the handbook on the 
offensive employment of South African armour. This is not true. What made the employment 
of the South African armour so unique was the freedom of action which the SATC officers 
enjoyed in testing the theoretical doctrine whilst deployed operationally in the East African 
theatre. The accepted UDF armour doctrine still formed the backbone of the SATC 
deployments throughout 1940-1941, but it was the ability of the UDF to test it under 
operational circumstances, and then mould it into something new and better, which proved 
pivotal to the operational successes which were achieved. It was the continuous cycle of 
innovation in terms of the employment of armour, which allowed the SATC to mould their 
doctrine as the East African campaign unfolded. This drew the ire of at least some British 
commanders. 
 According to Roodt, the small number of South African casualties suffered during the 
campaign in East Africa against a numerically stronger Italian army can be attributed directly 
to the effective employment of the SATC units. Whilst the South African armour did play a 
decisive part during the mainstay of the Allied victories during the entire East African 
campaign, these victories were seldom achieved in isolation, save for a few engagements 
which resulted in individual successes for the SATC units. It was indeed the unity of action 
evident between all of the UDF arms of services deployed in East Africa, which ensured the 
successes of the South African operations. The South African soldiers’ natural skills in 
buschraft, coupled with the fact that the UDF’s interwar policy was deliberately geared to 
preparing the military for offensive deployment in East Africa, ensured that the South African 
soldiers were indeed prepared for the ensuing operational deployments of 1940-1941. The 
pre-war focus on bush warfare, as advocated by Pirow, was thus not entirely wrong, though 
misconstrued when evaluated against the drive towards mechanisation in lieu of armoured 
warfare in Germany and Russia during the same period. The South African soldiers natural 
ability to be deployed as a mounted infantrymen, borrowed from the days of the 
Commando’s, meant that armoured warfare as advocated by the UDF during the campaign 
in East Africa, suited the South African soldier’s ability to grasp the promise of mobility, 
firepower, and protection, which armour promised.  
 The overall performance of the South African armoured units was commendable. 
Their continued resilience, willingness, and ability to remain operational under the harsh East 
African circumstances, bears a testament to the fighting character of the South African 
soldiers alike. The importance that was attached to the offensive roles that the SATC 
assumed throughout the campaign ensured that South African AFV took part in some of the 
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first, and final, engagements of the conquest of Italian East Africa. The SATC successes in 
East Africa were, however, an anomaly when considering that the lessons learned from this 
campaign, in terms of armoured warfare, did not sufficiently prepare the UDF for deployment 
to the North African theatre during 1941. Those lessons would in fact have to be re-learned in 
the Western Desert as the nature of the enemy and his weapons and tactics had changed 
considerably. The SATC successes in East Africa should not be measured against the South 
African deployments to North Africa, Madagascar, and Italy, and should be evaluated within 
the context of the East African theatre of 1940-1941. The nature of the South African armour 
operations, the character of the Italian military forces, and the topography, climate and 
communications of the East African theatre of operations, combined to directly influence the 
way in which the UDF implemented, innovated, and adapted the ageing doctrine which 
governed the employment of armour during offensive operations. 
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Africa Command 12th July 1941 – 8th January 1943. 
 Box 298, File A HQ EAF: Ops Orders. East Africa Force Operation Instruction No. 44 
– 6 Sept 1941. 
 Box 298, File B HQ EAF: Extracts from Appendices to War Diaries. Intelligence 
Report 204 A.I.L. Section. Operations against Gondar Area Nov 19th – 26th 1941. 
 Box 298, File B HQ EAF: Extracts from Appendices to War Diaries. Extracts from 
Appendix to E.A. Force War Diary for July 1941. 
 Box 298, File B Ops Record. Operational Record June 1941. 
 Box 298, File B HQ EAF: Extracts from Appendices to War Diaries. Extracts from 
Appendix to E.A. Force War Diary for July 1941. 
 Box 298, File B Ops Reports: 22 EA Inf Bde Garissa-Gimma. A Report on Operations 
of 22 (E.A.) Infantry Brigade 23 January – 21 June 1941 (Garissa – Gimma). 
 Box 299, File – East Africa Force Campaign. Report on the Operations of  11th 
(African Division between February 14th and April 6th 1941, during which the Division 
advanced from the River Tana area to Addis Ababa – 13 July 1941. Supplementary 
Report – Period: 6 April 1941 – 11 July 1941. 
 Box 299, File – 11 AFR DIV. Refugees and Patriots. 
 Box 299, File – East Africa Force. Report on Operations from 1st November 1940 to 
5th April 1941. 
 Box 299, File – East Africa Force. Report on Operations from 1st November 1940 to 
5th April 1941. 
 Box 299, File – 11 AFR DIV. Lesson from Ops – 19 June 1941. 
 Box 299, File – 11 AFR DIV Duplicate Material. PINCOL Period 1/4/41 – 1/5/41. 
 Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV. Report on Operations at El Wak – 30 December 1940. 
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 Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. 12th African Division Report on 
the Operations in Italian Somaliland Feb – Mar 1941. 
 Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 
(A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Notes on Conference prior to launch of Juba 
Ops – Jan 1941. 
 Box 300, File –11 AFR DIV Report on Operations 14 Feb – 6 Apr 1941. Report on 
the Operations of 11th (African Division between February 14th and April 6th 1941, 
during which the Division advanced from the River Tana area to Addis Ababa – 13 
July 1941. 
 Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 
(A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Letter from Godwin-Austen to Pienaar 6 
February 1941. 
 Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 
(A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Intelligence Summary No. 20 – 19 February 
1941. 
 Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 
(A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Note on Gobwen and Giumbo 14 February 
1941. 
 Box 300, File –11 AFR DIV Report on Operations 14 Feb – 6 Apr 1941. 12 (A) Div 
Intelligence Summary – 3 March 1941. 
 Box 300, File B 12 AFR DIV. 12th (African) Division Report on Operations in 
Abyssinia March to June 1941. 
 
6.2 SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES (PRETORIA) 
 Field Marshal J.C. Smuts Collection. Vol. 29, Item No.7. Telegram referred by High 
Commissioner, Cape Town to Prime Minister regarding situation in Middle East – 22 
March 1940. 
 Field Marshal J.C. Smuts Collection. Vol. 29, Item No.7. Secretary of State, London, 
to High Commissioner, Pretoria: regarding notification of regarding Union 
Government to inform the Italian Government that they are at war – 13 June 1940. 
 
6.3. UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN LIBRARIES 
 BC 294 (Patrick Duncan Papers), A 27.1. Memorandum 4 September 1939 – re 
South Africa and the question of neutrality 
 BC 294 (Patrick Duncan Papers), A 27.1. Memorandum 6 September 1939 – re 
South Africa and the declaration of war with Germany. 
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